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FROM SLAVE TO FREE LABOR 
IN THE BRAZILIAN SUGAR INDUSTRY:
THE POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF SOCIAL CONTROL 
AND CRIME IN PERNAMBUCO, 1850-1922
by
MARTHA KNISELY HUGGINS 
University of New Hampshire, May, 1981
Between 1850 and the turn of the century the dominant 
mode of production in the export sector of Pernambuco shifted 
from a slave to quasi-capitalist. The labor transition was 
not an evolutionary outgrowth of existing work relations - 
it involved struggle and coercion. The first part of this 
research shows how repressive social control effected the 
transformation of the mode of production; the second part looks 
at a product of the transformation, crime.
This research focuses on a frequently overlooked type of 
human intervention, social control, as a source of structural 
change, and places the motives of modernizing elites in a less 
positive light than usual. The study shows that an elite used 
repressive social control to transform the mode of production 
from slave to quasi-capitalist in order to secure the material
xii
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supports for their structure of domination. But, of course, 
social control effected the labor transition through inter­
mediate social processes. In the case under review, and 
theoretically in other contexts, as well, the criminalization 
of behavior fueled structural change. The data on social con­
trol are police and presidential reports, arrest statistics, 
penal codes, legislative records, and the newspaper editorials 
covering a seventy-two year period.
The second part of this study examines crime as a product 
of social structure and of structural change. There is a 
tradition in sociology from Durlcheim (1964) to Park (1924) 
suggesting a relationship between social disorganization and 
certain forms of deviance. In a different vein, radical crim­
inologists such as Quinney (1977) and Spitzer (1975) argue that 
it is particular forms of social organization, rather than 
disorganization which produce crime.
This study used elements of both social organization and 
disorganization theory to understand the relationship between 
social structure, social change, and crime in Pernambuco. The 
data lent support to both approaches. Deep-cutting disruptive 
changes were associated with increases in crime in both the 
slave/feudal and quasi-capitalist modes of production. At 
the same time, crime increased with the increases in socially- 
structured inequality.
xiii
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CHAPTER. I
THE CONSTRUCTION AND PRODUCTION OF CRIME 
Labor Supply, Social Control, and Crime
Historians have argued that the transition from slave 
to free labor in the Northeastern  province of Pernambuco, 
Brazil, was accomplished by voluntary methods of recruitment 
(Reis, n.d.a.) and that the shift to free labor was "nearly 
painless" (Eisenberg, 1974: 213), due to "the pressure of 
large numbers of free, rural poor" (Levine, 1979: Ch. 2)
"in a position of complete dependence and submissio n vis-a- 
vis the sugar planters" (Reis, n . d . a . : 3 2 ) . At the same time, 
two of these historians (Eisenberg, 1974; Rise, n.d.a.) give 
evidence that there was a great deal of planter dissa ti sfac­
tion with the quantity and quality of free labor, as in­
dicated by proposals for forced labor laws and for stricter 
enforcement of the vagrancy statutes.
The contradiction b et we en claims that the transition 
to free labor passed without a struggle and reports that 
formal action was taken against unwilling free workers 
provided the focus for this research on social control and 
crime. If Pernambucan officials, in fact, helped landowners 
obtain a work force by cr imi nal izing marginality, then the 
labor transition was not as conflict free as some historians 
have suggested. Furthermore, if two ingredients for social 
conflict, namely social control and crime, can be shown to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2have played a critical role in structural change, then we will 
be able to ca st new light on some traditional research p r o b ­
lems in economic development and social change.
Pernambuco
Pernambuco is one of eight states in the Brazilian 
Northeast. Its capital, Recife, is located on the Atlantic 
in the zona da m a t a , or forest zone. Beyond the zona da mata 
lies the scrub land of the a g r e s t e ; the arid backlands of 
the sertao are farthest from the sea.
In 1977, the bus ride from Recife to the backlands city 
of cabroba’ took twelve hours; in 1880, during the last decade 
of the Brazilian Empire, it took one stalwart traveler on 
horseback twelve days (Gardner, 1975:88). From the coastal 
capital to the Pernambucan interior the traveler passes 
through three distinct cultural and geographical regions.
The journey begins in the humid coastal forest zone.
Rick dark soil and an abundance of rainfall (up to eighty 
inches annually) made the coast ideal for sugar cultivation, 
a fact discovered by the early Portuguese colonizers. By 
the mid-sixteenth century, within fifty years after the dis­
covery of Brazil, the zona da mata had become a highly 
prosperous sugar-producing region. Until the abolition of 
slavery in 1888, Europeans grew rich while their slaves died 
producing sugar for the international market.
Between the zona da mata and the backlands lies the
✓
agreste. By the time the bus reaches Caruaru, its capital, 
prickly pear cactus, scrub brush, and livestock have
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
replaced the lush green sugar cane and fruit trees of the
littoral. During the colonial and Imperial periods, ranches
of the agreste supplied coastal sugar plantations with animals
to power the mills and to pack processed sugar to Recife.
The agreste was directly linked to the international market
in the nineteenth century only during the United States Civil
War, when cotton was grown in the humid mo unt ai n oases (b r e j o s )
that dot this semi-arid region of transition.
v
The stark sertao appears a few hours after the bus 
leaves Caruaru; now the fruit trees, grasses, and sugar cane 
of the zona da mata have completely disappeared. Here, dry 
soil and scrub brush dominate; even the prickly pear must 
be cultivated.
ty/
Towns like Ouricuri in the driest part of the sertao 
get less than twenty-four inches of rainfall annually; other 
sections of the backlands get up to forty inches a year, but 
poor soil and intense evaporation render much of the pr e c i p i ­
tation useless. Drought is a constant threat to life in the
A/ K)
Sertao. The people m  towns along the River Sao Francisco--
/ /  AS
Cabrobo, Oroco, Belem do ■:Sao Francisco -r can turn .to the 
river when there is no rain. Those further away -- Exu, 
Salgueiro, the lowlands of Ouricuri -- must depend entirely 
on the rains to water their meagre crops and livestock.
Research Problem
For over three centuries, Pernambucan planters used 
slave labor to produce sugar for an international market. 
Between 1850 and the early twentieth century, the dominant
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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4mode of production changed from slave-based to quasi­
capitalist. Changes in the international political economy 
initiated this transformation, while new forms of social 
control, directed at criminalizing free marginals, carried 
it forward.
Such social controls were an outgrowth of planters' 
dwindling resources, produced  by shifts in international trade. 
Social controls, in turn, checked the resource drain and p r o ­
moted further structural transformations. By emphasizing 
the pivotal role of social control in social change, this 
research sheds new light on theories of control, change, and 
crime.
Much of the literature on social control has focused 
on how social regulation emerges from and reflects the social 
structure. Chambliss (1964) showed how shifts in labor supply 
and demand influenced the focus and content of vagrancy laws 
in Europe and North America. Reusche and Kirkhheim er (1968) 
related forms of penal puni shment to such ma ter ial factors 
as labor supply and the degree of impoverishment of the p o p u ­
lation .
This study does not take issue with such linkages. In 
fact, it strengthens the support for them by showing how 
changes in material conditions influenced the amount and type 
of social control in nineteenth and twentieth century Pernambuco. 
However, the model goes beyond that relationship to theorize 
also about the influence of social control on social structures.
The research focus at that point shifts from social control 
as the product of socio-structural change to examining it as
1-in »n. I
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5the promoter of further structural modifications.
Several theoretical currents in the literature on social 
change assign causal importance to endogenous sources of change 
The most frequently discussed internal origins of change are 
evolution (Spencer, 1897) and contradictions (Mao, 1967; Marx, 
1906). Much of the sociological literature on evolutionary 
change argues that structures evolve in a linear fashion by 
an incremental combination of emerging systemic elements.
On the other hand, when endogenous change is powered by c o n ­
tradictions, the clash of systemically generated opposites 
produces qualitative structural modifications.
Another dominant current in the social change litera ­
ture examines the role of del ibera te ly-indu ce d structural 
change. Direct action for social change has taken many forms: 
revolution (Cuba in 1959)? wide-reaching democratic  reforms 
(Mexican land distribution, 1934-1940); technological mod e r n i ­
zation of the productive system (Brazilian Northeast after 
1890). Part of the literature on human intervention examines 
the role of political and economic elites in social change.
An off-shoot of that literature emphasizes the positive role 
of elites in modernization (Eisenstadt, 1973; W. Moore, 1963).
Without denying any of these sources of change, this 
study focuses on a frequently overlooked type of human inter­
vention, namely social control, as a source of social change; 
this tends to show the less attractive side of modernizing 
elites. These aspects of social change are easily overlooked 
since there is a tendency to view change as positive, and 
hence tc disregard situations where it is retrogressive and/or
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
accomplished by coercive means.
Par ticularly neglected by most mod ern ization analyses 
is structural chance initiated to regulate a potentially 
disruptive situation, where one set of changes is used to 
block another. For example, a dominant class may restructure 
some aspects of the social system in order to forestall other 
changes that could threaten its privileged position.
This study shows how an elite used repressive social 
control to transform the social structure in order to assure 
material support for its continued dominance. But, of course, 
social control effected social change through intermediate 
social processes. In the case under review, the c r im in ali­
zation of behavior fueled structural change.
Consequently, crime is central to this research. But 
besides questioning why some people commit crime, this study 
asks why some behaviors are defined and regulated as criminal. 
These questions can be answered, in part, by information about 
the distribution and supply of material resources. Such an 
approach to social control and crime is suggested by theories 
of crime that focus on the political economy.
It is a central postulate of political -econom y theory 
that the economic system is not politically neutral. The: 
system of production and distribution is structured by class 
relations of power and domination (Balkan, 1980). The p o l i ­
tics of production and distribution, in turn, shape crime 
and social control.
The principal contemporary sociologists to focus on
_
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the political-economy of crime and social contrcl are Richard 
Quinney (1977), Steven Spitzer (1975), and Ian Taylor e_t al_ 
(1973). These authors explain crime and control in terms of 
the political economy of capitalism. Richard Quinney's model 
of crime has two elements, crime control and criminality.
Both phenomena are shaped by the politics of pro duction and 
distribution under capitalism.
Steven Spitzer (1975) argues that crime and deviance 
are products of capitalist relations of production. A c c o r d ­
ing to Spitzer, populations become eligible for management 
as deviant when they "disturb, hinder or call into question" 
some aspect of the social relations of production. Capitalist 
relations of production generate social threats; state force 
regulates the threats for the capitalist class.
Ian Taylor e_t al_ (1973) follow Quinney and Spitzer in 
viewing social control as central to a theory of crime, and 
in seeing crime and control as products of the political 
economy. Taylor £_t a_l argues that contemporary crime must 
be understood in terms of the "rapidly changing economic and 
political imperatives that underpin on the one hand the 'lay 
ideologies' and on the other 'crusades' and initiatives that 
emerge p e r i o d i c a l l y ...to control the amount and level of 
deviance..." (Taylor et_ a l , 19 7 3) .
These arguements are a first step in theory building, 
but of course, they raise many questions. How do patterns 
of production and distribution shape crime and control in 
non-capitalist political-econo mies? Do fluctuations in
nn.—
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8material conditions influence crime and social control?
What is the role of crime and control in social change: do
they merely reflect material changes, or can they also promote
structural change? Through a case study of social control
and crime in Pernambuco, a traditional society in transforma-
tion from a slave to quasi-capitalist mode of production, I 
intend to examine these questions. Figure A presents the 
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9Material resources (V-l) include any physical goods or 
economic services such as land, labor, and their products, 
that contribute to the production of wealth^. In Pernambuco, 
the critical resources were those that provided the material 
basis for planter power. Much of the sugar barons' power was 
founded on their exclusive ownership of the land which others 
needed for survival. The planters' power also derived from 
their positions as directors of economic production and owners 
of the instruments of production (slaves, tools, mills). A d ­
ditional support for planter power was the profit from sugar 
sales .
Changes in the international political economy eroded 
two of the planters' resources: labor supply and wealth from
sugar sales. The 1850 forced cessation of the African slave 
trade had an immediate impact on the supply of labor; decli n­
ing world sugar prices more slowly eroded planters' profits.
To complicate matters, the slave population began to shrink 
just when agricultural output was being expanded to compensate
Strictly speaking, resources (V-l) are a part of the 
mode of production (V-5), since they make up part of the 
forces of production. The forces of production include 
natural resources and, in the case of a slave system, the 
labor force. Page 14 gives the rationale for according separate 
variable status to some aspects of the mode of production 
while also using the mode of production (which includes those 
elements) as a separate variable.
t.-*
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for the drop in world sugar prices.
Until mi lling technology had been improved, the only 
way to increase output was by larger labor inputs; the shortage 
of slaves necessitated pulling free labor into the export sector. 
However, free people were unwilling, and to a certain extent 
unable, to ta k e  the slaves' place. Consequently, as the number 
of slaves decreased, the severity of social control over 






two objectives and promoted the transfo rmation through two 
different processes. Only one of the objectives was clearly 
articulated by the planters and the government: mill m o d e r n i ­
zation would reduce production costs and keep planters co mp e t i ­
tive in an international market where prices were falling."*
*"The Model presents the relationsh ip between material 
resources and social control as V - l — > V - 2 .
2
Technological change is def ined as a modi fi cation of the 
physical instruments of production.
3
The model suggests the pr ofit maximization motive by 
the arrow from material resources to technology (V-l—^ V - 3 ) , 
and from technology to the mode of production (V-3->»V-5).
owners could not afford to have free workers engaged in
that did not produce wealth.*"
As labor problems deepened and world sugar prices
tinued to fall, the Imperial and Provincial Governments
ttoduced a subsidy program aimed at salvaging the sugar
2
by up-grading technology. Changes in Technology (V-3)
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Planters and politicians only indirectly acknowledged that 
mill modernization would facilitate social control over 
labor: modern mills would reduce the labor dependence of
the sugar industry and give employers greater control over 
the work force.1-
Capital improvements facilitated the transformation 
by modernizing the forces of prod uctio n and by restructur in g 
the social relations between free workers and employers. Of 
course, state-initiated repression against unwilling workers 
offered one solution to labor shortages; technology provided 
another, for mill modernization threw people out of work and 
increased the labor surplus. The population surplus became 
a resource landowners could use to restructure relations b e ­
tween themselves and wage laborers; workers' compet ition for 
jobs drove wages down, making  it possible to secure labor at 
the lowest possible pay. Moreover, mechanization contributed 
to the e m p l o y e r s ' control over the more troublesome w o r k e r s : 
those who wouldn't play by the planter's rules were replaced
by machines, or by more willing workers displaced from other
2
jobs by technology.
Unemployment was beneficial to landowners, but costly 
for w o r k e r s : crime was a by-product of w o r k e r s ' economic
displacement. However, technological modernization did not
^The labor regulation motive is suggested by the 
arrow between V - 2 — *-V-3 and V - 3 — ^ V- 5.
2
The labor regulation function of mechanization c a u ­
tions against a simplistic interpretation of Marx: changes
in technology do not necessarily lead to mod ifications in 
work organization; technology can be used to deliberately 
restructure work relations.
is*
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take hold until the end of the nineteenth century. Yet, the 
quantity and quality of labor had become an issue soon after 
the cessation of the African slave, trade. As the slave force 
declined, state-initiated repression against labor emerged 
as the official response to labor shortages.
A "moral passage" was the legitimating mechanism in 
this drive against free marginals. Moral passages are public 
crusades in which one-tolerated behavior is redefined as d e v i ­
ant and treated as criminal (Gusfield, 1976).^ There were 
two stages in Pernambuco's moral passage that transformed 
marginality into a criminal status. Each stage was charac­
terized by different strategies of social control against 
l a b o r .
The general model hypothesizes that social control (V-2)
restructured the social relations of production through two
2 3
processes, socialization and coercive labor recruitment.
Note that the designation "moral passage" suggests 
nothing more than a period of moral redefinition, and says 
nothing about morality per s e . In fact, the nineteenth- 
century "moral passage" in Pernambuco could be regarded as 
immoral from some ethical perspectives, since it involved 
developing an ideological justification for increased repres­
sion against the free population.
2
The socialization function of 'So.caal control is in­
dicated by the arrows V-2->>V- 5 .
3
The labor recruitment function is indicated by the 
arrows V-2-> V-4-**V-5 .
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The preparation of free Pernambucans for work in the export 
sector functioned throughout the moral passage, although 
socialization became more repressive as abolition approached. 
Coercive labor recruitment was an aspect of the more pervasive 
worker socialization process, but was most prevalent during 
the latter stages of the moral passage.
The model uses moral pas sage crime (V-4) to symbolize 
coercive labor recruitment. When increases in crime are the 
result of a moral passage, new boundaries between acceptable 
and unacceptable behavior have been created; the actual in ci­
dence of problematic be havior remains relati vely stable, 
Pernambuco's nineteenth century moral passage provided the 
ideological justification for treating idlers as criminals; 
moral passage crime gave planters a mech anism  for overcoming 
labor shortages.
However the tra nsformation involved far more than just 
the shift from slave to free labor. Tr ans for ming modes of 
production involves structural chances in production t e c h n i ­
ques and in the social relations between workers and n o n ­
workers. A closer examination of the internal organization 
of several modes of pr oduction suggests the scope of the 
Pernambucan transformation.
Modes of Production
The mode of production (V-5) is the most critical v a r i ­
able in this study from the standpoint of the number of other 
factors that interact with it. A mode of production describes 
the way people organize (or are o r g a n i z e d )for survival. It
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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includes the forces of production (machines, instruments,
tools, raw materials, natural resources, human beings^-) and
the social relations between producers and those who own and
2
control the production process. In short, a mode of p r o d u c ­
tion includes the objects of work, the instruments of p r o d u c ­
tion, and the form of work organization.
Hindess and Hirst (1975) distinguish one mode of p r o d u c ­
tion from another according to the means of appropriating
3 . 4
surplus l a b o r . In a feudal mode of produc tio n one group
secures surplus labor from another by means of feudal rent;
in the slave mode of production, a property relationship makes
^That is,the knowledge, talents, aspirations and needs 
of human beings (Hurley, 1976).
2
Two aspects of the mode of production, technology and 
material resources, are accorded separate variable status in 
the model(V-l, V-3), as well as being included in variable 
five (mode of p r o d u c t i o n ) . By holding these elements of the 
mode of production apart from the articulated combination of 
elements, while also including them in it, the model can show 
how changes in specific aspects of the mode of production 
facilitate its transformation.
3
Surplus labor refers to the work a laborer performs 
beyond that required for survival.
4
In Hindess and Hirst's (1975: Chapter 5) cl ass ifica ­
tion, the feudal mode of production is a particul ar set of 
relationships between workers and non-workers that can exist 
in socio-historical contexts outside the feudal period (1975: 
242). Other schol a r s ,(D e e r e , 1975; Denisoff and Wahrman, 1979) 
have classified work org anization in certain parts of Latin 
America feudal. When Furtado (1973; 54-55) claims that the 
work structure of Brazil's sugar economy was not feudal, he 
utilizes a different set of differentiating criteria than this 
author. For a discussion of the points of disagreement, see 
Chapter II, footnote 1, Page 40.
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some humans an alienable possession of others; in the capi tal­
ist mode of production, one group secures surplus labor from 
another through wages (Hindess and Hirst, 1975).
Although societies may contain more than one mode of 
production, one mode is usually dominant. Before the ab o l i ­
tion of slavery, Pernambuco's rural zone had two separate but 
interrelated labor systems. A slave mode of produc tio n was 
dominant and produced the cash crop, while a feudal mode.^ 
supplied non-profit-produc ing support services to the export 
sector. A capitalist mode of production began to emerge as 
abolition approached, but during the post-ab oli tion years 
covered by this analysis, feudal work arrangements and wage- 
labor shared the labor force. When the research period ends 
in 1922, neither a feudal nor capitalist mode of production
2is dominant/ and the mode of production is q u a s i - c a p i t a l i s t .
This analysis must incorporate both the dominant and 
secondary modes of production to understand the complications 
of the transition. The change in labor organization involved 
more than exchanging free labor for slave; it consisted of 
turning feudally organized free producers who were marginal 
to the export sector into wag e-earning cash-crop producers. 
This chapter and the next show why that transformation was 
much more complicated than changing the few slaves who were 
still active in the export sector at abolition into wage 
laborers within the same sector. An examination of the 
internal organization of the three modes of production will
^The feudal mode of production includes several diff­
erent labor forms. These are discussed in Chapter II.
2
Feudal work relations mixed with wage labor.
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illustrate the role of resource owne rs hip and distri bu tion 
in social control. That discussio n will also hig hlight  some 
of the main stumbling blocks in transformation of the mode 
of production.
Slave Mode of Produc tion
The slave mode of production consists of a social d i v i ­
sion of labor between workers and their owners, tied together 
by private proper ty r e l a t i o n s (Hindess and Hirst, 1975: C h a p ­
ter 3). The labor force is the p r o p e r t y  of one group, and 
has no legal or social existence apart from its owners. B e ­
sides owning the labor force, the ma ster possesses all other 
elements necessary for pro duction (tools, land, etc.), and 
receives the entire product of the slave's labor.
Since slaves are legally se par ated from the means of 
maintaining themselves, their master must provide upkeep.
From the master's perspective, upkeep is a necessary cost of 
production because slaves, like other forms of property, must 
be maintained to retain their value as capital.^ One way the 
slave mode of produ ction is distingu ishable from the feudal 
and capitalist is in the master's provision of subsistence
"'’This should not suggest that masters maintained their 
human capital in mint condition; high slave mortal ity rates 
belie that. It merely suggests that slave owners had to 
maintain slaves at the minimal level or this labor force would 
not be able to work for the owners.




r e s o u r c e s  t o  t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e . ^  B e c a u s e  s u b s i s t e n c e  i s  p r o ­
v i d e d ,  w o r k e r s  a r e  u n d e r  n o  s t r u c t u r a l  c o m p u l s i o n  t o  e x c h a n g e
2
labor for survival commodities.
Feudal Mode of Production
The feudal mode of production takes its form from the 
structure of land holding. Preconditions include c o n c e n t r a ­
tion of landownership in a few hands, and a division of estate 
land into a portion that benefits the landowner ("demense 
land") and a section that provides subsistence for the worker  
("rented land") (Hindess and Hirst, 1975: 238-239). Feudal 
rent, paid as in-kind gifts, cash, or work on demense land, 
secures the worker's right to self-support on rented land.
Feudal relations of production are characterized by the 
worker's effective po sse ssion  of the means of subsistence 
(rented land and rud imentary tools) but lack of juridical 
ownership over those means. The non -pro du cing class owns the 
means of survival; ownership is the basis for appropriation 
of surplus labor from feudal tenants. The concentration of
In nineteenth century Brazilian slavery some of the 
human chattel were permit ted to plant crops for self-support 
and dispose of the surplus for cash. Some urban slaves hired 
out by their masters had to use some of their earnings to 
maintain themselves. These cases do not invalidate Hindess 
and Hirst's arguement; they merely suggest that some slaves 
at some times are under more of a subsistence compulsion 
than others. Field slaves during peak production periods are 
under a weaker subsistence compulsion than urban slaves for 
hire .
2
This does not deny that slaves faced very real forms 
of physical coercion, it merely suggests the lack of an i n ­
direct form of structural coercion to labor.
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land ownership acts as a powerful mechanism of social control: 
the free producer is under a structural compulsion to labor 
or produce in-kind gifts for the landlord in order to use the 
land necessary for survival.
Capitalist Mode of Production
Under capitalist relations of production, the worker 
is divorced from ownership or even de_ facto possession of 
the means of production and subsistence. The worker's labor 
power'*' has become a commodity bought and sold on the open 
market; wages paid to workers secure their surplus labor.
As in the slave and feudal modes of production, key resources 
are held by one segment of the population. In contrast to 
these other systems, the segment without effective owners hip 
survives by selling its labor power and using earnings to 
purchase commodities from the owning class.
In the capitalist and feudal modes of production, the 
owners of key resources do not provide subsistence to the 
work force, and the workers lack direct control (ownership) 
of the means of survival. This structural configuration forces 
workers to supply surplus labor to the owning class, either 
as rent-service or wage-labor, in order to insure their own 










Because wage laborers are dependent on one segment of 
the popul ati on for both earning and survival commodities, they 
are under the greatest "survival compulsion" of the three 
forms of labor. Slaves are under the least survival co m p u l ­
sion, since subsistence is provided; free produc ers  directing 
their own subsistence cu ltivation are in the middle; the sur­
vival compulsion is strongest for wage laborers, as they must 
sell labor power in order tc purchase items of personal c o n ­
sumption. These variations in survival compuls ion suggest a 
"survival compulsion" continuum.
Figure B
Survival C o mpulsi on  Continuum 
Slaves Free Producers Wage Laborers
Bars mark the location of each mode of pr oduction within 
the continu um to suggest that compulsion varies within modes 
of production. Changes in social, economic, or political 
conditions may lead to shifts in survival compulsions. For 
example, when an export-de pen dent slave economy loses inter­
national buyers, subsistence may be withheld, with slaves 
hired out to support themselves and their masters. The
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combination of economic expansion and a scarcity of labor 
in a feudal economy may lead to the eviction of squatters 
and the decay of feudal relations of production. Without 
land for subsistence, former feudal free holders must work 
for wages in order to purchase survival commodities. If 
wages are low, laborers must endure longer hours just to 
secure enough money to support themselves.
A recognition of the survival compulsion built into 
each mode of production assists in understanding some of the 
conflict during the Pernambucan transformation. Much of the 
struggle surrounding the trans for mation of the mode of p r o ­
duction was a product of alterations in survival compulsions. 
Turning free holders into cash-crop producers involved alte ra ­
tions in informal land-lease agreements. The free population 
did not accept the more demanding rental agreements without 
a struggle.
As the transformation progressed, officials turned to 
direct repression against the free population. Eventually, 
technological improvements in milling helped sugar producers 
gain greater control over the work force. However, these 
technological changes, and the larger transformation, produced 
new problems and exacerbated old ones.
By-Products of Soc io-Structural Change
Up to this point the mode of production has been a 
dependent variable in the model. However, this study does 
not restrict structural transforma tio n to that position, for
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such theoretically diverse scholars as Marx (1906) and Durkheim 
(1964) have pointed to the value of viewing socio-structural 
changes also as causal variables. Whether the theorist claims 
that transforming the mode of production simultaneously alters 
the superstructural elements dependent on it (Marx, 1906), or 
: that rapid social, economic, or political changes cause social
disorganization and anomie (Durkheim, 1964), the message is 
the same: structural change produces new structures and new
p r o b l e m s .
One such emergent p r o b l e m  in Pernambuco was crime. Why 
are some types of crime more likely than others to be produced  
by real changes in the environment? One answer is that c e r ­
tain kinds of change cause social dislocations. There is a 
tradition in sociology from Durhkeim (1964) to Park (1924) 
suggesting a relationship between social disorg anization  and 
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r, political scientists such as Olson (1971) and 
1971) have demonst rated a rel ationship between 
s of change and collective violence. Many economists 
9) have noted the socially de stabilizing effects 
nomic change; the Dutch crimin ologist Bonger (1969) 
ated a relationship between economic dislocation 
lovment) and crime. The work of these authors 
sonable to hyp othesize a relationsh ip between 
social dislocation and crime, 
fferent vein, radical criminologists such as 
7) and Spitzer (1975) argue that it is par ticular 
ial organization rather than disorganization,
22
which produc e crime. Most radical theories of crime begin 
with the mode of production, or system of p r od uction that 
links human labor to the env ironment (Balkan, 1980:13). Radical 
theory holds that class-based modes of p ro du ction generate 
problem populations. These pr ob lem po pulations become eligible 
for man ag ement  as deviants when their behavior threatens the 
structure of production and distribution.
Both social org anization  and disorgan izati on  theory 
provide guidelines for this analysis. Radical theory h y p o t h e ­
sizes a rel ationship between  social ly-stru ct ured inequality 
and crime; while social dis organi za tion theory proposes a 
relationship between social change and crime. A model of the 
central variables in the analysis of social structure and crime 












The crime produced by socio-structural conditions is 
labeled "true prevalence" crime (V-6). The analysis of true 
prevalence crime begins wit h the assumption that fluctuations 
in some crime rates are the product of real changes in the 
behavior of the population, rather than shifts in social control 
strategies and priorities. The model suggests that true p r e v a ­
lence crimes were the res ult of three separate factors: material
resources, technology; the mode of production.
Material Resources 
The first major assault on traditional social organi zation





came with the cessation of the African slave trade. The loss 
of slaves (V-l) disrupted both landowners and the free rural 
poor: landowners were in trouble because their labor force
was shrinking; free squatters suffered because planters im­
posed more demanding land-lease requirements on them in order
[ to secure a workforce (Reis, n.a., 10).
Another major assault on critical resources came when 
Brazil began losing international sugar customers (V-l).
Since the Pernambucan economy survived by supplying i nt er ­
national buyers with sugar, decreases in world sugar prices 
and changes in world pur chas in g habits had a negative impact 
on the entire province. However, planters could still hope 
to recapture a portion of the world market if pr odu ction  costs 
could be reduced.
Technology
Su bsidized mill mod erni zation  (V-5) offered a way of 
cutting costs and increasing output. The modern refineries 
represented more than a change in technology; they had a p r o ­
found impact on rural social organization. The refineries 
eroded traditional settlement patterns and social relations 
in the sugar zone by replacing slow-paced, lab or-intensive 
agriculture with ca pitalistic ally-orie nted agrobusinesses 
(Pang, 1979) . Almost every segment of the rural work force 
was downwardly mobile with modernization; some workers were 
totally stripped of their means of subsistence ("marginalized") 
by labor-saving technology.
Mode of Production
In one respect, the socially disruptive effects of
P
m m ,- . - .
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technological changes cannot be separated from the social 
dislocations produced by the larger transform ation  of the 
mode of production (V-5). However, the transformation as a 
whole spawned problems that stretched beyond those produ ced 
by changes in any one element of the mode of production. In 
1890, two elements of the mode of prod uc tion were undergoing 
change: slavery had been abolished and the new social r e l a ­
tions of production between free laborers and employees 
were being worked out; during the same period, the second 
stage of mill modernization began. Chapter five examines 
the types of crime pr oduced by the transformation, as well 
as the forms of criminality associated with the different 
modes of production.
Data Sources
The relationships hypothes ized in the model are e l a b o ­
rated through a variety of primary and secondary sources. 
Secondary data are the foundation for the analysis of material 
resources and technology. Primary sources describe social 
control and crime. Both pr ima ry and secondary sources provide 
the background for the transformation of the mode of p r o d u c ­
tion. The essay on sources in Appendix A describes the data 
sources in more detail.
0
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CHAPTER II
ENGENHO A U S I N A ; A SHORT HISTORY OF LAND, LABOR, 
j AND TECHNOLOGY IN PERNAMBUCO
Introduction
The history of Pernamb uco covered in this study can 
be conven iently divided into three p e r i o d s .^ The first
2
("E n g e n h o ; 1850-1880:) focuses on the engenho plantation
and the slave mode of prod uc tion associated with it. The
3
second ("Engenho C e n t r a l ; 1880's") is really a subsection
of the first and begins in the eighties with the introduction 
of centralized mills. Pro duction and work in that period 
were organized similarily to the first, but wit h a 
dwindling slave population planters began turning to free 
labor. During the eighties, Brazil abolished slavery (1888) , 
became a republic (1889), and began a program  of technological 
modernization aimed at regaining the Northea st's supremacy 
as a world sugar supplier.
4
The final period ("U s i n a : post 1890") includes the
shift from traditional and centralized mills to sugar
^The author has create d this peri od ication for a n a l y t i ­
cal purposes. Actually, the engenho period stretches back 
to colonial times and the usina to the present.
2
Engenho refers to the plantation complex as well as 
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refineries (Usinas). The refineries reduced the sugar 
industry's labor dependence and introduced a change in work 
organization. However, in spite of modernization, the sugar 
industry declined after the turn of the century as Brazil 
lost foreign sugar consumers. During the first decades of 
the usina period, planters continued the struggle to pull free 
producers into the sugar economy; after the turn of the century, 
labor-saving technology and the loss of foreign markets made 
this effort less necessary.
The Sugar Cycle and Dependency
For over three centuries slaves had produced Pernambucan 
sugar on large estates (engenhos) for an international market.
By the middle of the nineteenth  century the slave population 
had begun to decline, and by the turn of the century foreign 
markets had all but dried up. For a time, slave scarcity posed 
a serious threat t 
cal modernization 
alleviate the labo 
planters lived in 
century producers: 
balance slave depl 
a renewed demand f
Before discu 
(Prado, 1967) some 
tion as a peripher 
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I
o sugar production; eventually technologi- 
and the loss of international markets would 
r shortage. However, mid-nin ete enth century 
a different historical period from twentieth 
sugar barons of the last century had to 
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background must be given on Brazil's posi- 
al nation in an expanding world mercantilist 
sugar pro duction began in the sixteenth
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century and during much of the next century the Northeast 
was the world's chief sugar supplier. The sugar cycle was 
the first of Brazil's three export cycles; it was followed 
by the gold and diamond cycle of the eighteenth century; 
coffee provided the country's chief export earnings during 
the nineteenth century. Although each cycle concentrated 
on different primary products, their natural history was the 
same : drive for quick profit; regional concentration of
economic activity; export boom; resource depletion; decline 
in the world demand for the export product; and economic 
stagnation (James, 1959).
Brazil's export dependence should make it clear ths.t 
a study of Brazil cannot focus on that country alone. Rather 
the focus must be on a dep endency structure because Brazil 
was born of mercantilist expansion, which meant that events 
abroad strongly influenced its economic and social growth.
In its dependent position, Brazil fueled capitalist expansion 
by supplying industrializing nations with raw materials and 
by purchasing luxury consumption goods from the nascent 
European industries.
Rather than the more common dom inant -peripher y re la­
tionship, the dependency structure of the colonial period 
was a triad (Stein and Stein, 1970) :
Metropole I Metropole II
P e r i p h e r y
(• :'l
w
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Metropole I consisted of, first, the Dutch and later Great 
Britain; Portugal was an intermediary (Metropole II); while 
Brazil was on the periphery. Both Brazil and Portugal o c ­
cupied a dis adva ntaged position in the dependency triad v i s - 
a-vis Europe. Portugal's inferi ority  was set by the terms 
of the Methuen Treaty (1703) which gave the British p r e f e r ­
ential tariffs and extra -territor ial rights in Brazil in 
exchange for protecting Portugal from Napoleon. Most of the 
revenues Portugal earned from its colony's sugar were used 
by Portuguese elites at home to mainta in an aristo cratic 
life style and ensure a privilege d position among other 
European elites (Stein and Stein, 1970 : 21-22 , 24-26) . The
story was similar in Brazil: planters used revenues to p u r ­
chase slaves and the trappings of aristocracy rather than 
to improve agricultural eff iciency and technology. The domi­
nating met ropolitan  powers were not so short-sighted; Great 
Britain's dev el opment  was accomplished by tr ans for ming its 
internal economic and social structures using raw materials 
from peripheral societies to fuel its own industrialization 
(Stein and Stein, 1970: 67).
Dependency had serious consequences for Brazil. One- 
by-product of Brazil's export dependence during the sugar 
cycle was a concentration of economic activity in the north­
east such that a small elite held the bulk of earned income 
and other assets (land, slaves) (Furtado, 1963) . A central 
contradiction of the plantation system was that the engenho 
was part of a capitalist system but was run by a pre-capitalist





landed aristocracy (Genovese, 1967). Due to the engenho's 
embeddedness within a larger economic system, the economic 
well-being of periphery elites was vulnerable to fluctuations 
in foreign supply and demand. Even though they were f i n a n ­
cially vulnerable, sugar planters took almost nc action to 
ensure some measure of independence from economic i r r e g u l a r i ­
ties (Reis, n . d . a . ) . While refusing to recognize economic 
vulnerability, the aristocratic spirit of the planters absorbed 
capitalist acquisitiven ess and directed it into channels more 
acceptable in slave society: accum ulati on of land, slaves,
and luxury consumption goods (Genovese, 1967) , neglecting 
improvement in sugar cultivation and processing.
As long as there were sugar consumers and abundant 
labor inputs, planters were nevertheless  in good shape. The 
time-honored solution to the recurrent setbacks pr odu ced by 
the vagaries of the world market was to conquer new markets 
and/or increase output by greater labor inputs. However, 
planters faced a new challenge after the end of the African 
slave trade in 1850 when the labor-intensive sugar industry 
began losing its preferred slave workers. The final blow 
to the Northeast's economy came when Brazil began losing 
foreign sugar consumers and had to turn to the relatively 
stagnant domestic market.
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The Engenho Period: 1850-1880
The basic elements of the sugar cycle were latifundia, 
slavery, monoculture, and pro duction for export. Before d i s ­
cussing the basic features of the sugar cycle during the en­
genho period, it would be useful to illustrate briefly their 
variation during each of the three periods. The latifundia 
system had its origin in large land grants distributed in 
the colonial period to a small number of individuals who came 
to control, limit, and block access to the land. During the 
eng.enho (1850-1880) and central mill periods (1880's), land- 
ownership remained in the hands of the few; in the usina 
period (post-1890) , landowner ship became still more c o n c e n ­
trated. Monoculture and export production were permanent 
features of the sugar cycle, although export earnings, of 
course, fluctuated with shifts in world demand. During the 
central mill period, the e n g e h n o 's slave mode of producti on  
was replaced by a quasi-capitalis t one; the transformation 
had been kicked off in 1850 with the forced cessation of 
the African slave trade.
Land
Portugal colonized Brazil by awardi ng land grants 
(s e sm arias ) measuring between seventeen and fifty square 
miles to anyone with the desire and means to use the land 
properly (Dean, 1971). But applicants' means must have i n ­
fluenced awards more than their enth us iasm because once in
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B r a z i l ,  t h e  a w a r d e e  w a s  e x p e c t e d  t o  d e v e l o p  t h e  s e s m a r i a  a s  
a s o u r c e  o f  t a x a b l e  e x p o r t s  a n d  p r o t e c t  i t  a g a i n s t  f o r e i g n  
i n t e r l o p e r  s .
Even without invasion, however, all was far from calm 
in the early days of settlement. Overlap ping sesmarial b o u n d ­
aries, due to the sometimes corrupt and usuall y unsystematic 
land awarding procedures, provok ed land disputes. Some d i s ­
putes were taken to the hopele ssly clogged colonial courts 
(see Schwartz, 1973); most commonly, landowners dealt with 
each other and with poachers themselves. A frontier morality 
coupled with an over-burd ened and sluggish court system e n ­
gendered force and violence as the most efficient way to 
determine who would hold the land.
The very size of sesmarias makes it clear that the 
awardees were anything but individual homesteaders, a s uspi­
cion bolstered by Gilberto Freyre's (1945) observation that 
manual labor was not a part of the aristocratic landowner's 
world view. According to Freyre the first awardees were men 
with "a love for display and grandeur and a distaste for 
manual work" (1945:19).
But not all the early colonizers of Brazil were wealthy 
aristocrats. While the landless included a mix of poor 
farmers from the Azores and Madeira, Portuguese artisans 
(Schwartz, 1973a) , and deported criminals (Russell-Wood, 1968) , 
the majority of the landless were slaves. Aside from the 
slaves, Freyre (1945:35-36) divides the first arrivals into 
two groups: "horizontal" and "vertical" founders.
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The vertical founders came from Portugal with sufficient 
capital to establish themselves as sugar planters, living 
"almost like feudal lords". The sugar barons brought a life 
style and social status from Portugal (1945:37) that was "not 
only maintained in Brazil but improved by them with the rapid 
prosperity of cane agriculture and the sugar industry..."
By contrast, the "horizontal" founders were men continuously 
migratory, "whose spirit of adventure and love of individual 
freedom were too strong to let them settle down... (the 
frontiersmen) were simple and even rustic in their social 
tastes and habits..." (Freyre, 1945:35). What Freyre alludes 
to, but does not specify, is that one group (vertical founders) 
owned land (and slaves to do their work) while the other was 
landless. From the beginning of colonization into the modern 
period, land more than anything else defined status, life 
style, and indeed, life chances in Brazil. Romance aside, 
the horizontal colonizers' mi grato ry life style was due less 
to their "spirit of adventure" than their lack of land in a 
system where*as one early traveler observed, "the land has 
masters and they have the power to stop strangers from using 
it" (in Reis, n.d.a.:7).
Sugar
The first sugar plantations of Pernambuco were es ­
tablished in the middle of the sixteenth century. By the 
seventeenth century, Pernambuco led the world in sugar p r o ­
duction. The Northeast's sugar economy continued to prosper
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for the next fifty years, but in the 1650's its prosperity 
ended as Caribbean sugar edged Brazil out of traditional m a r ­
kets.
After 150 years of decline, sugar exports began increas ­
ing again in the early nineteenth century in response to 
European and North American popul ati on growth (Eisenberg, 1974 
14) . During the period of renewed prosperity between 1800 
and 1880, Pernambucan sugar pro duction rose twenty-fold 
(Denslow, 1974:1), and the absolute volume of sugar exports 
reached a level (after 1830) five hundred percent above the 
apex of the colonial sugar cycle (Eisenberg, 1975:4). H o w ­
ever, even during the export booms of the nineteenth century 
Brazil had to fight to retain a dominant position in the world 
sugar market. A serious threat to her superi ori ty came in 
the early part of the century when Europeans turned their 
backs on Brazilian sugar in favor of continental beet sugar. 
That caused serious problems for Pernambucans because at m i d ­
century, Europe purchased over sixty percent of Brazilian 
sugar exports (Denslow, 1974:15).
Planters lost more than their sugar consumers when 
Europe entered the sugar market, for cheaply-produced 
European beet sugar drove down world prices. The excess of 
beet sugar meant that Brazilian exporters could not raise 
prices by withholding supply, so planters simply had to 
produce as much sugar as possible at the going rate (Eisenberg 
1974:14). However, the only way to increase productivity 
in the technologically-poor sugar industry was by larger
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labor inputs. What made that pro ble matical was that after 
mid-century, the slave po pul ation  was dec li ni ng and free 
workers were not stepping forth to fill slave vacancies.
Brazil turned to the United States as European sugar 
producers gained an increasing portion of the continental 
market. The transition was temporarily successful as sugar 
sales to North America rose rapidly in the seventies and 
eighties. By 1889 North Americans were buying more Brazilian 
than European sugar (Eisenberg, 1974:22). However, pr osperity  
was short-lived because the United States eventually turned 
to sugar producers closer to home. After the beginning of 
the 1890's exports to the United States declined steadily; 
by the early twentieth century North Americans consumed less 
than five percent of the Brazilian Northeast's sugar. With 
the loss of foreign markets, Brazilian producers turned to 
the relatively small domestic market, only recovering a p o r ­
tion of the world market for a brief period during World 
War I.1
The Engenho
The Portuguese engheno plantation was the instrument 
of occupation and settlement of the Northeast, created as 
a sub-sector of the European economy to produce staples for
^Brazil captured a portion of the world market for brief 
periods after World War I, but this summary only covers the 
pre-1922 variations in the sugar cycle.
^ _
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external consumption. Plantations were the locus of p o p u l a ­
tion in a dispersed patter n of settlement and most of the 
Brazilian population was gathered into what Caio Prado 
(1967:334) has called "patriarchal clans" living on p l a n t a ­
tions. These clans consisted of all those participating in 
plantation life from "the plantation owner...to the humblest 
slave and agregado (squatter) who formed part of his retinue" 
(Prado, 1967:334).-
Enghenhos were in some respects extremely dependent on 
foreign supply and in other respects quite independent. D e ­
pendence was engendered by primary product specialization 
which deflected any tendency toward industrialization and 
made it necessary to obtain sophisticated agricultural e q u i p ­
ment and luxury consumption goods outside the country. On 
the other hand, as a result of geographical isolation, en- 
genhos themselves had to produce food and clothing for their 
work force and some items for the plantation family.
It would be a mistake to see the engenho as no more than 
the locus of production for export. Each was a state within 
a state, the planter at its head. Due to such factors as iso ­
lation, the sugar baron's distrust of urban bureaucrats and 
the urbanites' distaste for the crudeness of rural life, en- 
genhos were relatively free from outside interference. The 
landowner coordinated pla ntati on  services, beginning with 
the provision of a priest (usually a close relative) who 
watched over the spiritual life of the engenho's "patriarchal 
clan". The priest had very little opp ortunity to countermand
fSfStesmw*_
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the planter's notions of morality (if there was a discrepancy) 
since the priest was more "dependent upon (the planta tion 
master) than upon his bishop" (Freyre, 1945:38).
The engenho priest was the first line of defense in the 
planters' was against disorder. On each engenho a p l a n t e r ­
headed militia stood ready to step in when religious control 
failed. The private militia was recruited from squatters, to 
put down slave revolts, resolve family feuds, settle land 
disputes, or determine the outcome of elections (Levine, 1974). 
The squatters were kept in line by dependence on the planter 
and his land; beatings and evictions were the price they paid 
for failing to respect the engenho order. After the colonial 
period when conditions really surpassed the control c a p a b i l i ­
ties of the planter, the National Guard or Provincial Police 
were summoned. The winning side was determined once the 
National Guard appeared, since guard units were composed of i
municipal residents answerable to officers who were almost 
always the municipalities' largest landowners (Eisenberg, 1974).
The system of granting land to moneyed aristocrats 
established the link between landownership and power, and the 
isolation of their plantations forged it. Urban bureaucrats 
could not police effectively the rural areas, so landowners 
were left the task of maintai ning the level of law and order 
necessary for uninterrupted sugar production. The g o v e r n ­
ment bureaucrats seemed quite wi lling  to give over some of 
their power to the landowner because they needed him to p e r ­
form the state's taxation, enlistment, and electoral eTixol-lment
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within the engenho's domain (Caio Prado, 1967:335). The u p ­
shot was that each planter served as executive, legislative, 
and judicial authority on his land, exercising as many rights 
as force of arms would allow. Moreover, Eis en berg (1974) shows 
that in time the traditional power of the land owner was b o l ­
stered by the badge of polit ical office.^-
L a b o r  D u r i n g  t h e  E n g e n h o  P e r i o d
The Northeast's geography and climate were favorable 
to sugar cultivation, and transportation costs were minimal 
due to the short distance be tween the sugar zone and the 
coast. Only an abundant labor force was lacking (Eisenberg, 
1974). After failing in their attempt to enslave the indige ­
nous population, planters began importing West African slaves 
to fill the labor void. Slavery quickly became the most 
important institution in Brazi lian society. At the peak of 
the seventeenth century sugar boom, slaves outnumbered free 
people in the Colonial popu latio n by three to one. Slaves 
were most concentrated in the regions of export production. 
During the sugc^r cycle, the northeast held the bulk of the 
slave population; in the eig hteenth century slaves were heavily 
concentrated in the gold and diamond regions of the center- 
south; the coffee economy of the nineteenth century was the
For a case study of the links between land ownership 
and political office in a Pernambucan municipality, see 
Eisenberg (1974: Chapter 6) .
'0
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i ■
i impetus for an increased conce ntration of slaves in southern
Brazil.
i: At the time of Brazil's independence from Portugal (1822),
f  ■  ■
| approximately forty percent of the Brazilian population was
!■ ■:
! slave; most of those slaves were in the c e n t e r - s o u t h . The pro-
i :
I : .
h . portion of slaves in the Pernambu can population at mid-century
had fallen to twenty-one percent. Even though Pernambucan
planters had a relatively small slave force, they utilized
the remaining slaves in the most profitable way: three-fourths
; of the Pernambucan slave po pul ation  worked in the export sector
t-"
(Eisenberg, 1974).
Slaves powered the export sector, but were not the only
workers in the plantation zone. The free were numerous and
formed a number of strata dif ferentiat ed from one another by
such factors as, type of work, skill, skin color, and regi on
of residence. In spite of those real or imagined differences,
the impoverished rural po pulation shar ed one fact in c o m m o n :
their dependence on the senhor and his land.
The sections to follow will focus or the vario us strata
of the free population, especi ally the wcrk roles of free
people during the engenho period. Before that, addi tional
background on the labor systems of the rural z o n e .
The Dual Pla ntation Economy
\' ]
| The Northeast's system of agriculture and labor organi-
i
f zation (latifundia, monocrop plantation agriculture, and
S slavery) had a profound impact on socio-structural arrangements.
I;
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The masters and slaves were clearly delineated by their d i f ­
fering position in the sugar production process; all other 
workers less directly linked to the export sector have been 
labeled "unclassified marginals" (Prado, 1967:328).
According to one estimate (in Prado, 1967:328), u n c l a s ­
sified marginals constituted half of Brazil's colonial p o p u l a ­
tion of twelve million. It must be recognized that margi.nality 
was a product of an export-oriented economic system in which 
slave labor was dominant. Free workers were outside the e x ­
port sector because the widespread use of slaves created a 
shortage of stable employment (Prado, 1967: 325-326). Equally 
important, free men and women exercised a good deal of sel f­
exclusion. The extensive use of slaves in all forms of work 
produced an association between slave status and manual labor. 
By remaining outside the export sector, free men and women 
differentiated themselves frcm slaves.
However, we may not assume that because the free p o p u l a ­
tion was marginal, its services were inconsequential to the 
life of the system. In the first place, a surplus pop ulation 
is always valuable when labor requirements exceed the existing 
pool. The Northeast was no exception. Free men and women were 
pulled into the sugar economy periodi cally when the slave force 
was insufficient to the task as, for example, during export 
booms created by fluctuations in world demand. Of even greater 
importance, free men and women performed a number of services 
that guaranteed the success of sugar production. For example, 
squatters provided the slaves' food as well as serving in
s?
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the landowner's private militia.
C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  i t  s e e m s  more, f r u i t f u l  t o  d e l i n e a t e  d i f ­
f e r e n t  l a b o r  s y s t e m s  a n d  t h e i r  f u n c t i o n s  t h a n  t o  f o c u s  s t r i c t l y  
o n  t h e  d o m i n a n t  m o d e  o f  p r o d u c t i o n ,  r e l e g a t i n g  t o  m a r g i n a l  
s t a t u s  a l l  w o r k e r s  w h o  d o  n o t  d i r e c t l y  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  e x p o r t  
p r o d u c t i o n .  A p p r o a c h i n g  t h e  p r o b l e m  i n  t h i s  w a y ,  we s e e  t h a t  
t h e  r u r a l  z o n e  h a d  t w o  s e p a r a t e  b u t  i n t e r r e l a t e d  l a b o r  s y s ­
t e m s :  a s l a v e  m o d e  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  p o w e r e d  t h e  e x p o r t  s e c t o r ,
w h i l e  a  s u r p l u s  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  f e u d a l l y  o r g a n i z e d ^  f r e e  w o r k e r s
2
p r o v i d e d  s u p p o r t  s e r v i c e s  f o r  t h e  s u g a r  e c o n o m y .
T h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  f e u d a l  a n d  s l a v e  m o d e s  o f  p r o ­
d u c t i o n  c a p t u r e s  t h e  d i s t i n c t  s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  
w i t h i n  P e r n a m b u c o ' s  n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  d u a l  e c o n o m y  i n  a  w a y  
t h a t  P r a d o ' s  d i c h o t o m y  b e t w e e n  s l a v e s  a n d  u n c l a s s i f i e d  m a r ­
g i n a l s  c a n n o t .  T h e  s l a v e - f e u d a l  d i s t i n c t i o n  s u g g e s t s  a n  
e c o n o m y  w i t h  d i f f e r e n t  l a b o r  s y s t e m s ,  e a c h  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  b y
Celso Furtado (1963:54-55) maintains that the N o r t h ­
east's plantation social structure was capitalist, not feudal, 
for two reasons. On the one hand, planta tions produced for 
an external market; on the other, feudal ism is only possible 
where a lack of durable goods severely limits the accumulation  
of wealth. One may agree that the Northeast's economy was 
a part of a capitalist economic system without also conced ing 
that the plantation system was without feudal elements. This 
study uses Hindess and Hirst's (1975) criterion for c l a s s i f y ­
ing modes of p r o d u c t i o n ; within their scheme, the variables of 
commodity producti on/circ ulation and wealth accumulation are 
secondary to the me chanism of ap propriating labor.
2
This is an ideal-typical differentia tion and theire 
were some exceptions to the designation. Some slaves were 
engaged in domestic labor and some of the free population was 
employed in sugar production (millers, cane transporters). 
However, the distinction holds for the majority of slaves 
and free workers.
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different systems of resource distri bution and Unique r e l a ­
tions of production. Each sector of the. dual economy had a 
unique form of socio-economic organization; both sectors were 
essential to the economic life of the system.
However, the dual economy posed a major stumbling block 
to the transformation. The Pernambucan transformation involved 
turning feudally-organiz ed free, producers into wage laborers 
in the export sector. The incongruity between feudal and 
capitalist forms of work organization complicated the t r a n s ­
formation: the feudal relations of pro duction had to be destroyed
down before free workers could become full-time wage laborers.
Labor: Free Workers
At the be gi nning  of the nin eteenth century, free people 
made up almost four-fifths of the Pernambucan population.
Most of the free, pla nta ti on population  was squatters 
(Eisenberg, 1974:183). The indigenous population was the 
first to be reduced to the status of squatter by landowners, 
to be followed by impoverished immigrants from Portugal, the 
Azores, and Madeira. As time passed, manumitted slaves and 
half-castes were also forced into squatter status. It is 
not surprising that squatters were so abundant on engenhos; 
the status was inescapable in a region of such extreme c o n ­
centration of land ownership.
The squatter's life was highly uncertain. The most he 
could expect in the zona da mata was informal land occupancy 
rights. One ninetee nth -century traveler's observations
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highlight the violence and precariousness of squatter life:
(The squatter) lives in fear of his landowner. He 
cannot be sure of awaking in the same place as he 
lay down to sleep. He shelters himself in a m i s e r ­
able thatched hut on some one else's land...He does 
not live there so long as he behaves h i m s e l f ... but 
only so long as he wants to subject himself to serve 
as an instrument of lust...(in Eisenberg, 1974:184).
H o w e v e r ,  t h e r e  i s  n o  r e a s o n  t o  a s s u m e  t h a t  t h e  s q u a t t e r s  w e r e
without resentment; Levine (1974:30) reports that landowners
seldom left their houses without a body guard (c a p a n g a ) for
protection from angry squatters seeking to avenge personal
dishonor or their indiscriminate eviction from plant ati on
] a n d  .
Landowners justified their harsh treatment of moradores
by citing their squatters' lack of responsibility:
This horde of men lives witho ut rules, without morals, 
without respect for the rights of others, except when 
there is fear of the use of absolute or despotic measures... 
at present the landowner is at the mercy of the worker, 
s q u a t t e r ... who lives on the pr op erty until the day when 
he can trick the landowner. Achieving his purpose, he 
leaves without giving the least satisfaction to the lan d­
owner...(in Eisenberg, 1974:184).
After hearing the landowners' side of the story, it is 
time to take a look at the actual terms of exchange between 
plantation masters and moradores. The planter conceded a 
plot of poor land on the outer margins of the estate where 
the squatter and his family could build a mud hut and plant 
a food crop. In return, moradores were required to surrender 
a portion of their produce to the engehno work force, guard 
the estate against intruders, and serve in the planter's 
private militia. These rental obligations remained in force 
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the growth of sugar production after the 1850's; from then 
on, moradores had to perform all of the usual services plus 
work, a few days of each week, in the cane fields.
Seasonal Migrants
Seasonal migra nts to the zona da mata made up another
segment of the free, rural population. The migrants or
corumbas descended upon sugar pla ntations annually tc escape
r~>
t h e  r a v a g e s  o f  t h e  d r y  s e a s o n  i n  t h e  s e r t a o . -  B a c k l a n d s  s l a c k  
s e a s o n  a n d  c a n e  h a r v e s t  w a s  f o r t u i t o u s  b e c a u s e  i t  a s s u r e d  
p l a n t e r s  a  l a r g e r  l a b o r  f o r c e  t h a n  t h e  s l a v e s  o r  m o r a d o r e s  
a l o n e  p r o v i d e d .  O n c e  o n  e n g e n h o s , m a n y  o f  t h e  c o r u m b a s  b e ­
c a m e  d a y  l a b o r e r s ;  m o s t  l e f t  t h e  z o n a  d a  m a t a  a t  t h e  e n d  o f  
t h e  h a r v e s t .
S a l a r i e d  W o r k e r s
Salaried skilled workers formed another segment of the 
free plantation population. Engenhos needed a number of 
workers other than those directly associated with sugar p r o ­
duction -- specialists like ironsmiths, bricklayers, and 
coopers. Some of those specialists were slaves, but a good 
number were free. Schwartz (1973a) reports that the first 
Portuguese expeditions carried a number of artisans to 
Brazil, but as time passed, free slaves and half-castes with 
in-service training filled these jobs.
The mill workers constituted a particularly important 
segment of the skilled plantation population -- people like the
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mestre de acucar (sugar master), who was in charge of the 
mill and something of a chemist in his own right. The purgador 
was another key link in the operation because he removed the 
sugar's impurities; next in line was the re fi n a d o r who r e ­
fined the sugar after it had been treated by the purgador.
These and other millers were in great demand during the period 
of economic expansion (1850-1380) when the number of mills 
increased two-fold (Reis, n.d.a.:16). Once expansion ceased 
and mill consolidation b e g a n , 1 many men who had enjoyed a 
position at the tcp of the sugar industry's occupational p y r a ­
mid lost their jobs.
Lavradores de cana form the final category of the free 
plantation work force. In the first decades of colonization 
the Portuguese encouraged farmers in the Azores and Madeira 
to migrate to Brazil (Schwartz, 1973a). Once in the colony, 
many of those farmers became lavradoes. Lavradores were a 
small proportion of the free population but materially the 
most comfortable (Schwartz, 1973a). In many respects, lavradoes 
resembled sharecroppers, but it would be a mistake to c a t e ­
gorize them as such because they were in fact an ancillary 
part of the planter class, since they came from the same social 
background, though without the control of land that would have
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Lavradores de cana (Cane Growers
1In 1888, there were 1800 mills in Pernambuco, but this 
number declined to 900 by the 1920's (Reis, n.d.a.:4).
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supported the life-style to which they aspired (Schwartz,
1973 a :176-177 ) . Like the landowners, lavradores were p r e ­
dominantly white; in contrast to other landless segments of 
the engenho population, lavradores enjoyed relative wealth 
and social status due to their ownership of slaves, work 
animals, and rudimentary agricultural equipment (Schwartz,
1973a) .
Lavradores' significance for sugar production can be 
gleaned from the fact that in 1878 they grew over half of 
the sugar shipped from the province (Eisenberg, 1974:92).
In spite of their important contribution to the economy, 
lavradores remained economically disadv ant aged because their 
cane had to ground in the landowner's mill and a fourth to 
a third of the sugar surrendered to the planter, along with 
the by-products: molasses, rum, and waste products. More 
onerous lease arrangements held lavradores to clearing a 
portion of engenho land and establishing a new plantation 
complete with mansion, mill, and slave quarters (Schwartz,
1973a). When the lease expired, the cane grower surrendered 
all land and improvements to the landowner.
Other free workers in the rural zone included the pack- 
horse drivers, foremen, engenho administrators, and full-time 
body guards. A key group was the pack-horse drivers (a l m o c r e v e s ) 
Almocreve was an occupation that linked the urban and rural 
areas. Pack-horse drivers carried goods from the port of 
Recife to the plantations and returned to the capital with 
loads of sugar for export, warehouses. Prior to the arrival
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of the railroads, the export economy would have ground to a 
halt without almocreves, for they transported most of the goods 
between the plantations and Recife; after the railroads began 
serving the plantations, almocreves lost their occupation (Reis 
n . a . a : 1 6 - 1 7 ) .
Pack-horse drivers were relatively well off, next to 
the squatters, because "they owned a horse, and gun, and p e r ­
haps even a slave" (Reis, n.a.a:16). In spite of those minor 
symbols of wealth, almocreves had a bad reputation among land­
owners because their mobile lifestyle was thought to be well- 
suited to crime.
Summary: The Engenho Period
Sesmarias in the Pernambucan zona da mata were the locus 
of engenho plantations, which used slave labor to grow and 
mill sugar fcr an international market. The plantation house 
was the center of life on the sesmaria and more often than 
not the planter and his family lived on the estate with other 
members of the pat riarchal clan. European population growth 
at the turn of the nineteenth century gave a breath of life 
to the sugar economy, and prosperity continued until the 
eighties when chaper European beet sugar edged Brazil out of 
continental markets. With the loss of the European market, 
Brazilian exporters turned their attention to North American 
sugar consumers. The transition was temporarily successful, 
but in the nineties North Americans began buying sugar from 
producers closer to home. The Pernambucan economy declined
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as foreign markets were lost: extreme dependence on foreign
demand meant that the economic we ll-being of the society 
fluctuated with the vagaries of the world market.
Plantation work organization assumed two separate but 
complementary forms: a slave mode of production powered the
sugar economy, while a feudal work structure accomplished the 
non-profit-producing work in the region. Between 1850 and 
abolition, the slave population declined rapidly due to the 
cessation of the African slave trade, interprovincial slave 
trade, deaths unbalanced by births, and private manmissions. 
The decline came at an extremely bad time: beginning in the
fifties, there was increased demand for brazilian sugar and 
the only way to increase output was by larger labor inputs. 
Since slaves were no longer a viable alternative, planters
began turning to the free population for labor.
However, the task would not be so simple as merely to
insert a free worker into a position vacated by a slave. It
involved the more complicated procedure of turning f e u d a l l y - 
organized subsistence farmers into full-time cash-crop p r o ­
ducers. That was troublesome on two counts. First, the 
feudal work structure itself blocked the transition; second, 
certain characteristics of the free population militated 
against their easy movement into export agriculture. To 
begin with the latter first, previous experience had taught 
moradores to avoid plantation agriculture because they were 
overworked and used in jobs too dangerous for financially 
valuable human chattel (Reis, n.d.a; Eisenberg, 1974).
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Furthermore, free people associated plantation work with slave 
status and avoided it as one way of differ entiating  themselves 
from slaves (Prado, 1967; Reis, n.d.a:25). If those reasons 
were not sufficient, the rigorous work discipline and c o n ­
comitant loss of freedom offered additional incentive to shy 
away from the export sector.
The transition was further complicated by the fact that 
so long as moradores were excluded from export agriculture, 
they could not acquire the relevant skills and labor re g i m e n ­
tation required to function suc cessfully within that domain. 
Obviously, once moradores began working, they devel oped skills 
and become accustomed to the rhythms of the export economy. 
However, the squatters' mobility and certain elements of the 
feudal rent structure militated against such regular e m p l o y ­
ment.
The moradores' ease of movement was a thorn in the 
side of planters. In fact, moradores moved so often that they 
were frequently described as "nomadic and rootless, incapable 
of settling anywhere for any length of time" (in Reis, n.d.a:6) 
Reis (n.d.a:24) reports that moradores' nomadism discouraged 
landowners from teaching them skills because planters never 
knew how long squatters could be counted on to remain on the 
en g e n h o .
Feudal work organi zatio n itself blocked any easy transi­
tion. The Northeast's post-1850 feudal rent structure obliged 
the squatter tc exchange some produce and labor in the expert 
sector for the right to erect a hut and grow subsistence crops




on engenho land. In Hindess and Hirst's (1975) discussion 
cf the general characteristics of the feudal mode of pr o d u c ­
tion, the authors note that feudal rent obl igations create 
a division in the worker's day between "necessary labor" 
(subsistence farming) and "surplus labor" (cash crop pr o d u c ­
tion in the export s e c t o r ) : surplus labor extrac ted as rent
more or less guarantees the worker's right to p e r f o r m  n ece s­
sary l a b o r .^
A closer look at the internal logic of feudal work o r ­
ganization illustrates how it limited exchanging squatting 
rights for labor services. Theoretically, the squatter who 
gave too much time to cash crop pro duction would have insuf­
ficient time for the family plot. When that occurred, the 
unpaid worker had no way of ma int ainin g himself and no p r a c ­
tical reason to trade labor for squatting rights. Thus,feudal 
rent was not a viable means of securing full-time workers. 
Furthermore, this system did not reward labor efficiency, 
nor did it encourage worker p r o d u c t i v i t y . Therefore, the most 
planters could expect from squatters was half a week's work 
at the same level of pr odu ctivi ty as customarily given. How­
ever, with a depleted slave population and increased demand 
for sugar, this was not sufficient. Thus, as the seventies 
closed, planters actively sought new ways of extr ac ting a d ­
ditional work from free people.
^For a further discussion of the concepts of "necessary 
and "surplus" labor, see Hindess and Hirst (1975).
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The Engenho Central: 1880's
As the eighties commenced, sugar producers were facing 
decreasing revenues and searching for new sugar markets. In 
spite of economic downturn, planters could still hope to re ­
capture a portion of the world market if sugar could be p r o ­
duced more cheaply. Modernizat io n offered a way of lowering 
prices, but any attempt at salvaging the economy through 
technological improvement wo uld fail if the sugar barons 
could not wrestle a portion of the free labor mixture of 
squatters, freed slaves, and migran ts into a cheap, dependable 
work force.
Labor problems accompanied economic worries. The slave 
population had decreased by more than fifty perc ent between 
mid-century and the eighties (Reis, 1974:11), and free men 
and women seemed neither willin g nor able to step into the 
slaves' jobs. Thus, even though there was an abundant free 
population, planters insisted that slaves were the only workers 
capable of ke eping the sugar economy afloat. One leading 
landowner made it clear that a population surplus was not 
itself sufficient to stave off a labor shortage, warning 
that "of the 1600 engenhos which serve the Recife market, 
only one-tenth would be capable of grinding cane the day after 
the complete emancipation that is demanded by the abol it ion­
ists" (in R e i s , 1974 : 8) .
Mill modernization:, began in the 1 8 8 0 's with the in­
troduction of central mills (engenhos c e n t r a i s ) . Modern
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mills brought more than a new technology. The central mill 
concept involved modify ing the division of labor in the sugar 
industry. With the establishment of central mills, some of 
those with access to capital were able to own the technology 
to grind cane purchased from landowners who had the cane grown.
The government believed that a division between agriculture 
and industry would encourage more efficient use of land and 
labor. Consequently, plantation masters could direct all their 
resources into land improvements, and mill owners could use 
their capital to update technology (Eisenberg, 1974:83).
In the eighties, the Imperial and Provincial governments in­
troduced subsidies as an incentive fcr central mill c o n s t r u c ­
tion. Politicians encouraged foreign bus in ess interests to 
build mills so that the infusion of outside capital would 
facilitate wage payment, thus inducing free people to work 
in the sugar industry (Eisenberg, 1974)- Foreign-owned 
central mills were completed by the mid-eighties and Brazilian- 
owned mills appeared shortly afterwards.
The Brazilians met with some success as mill owners, 
but foreign-owned mills were dismal failures. There were 
several reasons why foreigners failed, not the least of which 
was their administrators' lack of experience as sugar m a n u ­
facturers and the administrators' failure to learn Portuguese.
But the principal reason for failure was the separation of 
land and mill ownership (Eisenberg, 1974: Galloway, 1958:300).
The first foreign companies did not own the fields or control 
the labor from which they obtained cane and had to contract
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with traditional landowners for supply. If the landowner did 
not like the mill's price, he would withhold  supply and grind 
the cane himself.^- As a result, central mill owners were 
squeezed between paying high prices for sugar cane or suffer­
ing shortages.
The failure of central mills highlights one of the 
major contradictions of the transition. The proble m lay in 
the misalignment of the forces and relations of production.
With the introduction of centralized mills, the forces of 
production (technology) in the sugar processing, sector were 
revolutionized while the relations of production in a g r i c u l ­
ture were still pre-capitalist. The disjunction of the forces 
of production in one sector with the relations of pr odu cti on 
in a complementary one was problematical because the enlarged 
capacity of the mills and their greater efficiency made larger 
quantities of cane a necessity.^
However, the relations (and fcrces) of production in 
agriculture militated against higher agricultural output. 
Production could no longer increase by committing more slaves 
to agriculture because the slave trade had ended and the slave 
population was declining. At the same time, feudally-organized
^Some planters resented the new factories and simply 
refused to cooperate, continuing to operate outmoded mills 
in spite of low sugar out-put and poor economic returns.
2
Another factor behxnd the need for greater p r o d u c ­
tivity was the low price of sugar on the world market; low 
prices meant that producti on had to increase in order to 
reap the customary profit.
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free producers were not easily substituted for slaves 
(see PP-47-49)- One way that the relations of production 
in agriculture could have been aligned with the forces of 
production in mill ing would have been to transform ag r i c u l ­
tural work organization from feudal to capitalist form. A 
first step would have been to make moradores into wage laborer 
by stripping them of squatting rights; once moradores had 
become dependent on wages as the only means of survival, land 
owners would gain greater control over their workers' lives. 
However, world sugar prices com plicated the transition to
wage labor since low prices proh ibite d paying free workers
1
a wage that would given them an incentive tc work harder at 
what they had traditionally avoided. Thus, from the eighties 
on,, planters turned to repressive mechanisms to obtain the 
amount and quality of labor desired from free workers.
Before discussing labor dur ing the central mill period, 
we must examine the motives for mod ernization more carefully. 
Most students of the Pernambucan sugar industry have emp h a ­
sized planters' desire to cut pro duction costs and produce 
cheaper sugar as the primary motive for modernization. While 
price reduction was clearly an important consideration for 
modernization, this research places equal emphasis on the 
hypothesis that modernization was introduced to reduce the 
labor dependence of the sugar industry.
This hypothesis gains plausi bility if we recognize 
that labor saving technology was implemented when the sugar 
barons were simultaneously losing the only workers they
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considered capable of running the mills, and having to turn 
to a free population unmotivate d to work regularly and for 
long hours in the export sector. There is little doubt that 
the plantocracy recognized the severity of the threat because 
a participant at the 1884 Recife Farm Congress warned that 
even though two-thirds of the sugar cane ground in the state 
was cultivated by free laborers, its proc essing  could not be 
done without slave labor, "the only one which under present 
conditions guarantees the readiness and continuity of the 
harvest" (in Reis, 1974:9).
However, technological change (engenho to central mill 
and, finally, usina) should not be separated from the t r a n s ­
formation of the mode of production because the two are 
integrally related. Transf orming modes of production involve 
modifications in the forces of production (tools, technology) 
as well as the relations of production. Some discussions 
of technological change fail to mention that changes in the 
forces of production are frequently implemented to promote 
modifications in the relations between workers and employers. 
Herbert Gutman (1976) did not make that error; he showed 
that one of the reasons North American textile mill owners 
modernized was to gain greater control over recalcitrant 
mill hands. Mechanization reduced labor requirements and 
increased the size of the surplus population, which drove 
wages down. Some of the workers who did not want to play 
by the owners' rules were replaced by machines; others were 
replaced by laborers thrown out of work by machines. 
Mechanization may have served a function of social control.
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in the Pernambucan case as well.
Labor.
Before entering the usina period, a brief word is in 
order about the labor structure of the central mill decade. 
During the eighties, work org anization resembled that of the 
engenho period, except that landowners were making greater 
use of free labor. However, a new stratum  of the free p o p u ­
lation emerged during the seventies and reached ma tu rit y in 
the eighties. The Rio Branco or "free womb law" of 1871 
stipulated that all children born to slave women after that 
date were free. Since the free womb law guaranteed gradual 
abolition, it had two qualifications. I n g e n u o s , as the 
children were called, were the wards of the mother's mas ter 
until age eight when the master could free them and receive 
state indemnification; or the slave owner could support the 
child until twenty-one and gain the use of its labor but lose 
indemnification. Ac cor di ng to Eisenberg (1974:158), most 
planters chose the latter course. In that way, they could 
continue to benefit from relatively captive workers even as 
the institution of slavery was cru mbling.^ But the days of 
planter reliance on slaves and ingenuos were drawing to a close 
Therefore, during the eighties the struggle between free 
workers and planters intensified. The conflict revolved 
around landowners' desire for a cheap, submissive labor force 
upon whom they could impose conditions rather than submit ting
1
According to Provincial Presidents' Reports (cited m  
Eisenberg, 1974:158), approximately 36,000 children of slave 
women (ingenuos) were born in Pernambuco between 1871 and 1887.
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to the conditions labor imposed. With abolition becoming 
more of a reality each day, planters had to put together 
a reliable work force, either using what they already had 
or by drawing from labor pools outside the country. Planters 
and poltiicians were clearly aware of the latter alternative, 
since the Imperial and Provincial Governments drew up programs 
to stimulate immigration as early as the fifties (Eisenberg, 
1974:198-199). However, immigration was not to be the 
answer to the sugar industry's labor problems. Immigrants 
never came to Pernambuco in large numbers, moving instead 
to the booming coffee economy of the center-south.^ C o n ­
sequently, Northeastern planters had to solve their labor
f problems from with Pernambuco.
i 'tf
| The Usina Period: Post-1890
The end of the eighties saw the demise of two major 
institutions of Brazilian society up to that time with the 
abolition of slavery (1888) and the end of the monarchy 
(1889). A period of turmoil followed the establishment 
of the Republic, as Brazilians jockeyed for a position in 
the new state. Planters' fears that freed slaves would desert 
plantations in large numbers did not materialize, in contrast 
to their dire predictions (Eisenberg, 1974:182). However, 
labor problems persisted. The population of ex-slaves was
^For a more thorough discussion of immigration programs 
and the varied reasons for Pernambuco's failure to attract 
immigrants, see Eisenberg (1 97 4:198 ff). In Rio C l a r o , Warren 
Dean shows how immigration programs operated to recruit labor 
for the center-south.
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insufficient to power the sugar economy,'1' and free workers 
had not become the kind of labor force that planters desired.
The second stage of industrial modernization, therefore, 
began in the 1890's with the construction of sugar refineries 
(u s inas). Usinas are large-scale central factories designed 
to mill the cane of many plantations (Hutchinson, 1957:41). 
After the central mills' failure to promote modernization, 
the Brazilian government established subsidies for sugar 
refineries. The refineries overcame the previous central 
mill failures because usineiros (usina owners) boug ht engenho 
plantations so as to control the cane fields and their laborers, 
as well as milling technology. The failures of the previous 
decade had taught modernizers that the new mi]Is could not 
succeed unless owners had control over agriculture as well 
as milling, and hence the labor force in both sectors.
As usinas spread, they absorbed engenho pla ntations
and in thirty years had reduced the number of engenhos by
2
fifty percent (Reis, n.d.a:4). As for traditional engenho
One year before abolition, there were 41,000 slaves 
in the province (I B G E , 1887). That put the propor tion of 
slaves in the population at about four percent.
2
Hutchinson (1957) reports that usineiros had a number 
of ways to secure engenho land. Besides having funds to 
purchase land, they had ways of forcing traditional engenheiros 
to sell. Usineiros would refuse to mill engenho cane, or take 
it and leave it to sour. After forcing the traditional land­
owner into bankruptcy, the usineiros would purchase the engenho 
land. It is interesting that these were the tactics used by 
engeneiros to secure the desired purchase price of cane from 
lavradoes (See Schwartz, 1973a).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
58
masters, a good number took advantage of government subsidies 
to become usiereiros; some sold their land and bacame cane 
suppliers (f o r n e c e d o r e s ): others left the pl an tat ion zone
altogether (Eisenberg, 1974; Galloway, 1958:302; Reis, n.d.a. 
There are no exact figures on how many landowners selected 
one or the other course of action, but Eisenberg (1974) holds 
that the majority remained in some part of the sugar industry 
Eisenberg (1974) further argues that the usina elite did not 
differ markedly from the engenho elite and that the structure 
of the sugar industry remained the same.
One could take issue, however, with Eisenberg's asser­
tion. Although the majority of usineiros may have been ex- 
senhores do engenho (traditional planters), it does not follow 
that the structure of the sugar industry was untouched by 
technological modernization. As usinas spread, social organi 
zation in the plantation zone changed frcm a We beri an  "tradi­
tional type" to a more "legalistic" form. The differences 
can be seen in Hutchinson's (1957:43) comparison of the two 
types of industrial organization:
Whereas the engenho was owned by a family...the usina 
is a c o r p o r a t i o n ...the corpor ati on may even be (headed 
by) a f a m i l y .. . (but) the plantation master (as) owner 
of lands and of slaves and ruler of small empires, d is­
appeared. But in his place an even more powerful figure 
appeared, the usineiro, the land-factory combination 
director and representative of corporate power.
Hutchinson's description suggests that the usina's
organizational structure placed a good deal of distance
between decision-makers and workers and that workers came
into less direct contact with those at the top of the pyramid
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than had been the case on traditional engenhos. Once the 
usinas took root, the industry was no longer directed by 
independent planters making individual (frequently non-economic) 
decisions about planting and marketing, for increasingly "boards 
of directors were formed, decisi on-mak in g became streamlined 
and more rational, and the mana gement  of refineries subject 
to outside scrutiny" (Pang, 1979:681).
Such changes in social organi zat ion are crucial to the 
analysis, since a different type of authority and control are 
associated with each type of social organization. Certainly, 
the resident senhor de engenho on an isolated pl antation sur­
rounded by slaves, squatters, and other members of the p a t r i ­
archal clan had a different set of repressive and non-repres- 
sive social control options from the corporate usineiro 
operating within the structure described by Hutchinson (1957:
44) :
The big house was no longer the home of a mast er and 
the scene of his family life and social activities.
The top level of the social strata partially d i s a p ­
peared, and those who were left to do the agricultural 
work looked now the the factory for their instructions 
and pay, (and) to the new factory store for supplies...
Hence the usinas changed the structure of plantation 
authority as well as the range of social control options 
open to the directors of production. The usinas also brought 
changes in labor organization.
Labor
As usinas spread, the lot of the rural poor worsened. 
Squatter families were brusquely expelled from engenhos as
j
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usinas consumed greater quantities of cane land (Levine, 1974) 
Levine (1974) reasons that eviction occurred because the 
forced dissolution of the old patriarchal plante r-laborer  
relationship ended the right of the rural poor to raise 
' food for their own subsistence. A co mpl eme ntary hypothesisE
is that expulsion represe nted an attempt to marginalize 
squatters in order to extract greater quantities of labor 
from them. The principle is simple: workers who maintain
a family plot are under less structural com pulsion to labor 
(see Chapter I) than those for whom wages are the only means 
of survival. If squatters are stripped of subsistence plots 
and forced to live on wages, they are more likely to work 
regularly. It is only by working that they can legally 
obtain the commodities required to survive.
Usinas did not spell disaster for everyone. The new 
technological configuration opened up oppor tunities for usina 
operatives. However, only a small portion of the free popula 
tion was sufficiently skilled to enter these vacancies. Thus 
refineries were constantly plagued by labor shortages during 
the early stages of industrialization. It cannot go without 
mention that factory operatives and their families were in 
many respects worse off than squatters because the wives 
and children of the nascent proletariat were usually not 
employable in usinas, yet were forbidden to cultivate family 
plots as they had done on engenhos (Levine, 1979:31; Pang, 
1979).
Agricultural workers (frequently e x - m o r a d o r e s ) were 
now paid a daily wage, usual ly a s e c o , which is pay without
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meals, clothing or medical assistance (Reis, 1974:17). H o w ­
ever, wages were rock bottom between 1890 and the turn of 
the century (Table 3, Chapter 3), and squatting opportunities  
were denied many agricultural workers. Their standard of 
living had clearly deteriorated.^- To make matters worse, 
improvements in milling technology had placed agricultural 
workers in a bad position to bargain. Unineiros could get 
along with much less field labor since refineries could 
extract the same amount of sugar from less cane. Ag ri cul tural 
workers were not the only losers with modernization. Many 
skilled and semi-skilled mill workers faced unemployment 
since refineries cut the labor requirements of the mill in 
half (Reis, n.d.a:10) .
The change in pr odu cti on techniques and the u n c o m p e n ­
sated abolition of slavery also produced downward mobility  
for lavradores. Cane growers probabl y suffered a worse 
economic setback from abolition than landowners with a 
greater investment in slaves because, unlike the latter, 
lavradores had neither land nor capital other than slaves
and animals. In addition, milling efficienc y reduced'the
2
amount of cane required by refineries, and hence the number 
of cane suppliers needed in the industry. Finally, lavradores 
lost with modernization because some of the ex-senhores de
‘'’See Reis (n.d.a: 23-29) for indices of the declinin g 
standard of living.
2
According to Reis, the usinas could obtain the same 
amount of sugar from a much smaller quantity of cane.
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engenho who remained in the industry became cane suppliers 
themselves, taking over this occ upation from their former 
tenants, the lavradores, now without capital of their own.
Even the status of the traditional sugar planters was 
undermined by usina expansion. Under the usina system, many 
of the pre viously powerful landowners who did not become 
refinery owners were reduced to the status o f c a n e  supplier 
(fornecedor) . However, before being totally stripped of their 
power, the pla nte rs-tur ned-ea ne -suppli er s gained official 
recognition for their new occupation (Diegues, 1958:111). 
However, official recognition only secured a part of their 
lost honor, while the new technological configuat ion gave 
refinery owners power over the cane suppliers. In essence, 
the traditional pl anters -t urned-can e-supplie r s had traded 
power based on monopol izati on of land for a privileged  
status position within the emerging industrial order. In 
spite of official recognition of the occupation of cane 
supplier, fornecedores were only able to stabilize a m i n i ­
mum of the economic and political power that had been theirs 
as senhores de engenho.
All sugar producers in the 1890's faced serious p r o b ­
lems because the export economy had begun its final decline. 
The new economic downturn commenced in the middle of the 
eighties when the price of sugar broke from an average of 
$75.00 per ton (1879-84) to $54.00 in 1884-89 (Denslow, 1974 
22). Modernization was seen as the answer to the commercial
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crisis because the higher sugar-to-cane ratio would make Brazil 
competitive with beet sugar producers. Usinas overcame the 
problems that blocked central mill progress. But they failed 
to keep Brazil competitive in international markets because 
the world sugar supply was increasing faster than demand, and 
prices were falling (Reis, n.d.a:4). After the turn of the 
cervtury, Brazilian processors were obliged to sell their 
sugar to the relatively stagnant domestic market.
The sugar refineries may have failed to save the sugar 
economy, but they helped to solve the sugar producers' labor 
problems by eliminating the industry's excessive dependence 
on labor. Labor requirements had been reduced in any case 
by the loss of international markets. However, the co nj unc­
tion of two such developments that reduced labor dependency 
seems to have been overlooked by those students of the t r a n s i ­
tion who use planters' failure to pass forced labor laws as 
evidence that free people were easily pulled into export 
agr ic ultu re .
That line of thinking is exemplified by Reis' state ­
ment that "since there was an ample supply of labor, harsh 
methods of recruiting were ill-advised because they were 
not only unnecessary but also costly" (Reis, n.d.a:12). In 
contrast to Reis, it can be argued that the plantocracy 
decelerated the forced labor campaign only after the turn of 
the century, and only because they simply did not need as 
many workers due to the coincidence of labor-saving techno­
logy and the demise of the sugar economy. Although Eisenberg
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claims that, "in the era when the politicians finally a b o l ­
ished slavery, it was naive, if not presumptuous, to expect 
those same officials to countenance new forms of coerced 
labor" (Eisenberg, 1974:197), chapters III and IV show that 
landowners devised a number of schemes to coerce free people 
to work. A more realistic explanation than E i s e n b e r g ’s is 
that after the turn of the century, landowners could worry 
less about squatters' irregular work habits because the land­
owners needed them less.
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CHAPTER III
THE MORAL PASSAGE AND CRIME:
ABOLITION AND THE CRIMINA LIZATION OF MARGINALITY
t
Free Labor and the Transition
Between 1850 and 1880, Permanbuco's slave population 
was in decline while the sugar economy expanded. The int er­
section of those events made it inevitable that planters would 
have to find a new work force. Most students of the t r ansi­
tion (Eisenberg, 1974; Levine, 1979; Reis, n.d.a.) claim that 
the shift from slave to free labor was relatively easy due 
to the presence of large numbers of free rural poor in a 
region where the absence of "free soil left (squatters) with 
nowhere else to go and (where ) they consequently found them­
selves in a position of complete depend ence and submission 
vis-a-vis the sugar planters who monopo lized  the land" (Reis, 
1974:5). Reis adds that owing to those conditions, employers 
did not have to resort to anything but voluntary methods of 
recruitment and "harsh methods were ill-advised" (Reis, 
n.d.a: 12).
Reis and others have correctly noted that there was 
a large surplus of potential workers in the sugar zone on 
the eve of the abolition of slavery; they incorrectly assumed 
that workers who had been underutilized in the export sector 
could be freely substituted for slaves. As Herbert Gutman 
(1976) and E. P. Thompson (1966) have shown in their studies
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6 6
of the North American and English working classes, sheer 
numbers of workers do not make labor transitions easy. The
|
i lesson of Gutman and Thompson is that men and women bring
{' ;
1 -
| more to the job than their physical presence. Laborers bring
1 relevant skills acquired in the process of working, a useful
C
!.'■ attitude toward work, and a concept of time commensurate
with the form of work organization'*'-- all attributes Marx 
called "labor power" (i.e., the capacity to labor).
Another problematic assumption is that the powerlessness 
of the rural poor made it easy to incorporate them into the 
workforce. While it is true that the squatters' individual 
power was both much less and far more vulnera ble than land­
owners', the troublemaking potential  of the rural free lay 
in many of them retaining squatting rights while landowners 
were trying to mold such free workers into a rural p r o l e ­
tariat. Workers with land had a survival alternative to 
wages and were slow to become the kind of labor force planters 
demanded.
Introduction to the Problem
This analysis is guided by the ass umption that repr es­
sive social control propelled the transition from slave to
^E.P. Thompson's (1966) argument is that the concept 
of time compatible with agriculture is different from that 
of the modern factory and that agricultural workers cannot 
become effective in the industrial sector until they have 
internalized its unique rhythms.
I
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free labor, in contrast to that argument of most nord es- 
tinists’*' that free labor was an evolutionary outgrowth of 
existing work relations. Besides examining the role of social 
control in the labor transition, this study will show that 
increases in repression were a response to the interaction 
of slave depletion, decre ased sugar prices, and the need to 
increase production.
The turning point in the transition to free labor 
occurred when planters beg an defining mar gi n a l i t y  as a c r i m i ­
nal status; the shift in definition was associate d with 
changes in social control strategies. An examination of the 
period of redefinition provides insight into the processes 
involved in the criminali zation of deviance.
















Specialists in the study of the Brazilian Northeast.
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The model suggests that social control was the product of 
changing resource levels and that it facilitated the tr an s­
formation of the mode of production'*' through two different 
processes. The primary objective of the more general process 
was socialization of workers into the export economy (V-2—*V-5) 
Worker socialization was critical because the long-run success 
of the transition turned on converting a segment of the free
} population into a disciplined  work force. Social control
i; '
| served also as a mechani sm of labor re cruitment (V-2— ^ V - 4 - ^ V - 5)
f
| The labor recruitment hypothesis suggests that arrests for
I vagrancy and other public order offenses pr ovided  means of
t.
j. overcoming labor shortages.
Repressive socialization and punitive arrests were 
legitimated by a "moral passage" (Gusfield, 1969). Moral 
passages are periods of redefinition during which once-toler­
ated behavior is redefined as deviant and treated as criminal. 
The moral passage that turned marginals into idlers and p r o ­
vided the ideological justification for treating them as 
criminals gave planters a vehicle for ov ercoming labor sh o r t ­
ages .
The way people organize to make a living. This change 
is frequently referred to as the "labor transition"; however, 
this is an abbreviated term for a process that involves 
changes in political, economic and social structures that 
reach beyond the more limited changes in the organization of 
labor. This study focuses on an aspect of the larger trans ­
formation of labor organization, and leaves other aspects 
of the transformation for the larger study.
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The model represents socialization and labor r e c r u i t ­
ment as two separate processes. In fact, socialization includes 
labor recruitment. Socialization refers to all the strategies 
utilized to secure and mold free marginals into a cheap, 
dependable work force. The pa rti cul ar strategy of securing 
workers through their arrest guaranteed landowners a cheap 
workforce. However, we must not lose sight of the fact that 
such coercive labor recrui tme nt was a late development in 
the moral passage: as long as there were still sufficient
slaves to power the sugar economy, soc ialization and labor 
recruitment were largely n o n - c o e r c i v e ; as slaves became scarce 
and sugar prices fell, soc ialization and labor recrui tme nt 
became more repressive.
Changing Resources and the Moral Passage
Increases in repression against the free populatio n 
must be placed in the context of labor availability, sugar 
production, and sugar's selling price. Labor ava ilability 
is the first piece of the puzzle. As long as slaves were 
plentiful, planters could afford the luxury of using the 
free population only for supplementa ry labor. When there 
were temporary labor shortages, free people were pulled into 
the export sector through the traditional mechanisms of 
feudal rent, sup plementary wages, and corporal punishment. 
However, once free labor became the dominant mode, planters 
began searching for ways to place "free labor on a par with 
slave" (Falla, 1882), and the traditional means for labor
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recruitment were replaced with broad- ba sed coercive strategies.
Several developments joined after the seventies to in­
crease repression against the free population. The market 
price of sugar broke from an average of $87.42 per ton in the 
seventies to an eighties average price of $69.25; in the decade 
of the nineties, prices fell to an average of $48.92; price 
averages thereafter remained at about that level (Table 1) .
The falling prices of the eighties meant that some drastic 
adjustments had to be made if planters  were to mainta in their 
previous profits.
Planters' first adjustment to falling prices was to 
raise output; 1880's average annual output was almost double
| that of the seventies, and it rose still more in the nineties
! ...
i (Table 2). Furthermore, these substantial increases cannot
j,
be attributed to technological improvements, since the first 
central mills (largely failures anyway) did not begin o pera ­
tion until the 1885-86 harvest, and the big sugar refineries 
(USINAS) did not take hold until the turn of the century. 
Consequently, higher total output was due principal ly to larger
i;
| labor inputs, which from the eighties onward could have come
only from the free population.
In the absence of technology to increase productivity, 
there were three broad strategies to extract greater amounts 
of labor from free workers; planters could raise wages to 
give the free population a greater work incentive; landowners 
could evict squatters to force them into wage dependence; 
and/or they could use the repressive agencies of the state
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Table 1: Average of Annual Recife Sugar Price Index and
Range by Period, 1860-1914
Period
r
1860-1969 $87.09 ($77.22- 97.99)
1870-1879 87.42 ( 74.43-101.64)
1880-1889 65 .92 ( 43.66- 84.77)
1890-1899 48 . 92 ( 34.10- 69.93)
1900-1909 45 . 84 ( 27.40- 83.85)
1910-1914* 49.25 ( 33.45- 60.92)
‘Figures were not available for the entire decade. 
Source: Calculated from Denslow (1974:17-18).
‘'"Prices in United States gold dollars.
i
Prices
Average Annual Recife Range of Annual
Price Index (Dollars Average (Dollars
Per Ton)^ Per Ton)
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i  Table 2: Average Annual Sugar Produc tion in Pernambuco and








i Annual Average Range of Annual
; (Tons/Year) Averages (Tons/
[ Year)
1850-1859 63,630 ( 47,630- 82,830)
1860-1869 58,880 ( 42,240- 77,880)
1870-1879 89,520 ( 45,540-141,900)
1880-1889 150 ,740 (101,300-205,700)
1900-1909 144,780 ( 97,570-216,700)
1910-1915 154,660 (132,000-176,000)
Source: Calculated from Denslow (1974:9-10).
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to coerce the free into working for the planters for next 
to nothing.
Wages could have provided a no n-c oercive inducement 
for the free population to,work in the export sector, but 
wages in the eighties and nineties were too low to reward 
free workers for doing what they had always avoided (Table 3) . 
Furthermore, to merely maintain profits at the customary level, 
with sugar prices so low, planters had to find some way to 
prevent total labor costs from rising. It was especially 
difficult to reduce labor costs and shift to free labor since 
free workers required wages. However, the sugar barons a p ­
parently minimized the economic shock of the labor transition 
by cutting wages. Table 3 shows that both real and nominal 
wages began declining in the 1870's, and plumm ete d unevently 
through the eighties, to hit rock bottom in 1890. Although 
nominal wages then climbed steeply in the nineties, real 
wages crept up slowly due to high inflation.
Wages from the m i dd le of the nineteen th century to the 
early twentieth were not very much of a work incentive so 
planters were left with free laborers who lived up to their 
reputation of working only "long enough to obtain the most 
basic necessities" and behav ing as if "to be free is to have 
the liberty not to work." The sugar barons thus were left 
with two remaining strategies to get more work from the free 
population. They could evict squatters and force wage d e ­
pendency (marginalize squatters), and/or make greater use 
of the legislative and law-enforcement agencies to force




i Table 3: Minimum Daily Wages of Unskilled Rural Labor in


















1895 1 , 200 283
1897 1, 500 291
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squatters and other free persons into the plantation work 
force. Let us take up the question of marginali zation first.
The central question is why would landowners force 
squatters off the soil and introduce a wage system, however 
inadequate, when revenues were poor and they could already 
secure labor in exchange for squatting rights? The answer 
is that under pr evailing conditions landowners needed a 
a greater amount of labor than they had previo usly had: with
production expanding, plante rs required six to seven work days 
a week from resident moradores rather than the customary three 
or four.
Planters could gain much tighter control (e.g. more 
work days and greater productivity) over squatters by s e p a r a ­
ting them from their means of support and forcing wage d e ­
pendence as the only way to avoid starvation. The problem 
is clarified by Marx's story of "Mr. Peel," who took 3,000 
"persons of the working c l a s s — men, women, and children--to 
Australia expecting them to work on his plantation. But with 
land available for the taking, laborers preferred to start 
their own farms and Mr. Peel was left without a labor force" 
(Marx, 1906) .
The question of whether margin alization  was used must 
remain open. Data on evictions are difficult to obtain b e ­
cause planters' informal expulsions of squatters were not 
recorded and travelers did not mention large-scale evictions. 
There is evidence for margi nal ization during the twentieth 
century (Hewitt, 1969; Taylor, 1969) and the careful researcher 
might be able to find it for an earlier period as well.
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However, in order to limit this research to manageable p r o ­
portions, the question of squatter evictions has been set 
aside and full attention given to the role of state-initiated 
social control in the transformation.
The deviant label is usually applied to acts t h r e a t e n ­
ing to someone or something. It is essential to determine why 
some acts pose a threat and others do not. Steven Spitzer (1975) 
maintains that people are defined as deviant when they threaten 
the social relations of production in a particular system. 
Spitzer's dictum need not imply that deviants are motivated 
by revolutionary objectives, only that people are labeled d e v i ­
ant when their behavior and/or personal qualities repres ent a 
"significant impediment to the maintenance and growth of a 
system" (Spitzer, 1975). A population becomes a problem 
and a "social expense" when it undermines wealth accumulation.
By refusing to participate in Pernambuco's export sector 
as slavery declined, free people contributed to the erosion 
of planters' resources; without a large work force, pr oduction 
could not expand to compensate for low sugar prices. Those 
conditions turned the free population into a social expense. 
However, it is useful to remember that the free pop ulation 
was not always a debt; in fact, before the end of the slave 
trade, free men and women, as a surplus population, were part 
of the planters' resources, for they provided cheap back-up 
services for slave-powered e n g e n h o s . Free people became an
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The Sources of Deviance and Social Control
expense when the slave population declined and the free r e ­
fused (directly or indirectly) to fill slave vacancies in 
the export sector- In Pernambuco, the threat to wealth a c ­
cumulation was resolved by repressive social control: r e p r e s ­
sion effected the transition to free labor and turned the 
social debts back into assets.
Let us now turn to conditions in the zona da mata and 
see how Spitzer's ideas fit the general model. As the previous 
chapter argued, Pernambuco's pre-1850 rural labor structure
( •
consisted of two separate but interrelated work systems:
I ■
[. slaves produced the cash crop while a surplus population of
i
j feudally-organized free producers provided a number of extra-
i- economic support services. However, it must be stressed that
|
while free producers constituted the surplus population prior 
to 1850, they had not become what Spitzer calls a "proble m
■ p opulat io n. "-----------
|
f It is a mistake to equate a surplus population with a
problem population because a surplus of unemployed can enhance 
rather than menace produc tion by provid ing  cheap, supplementary 
labor for employers who already have a more or less permanent 
work force. A surplus population becomes a social expense 
when it undermines the accumulation of wealth (Spitzer, 1975).
The mono-crop, slave-powered agricultural system created m a r ­
ginals and laid the foundation for turning them into a prob lem 
population, but did not itself create the problem.
The Northeast's slave-dominated, export-oriented a g r i ­
cultural system created a surplus of unemployed marginals by
B
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its very operation. In the first place, there was a shortage 
of stable work in the export sector due to the wide-spread  
use of slaves. Secondly, free people exercised a good deal 
of self-exclusion because the ass ociation between slavery 
and work gave manual labor a bad name. Finally, extreme 
dependence on foreign demand created large variations in 
labor requirements? when demand was high, some of the free 
population were pulled into the export sector; with export 
decline, large numbers of supplementary workers were left 
"stranded outside the social order in a condition of poverty" 
(Prado, 1967:19). Prado describes the Northeast's marginals 
as
i n d i v i d u a l s ... with no proper means of livelihood, no 
fixed or decently paid employment, (who ) ma int ained  
themselves by begging or (were) driven to some d i s r e ­
putable or dishonest way of making  a 1 i v i n g ...(P r a d o ,
1967:333) .
According to a source cited by Prado (1967), forty to 
fifty percent of the population in the colonial period was
marginal in the sense described above. However, by all ac-
1 2 
counts (Prado, 1967 ; Schwartz , 1973b, Levine, 1979) , the
Schwartz (1973b) writes about the kinds of conflicts 
that were taken to court during the colonial period, but 
makes almost no mention of any wides pread vagrancy problem 
or the crime of drunkenness.
2
Levine reports that planters had trouble with squatters 
but indicates that the problems were within planters' control 
capabilities, suggesting that the situation was not so out 
of control that it required the assistance of outside a u t h o r i ­
ties.
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erratic work habits and nomadic life-style of the dependent 
poor were neither major social nor criminal problems r e q u i r ­
ing formal, outside intervention. At most, squatters were 
an inconvenience to landowners, but usually the probl ems  they 
caused could be handled within the confines of the plantation. 
A squatter who did not produce the required amount of food 
or failed to supply supplementary labor was expelled from 
the property and his house and crops burned (Levine, 1979). 
State intervention was minimal, serving to supplement rather 
than supplant plantation -b ased social control. When it did 
come, state int ervention was re pre sente d by national guard 
recruiters who swept through the countryside impressing idlers 
into the passing military units.
So long as slaves were plenti ful there was no need to 
correct the un desirable qualities of the rural poor, but as 
the slave pop ulati on  declined planters began to look upon 
free peoples' unwillingness to work  in an entirely new light.
It was a simple fact that, with the slave population depleted, 
landowners could not afford to see free people engaged in 
non-wealth p r o du cing activities. Consequently, after 1850, 
being free and without work having irregular work habits, or 
simply moving around too much became problems for the planters, 
and ultimately for the police and law-makers.
This shift in the definition of marginality illustrates 
what Gusfield (1967) calls a "moral passage". A moral p a s ­
sage facilitated the transition to free labor by providing 
an ideological justification for increased repression against
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the free population.
The transition's moral passage went through two stages, 
each involving diffe ren t definitions of the labor crisis and 
ways of coping with  it. Labor scarcity was the issue of the 
day during the first phase, kicked off by the forced c e s s a ­
tion of the African slave trade in 1850. At that time, "labor 
scarcity" was equated with an insufficiency of slaves rather 
than a shortage of free labor. During the labor scarcity phase 
of the transition, traditional mechanisms of labor recruitment 
predominated; state intervention was generally not concerned
with repression, be in g directed instead at limiting the slave 
drain and co ncentrating  the remai ning slaves in the export
sector, the latter was accomplished by regulating planters' 
utilization of their bondsmen.
As the peri od progres sed and planters incorporated more 
free people into the workforce, the issue of labor scarcity 
was replaced by talk of the "labor problem". That definition 
of the situation evolved because free workers failed to come 
forth in sufficient numbers to fill slave vacancies, and b e ­
cause their job perfo rmance was well below planters' e xpecta ­
tions. Lest we assume that some particula r new quality of 
the free population was totally responsible for the planters' 
change in posture, we must remember that with the slave force 
contracting and produ ction expanding, planters could no longer 
allow free workers to remain outside the export sector. 
Planters wanted to make free labor equivalent to slave labor: 
with that attitude, any deviation from the master-slave
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relationship was intolerable. In order to achieve their o b ­
jectives in the labor problem phase, planters set aside many 
of the traditional mechanisms of control in favor of broader 
repressive strategies.
The Moral Passage: Labor Scarcity 1850-1880
Slaves
The cessation of the African slave trade posed a more 
serious threat to the labor supply than any other factor: 
even high slave mortality could be offset so long as nothing 
prohibited importation. Once the slave trade ended, however, 
planters began to think of alt ernative labor sources, but 
the emphasis was on supplementing rather than replac ing  slave 
labor. Planters began using free workers, although with great 
reluctance. As one powerful figure observed, slave labor still 
exists and "we are not accustomed to free labor...se we are 
like a man who has old habits and does not know how to adapt 
himself to new circumstances" (Falla, 1875).
Slave prices rose as their numbers declined, e n c o u r a g ­
ing many landowners to divest themselves of slaves in order 
to pay debts. A regular slave trade developed between the 
Northeast and Center-South because coffee planters were hungry 
for slaves and ready to buy all the sugar barons could supply. 
During the first ten years of the inter-provincial slave trade, 
between one thousand and fifteen hundred slaves left Pernambuco 
annually, and by the time it ended in the early 1880's it is 
estimated that between 23,000 and 38,000 slaves had made the
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journey from Pernambuco South (Eisenberg, 1975: 156-157). 
Eisenberg (.974:157) explains that the imposition of the high 
entry taxes in the Center-South after 1881 ended the inter­
provincial trade and that taxes were levied to pr event  a slave- 
drained Northeast from supporting abolition.
It may seem contradictory to claim that planters w o r ­
ried about a shortage of slaves then they were busily selling 
them to the Center-South. Indeed, not everyone supported the 
slave drain: two years after the inter-provincial trade b e ­
gan, Pernambuco imposed an exist tax of 100,000 reis on each 
slave leaving the Province; the tax was increased to 200,000 
reis in 1859 (Eisenberg, 1974:156). Furthermore, some planters 
did not sell their slaves (after 1873), approximately four 
tenths of one pe rcent  of the slave population was sold an ­
nually (Reis, 1974:11), and even fewer planters divested them­
selves of their entire slave force. It is reasonable to assume 
that each landowner had a rough calculation of how many slaves 
he could sell (allowing for deaths) and still produce sugar 
with supplementary free labor.
Talk of abolition fed planters' fears about a labor 
shortage and as their fears increased, so did strategies to 
secure the remaining slave population. The free womb law 
was a nice compromise between the pro and anti-abolitionist 
positions in that it gave freedom to the children of slave 
women born after 1871 with the stipulation that freed children 
remain in the service of the mother's master until they reached 
twenty-one. In exchange, the depend ent minors of slave women
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
83
were supported by the master. That clause helped planters 
retain the skeleton of a slave mode of production even as the 
slave population declined and generated a stratum of the w o r k ­
ing population that some held to be preferable to slaves, since 
if the slaves "dies, it is a loss of 1,300 reis or more to 
its owner; the same does not apply to the ingenuo who is 
always sent to do more dangerous tasks, since if he dies, it 
is his own loss" (Reis, 1974:9).
Laws guaranteeing gradual abolition and taxes on slaves 
sold to the south provided one way of maintaining the slave 
population at a level that could support the economy. In 
addition to those strategies, planters exercised a good deal 
of self-help by using slaves in the most efficient w a y -  
transferring slaves from domestic service into the export 
sector, and concentrating them in milli ng rather than the 
fields (Reis, 1974:10). Those adjustments seem to have been 
successful because although free workers outnumbered slaves 
on Pernambucan sugar plantations in the 1870's, slaves p r o ­
duced over half the annual output (Reis, 1974:7).
Provincial and municipal taxes provided additional insurance 
that slaves would be used in the most efficient way: c o n c e n ­
trated in agriculture rather than employed in urban o c c u p a ­
tions. Taxes were levied as early as the fifties to discourage 
slave owners from using their captives in urban occupations.
In 1352, a tax was imposed on slaves working as artisans and 
mechanics in Recife (Diegues, 1952-56: 49-50); in the 1870's,
the city fathers began imposing taxes on the earnings of
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slaves working as ganhadores (slaves for hire). Eventually 
all slaves working in the provincial  capital were taxed so 
that "they might apply themselves to agriculture, leaving 
free workers the various (urban) jobs that slaves had performed' 
(Diegues, 1952-56 : 50) .
However, if taxation worked at all, it only attacked 
the problem of getting slaves out of the city and into the 
export sector. It had become patently  clear by the seventies 
that even though planters could produ ce the cash crop with 
a relatively small slave force, free labor would eventually 
become dominant in the export sector. Many high ranking 
Pernambucans conceded that slaves would not be available 
forever, and that free workers had to be moulded into a d is ­
ciplined work force.
Provincial President Cavalcante de Alburquerque (Falla,
1871) seemed aware of these points in 1871 when he warned that
the question of labor, involving the grave pr oblem of 
substituting free labor for the actual instruments of 
production will soon impose itself on the state...
(and) substitution is urged by the times...
But opinion was divided in the seventies over the economic
implications of the loss of slaves. An optimistic assessment
by President Cavalcante de Alburquerque (Falla, 1871) was
that "in spite of the decrease in slave labor, agriculture
has not wasted"; a more pessimistic observer in the seventies,
President Periera de Lucena (Falla, 1875), reasoned that it
was "giving up the slaves that prejudiced agriculture".
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Free Labor During the Labor Scarcity Phase
Landowners could come up with a number of good reasons 
for clinging to slaves, not the least of which was their 
perception of the free population as lazy, unreliable, and 
totally lacking the "readiness and continuity" of slaves 
(in Reis, 1974:9). Even when planters could find enough 
free people who would perform pl ant ation  agriculture, they 
reported that they could not get a good day's work of these 
hired hands, because free workers only remained in the fields 
"long enough to obtain the most basic necessities " (Diaro
de P e r n a m b u c o , 1882).
However, the elite adopted a more generous attitude 
toward the free population as the slave shortage became 
acute, conceding that not all free people were a loss to 
the sugar e c o n o m y - o n l y  a portion of them. President 
Cavalcante de Alburq uerqu e even rejected the often heard 
claim that "our people are lazy and incapable of agr i c u l ­
tural labor" (Falla, 1871), pr eferring to believe instead 
that even though a segment of the population was "profoundly 
demoralized, even lost," planters could obtain useful labor 
from the majority of free workers. In order to realize that 
objective, the President recommended in 1871 that the state 
establish agricultural schools to teach free workers the 
"sacred skills" of agriculture, with the Beggars' Asylum 
and the O r p h a n s ' School annexed to agricultural compounds 
so that destitute beggars and orphans could be "regenerated"
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through work.
The Beggars 1 Asy lum and O r p h a n s ' School are illustrative 
of the first-sta te-fu nded "retraining" programs di rec ted  at 
the free population. The Recife Commercial As sociation had 
been the moral force behind the establish ment of the Beggars' 
Asylum in 1860. The institution's objective was to "correct 
and regenerate the unhappy victims of misery" (Falla, 1861).
The state's rehabilitation program could not have been a 
smashing success since the first asylum was simply in a 
room in Recife's Pedro II Hospital with a capacity for 
twenty beggars. In the late 1 87 0' s, a permanent facility 
was completed (capacity 100) after a series of financial 
s e t b a c k s .
The Orphans' School (Colonia Orphanologico  I s a b e l ) was 
established in 1874 on the grounds of the Pimenteiras Military 
Colony in order to provide "abandoned orphans and free c h i l ­
dren of slave women an opportunity to become peaceful and 
moral citizens, useful to themselves and their country"
(Falla, 1874). In the Colonia Isabel, children would study 
the arts, industry, and "above all," agriculture (Falla, 1874).
Note that the orphans' colony was established three 
years after the passage of the free womb law, to assist, 
among others, the orphaned children of slave women. The 
orphans' assistance provided by the colony made it possible 
to keep the children of slave women in agriculture even if 
the master freed them at eight. For, as "abandoned" i n g e n u o s , 
they were eligible for "rehabilitation" and training in.the
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orphans' colony.
In 1874, the President of the Province voiced his s up­
port for the Orphans' School: "From an infancy that is m i s ­
erable, ignorant, and abandoned come, soon or later, a whole 
class of no-goods..." (Falla, 1874). The President, Pereira 
de Lucena, stressed his commitment to elementary education, 
and reminded his constitutents that "a society must educate 
its children" because moral and religious instruction along 
with elementary and professional education "clarify and 
elevate the spirit and give (orphans) the means to work."
And "work", the President added, "in all cases removes crime" 
(Falla, 1874). For President Periera de Lucena, therefore, 
the Colonia Isabel offered great promise, since it would 
mount a frontal attack on crime by teaching orphans a 
t r a d e .
If we cut through the laudable objectives of the 
Orphans' School and examine its goals more pragmatically, 
it is clear that the Colonia offered a way of socializing 
some free workers into the export sector. Remember that 
in 1871 Provincial President Cavalcante de Albuquerque 
pointed to the value of cooperation between institutions 
for indigents and business concerns; he argued that the 
economy could profit from annexing an orphans' school and 
beggars asylum to an agricultural disciplinary  colony. 
President Cavalcante de Albuquerque reasoned that such 
cooperation would provide agriculture with an infusion of 
trained, disciplined free workers while rehabi litating the
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"unhappy victims of misery" (Falla, 1871). The a d mini st ra­
tors of the Colonia Isabel must have concurred with that 
proposal because Provincial President Pereira de Lucena 
reported in 1875 that "in conformity with contractual ar­
rangements ... sixteen students of t h i s ... school were delivered 
to the owner of a...fa ctory in order to learn the principles 
of milling" (Falla, 1875).
Summary: The Labor Scracity Phase of the Transition
During the first decades of the labor transition, planters 
were worried about labor shortages because of the disappearance 
of slaves. Talk of abolition was met with laws to insure that 
it proceed gradually; the slave drain was attacked by t a x a ­
tion. Landowners could not see free workers as the dominant 
labor force in the export sector, and warned that abolition 
would result in a dramatic reduction in the production and 
export of our sugar, with fatal consequences for private and 
public wealth" (in Reis, 1974:8).
Planters had begun to complain about the undiscipline 
of free labor, but so long as free workers were merely s u p ­
plementary to slaves, state-initiated remedies were relatively 
"soft" and directed at only a fraction of the free population. 
Broad-based repressive strategies would not be implemented 
until the eighties when the scarcity of slaves made it clear 
that the planters would have to do their work with the free 
p op ul ation.
8r£>-3J4«v,„
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The Moral Passage: Labor Problems, 1880-189 0
The first Recife A g r i c u l t u r a l  Congr e s s  (1878) best marks 
the b e g i n n i n g  of the "labor p r o bl ems" phase of the t r an si tion  
to free labor. At that convention, pl an t e r s  a r t i c u l a t e d 
what was to be the domi n a n t  social control strategy  in the 
years s ur ro unding abolition. One p a r t i c i p a n t  made the 
s tr ate gy abun d a n t l y  clear in his call for a "severe police 
regime..., to which all ind iv iduals w it ho ut trade or craft 
will be subjected" (in Eise nberg,  1974:196); another urged 
a u t h o ri ties to "oblige the lazy to work (because) the ag- 
g olmer at ion of idle men in the large p o p u l a t i o n  centers is 
an imminen t danger, a p o s t p o n e d  and brutal r e v o l ut ion" (in 
Eisenberg, 1974: 196-197).
By the eighties, the bat tle lines had been drawn; the 
war was aga ins t the men and women who though t that "to be 
free is to have the libe rty not to work" (Eisenberg 1974:195). 
Once the enemy had been identified, the bat tle st rat eg y was 
clear: a plant er / s t a t e  al liance would o r c h e s t r a t e  the t r a n s i ­
tion while repr es sion p r o p e l l e d  it.
Another farm congre ss s p o ns ored by the ant i-abolitionist 
Sociedade A u x i l i a d o r a  da A g r i c u l t u r a  de P e r n a m b u c o  was held 
in 1884. The 1878 c o nv en tion had cons i d e r e d  a num be r of 
issues besi des the labor question, p a r t i c i p a n t s  at the 1884 
congress conc e n t r a t e d  their at t e n t i o n  on a b o li ti on and the 
con se qu ent labor pr ob l e m s  (Eisenberg, 1974:168). One c o n ­
ference pa r t i c i p a n t  re minded his fellow d e l eg ates that
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although two-thirds of the sugar ground in Pernambuco was 
cultivated by wage l a b o r e r s i t s  processing cannot be done 
without slave labor, the only one which under present c o n d i ­
tions guarantees the success of the harvest" (in Reis, 1974:9) 
Another worried planter warned that abolition would result 
in a "dramatic reduction in the production and export of our 
sugar, with fatal consequences to private and public wealth" 
(Reis, 1974:8). Their message was clear; without slavery 
the economy was doomed.
Slaves During the Labor Problems Phase
Most planters in the eighties still preferred slaves, 
although there was growing, if reluctant, acceptance of the 
necessity for free labor. Slaves were the first choice b e ­
cause "free labor is without discipline, bringin g only 
workers with all the vices and defects of a dangerous p o p u ­
lation addicted to robbery, who work only to obtain the most 
basic necessities" (D iaro De P e r n a m b u c o ,1882) . The upshot 
was that even on the eve of abolition, planters still searched 
for a way to get the most out of their remaining slaves.
An editoralist in 1882 (Diario de P e r n a m b u c o , 1882), 
argued that one way to do this was by legally restricting 
slaves to the rural areas, since "slaves a r e ... necessary for 
agriculture and (we must) use them for it only." He p r o ­
posed reserving urban occupations for free labor because it 
"is useless to stubbornly pursue slave labor where it is 
not necessary. ", The author of that proposal argued that 
forcing free people to accept a disciplined work routine
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in the city would facilitate the transition to free labor 
because the free would then be able to apply themselves to 
agricultural labor more successfully once they had worked 
steadily in the urban setting.
Planters' hysteria about the loss of slave labor and 
the substitution of free labor was really remarkable when 
one considers that by the eighties, slaves produced only 
one-fourth of the sugar shipped from the state (Reis, 1974:7), 
and that there was an abundance of cheap labor on sugar 
plantations in the years following the 1877-1879 backlands 
drought. Cuniff (1970) reports that it was not by chance 
that drough t refugees ended up on sugar plantations. As 
urban densit y increased/Recife officials be gan moving drought 
refugees to sugar plantations where they could provide ser­
vices to landowners hungry for cheap labor. However, in 
spite of what should have been an idyllic situation for 
planters (i.e., a surplus of impoverished migrants), land­
owners began calling for a law obliging free workers to 
perform agricultural labor.
Free Labor During the Labor Problems Phase
The same 1882 editorialist who wanted to restrict slaves 
to agriculture and free workers to the urban area suggested 
forcing free workers to sign work contracts because "there 
is not pers istent  work without force, and that is what the 
free worker presently needs" (Di^rio de Pernambuco, 1882).
The editorialist reasoned that the best place to implement
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the work contract proposal was in the capital city, Recife, 
where the initial indiscipline of free labor would not 
seriously threaten export production. Politicians came 
closest to realizing that objective in an 1887 Recife City 
Ordinance (Postura M u n i c i p a l , 1887) regulating the em p l o y ­
ment of c r i a d o s . Criados included all people working as 
domestic servants, as well as restaurant and hotel service 
workers. The 1887 statute stipulated that no one could be 
a criado in Recife without a contract certified by the Chief 
of Police. Presumably the Criado law kept some free workers 
under more discipline by bi nd ing them to an employer with 
the chief of police as the third party to the contract.
Nev ertheless police offici als had not been without 
weapons in their war against the undatifu.1 free population. 
The vagrancy statute long since enacted with its a c c om pany­
ing termo de bem v i v e r ,^ provided a means of extracting 
labor from unwilling workers. According to the Brazilian 
Penal Code (1830), a vagrant was any person lacking a fixed 
residence, withou t an "honest" occupation or one offensive 
to public morals or good- c u s t o m s . An individual adjudged 
vagrant was required to sign a termo de bem viver (kept by 
the local Justice of the Peace) obliging the law-breaker 
to secure honest employment within fifteen days. Failure
^"Terms of good behavior" a written promise between 
the signer and the police to secure honest employment.
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to do so, or rearrest for vagrancy, resulted in three years 
imprisonment. Vagrant children were sent to disciplinary 
industrial establishments until they reached twenty-one.
Vaga bon ds were not the only ones required to sign a 
termo. It was also designed for habitual drunks, beggars, 
and "turbulent" individuals who "offend good customs by 
words or acts (or who ) offend the public peace or the 
peace of families" (Codigo Penal do B r a z i l , 1830).. The l a t ­
ter stipulation was siffici ent ly vague to cover a lot of 
individuals. In so doing, the statute could provide a quick 
solution for labor shortages.
The main problem with the termo and vagrancy statute 
was that they were unenforceable, but it is interesting that 
there were few published complaints about the unenforceability 
of the statutes until the eighties. The eighties, however, 
marked a turning point; as the need for cheap labor increased 
so did programs to impress free workers into the labor force. 
In the year of abolition (1888), the Recife Chief of Police 
called for an agricultural penal colony for recidivist v a ­
grants; two years later, the head of one of the major banks 
demanded additional poo r-houses and asylums, and "strict 
penalties for vagabonds and beggars who did not enter such 
institutions" (in Eisenberg, 1974:197).
Apparently these proposals reached the Governor's ear, 
because in 1890 he recommended that the state establish a 
disciplinary agricultural colony for "all individuals who 
do not dedicate themselves to work, or who do not look for
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it, or for being vagrants" (M e n s a g e m , 1890). He added that 
idlers would be incarcerated whe ther they were out of work 
because "they can't find it" or because of "personal vice."
The Governor reminded law enforcement officials that they 
could begin immediately "regenerating" the idle through 
forced work by sending idlers to one of the abandoned drought 
relocation camps now reopened for this purpose. The Governor's 
choice for the first agricultural penal colony was the Fazenda 
Suassana drought camp, conveniently located in a rich sugar 
i municipality near Recife (M e n s a g e m , 1890).
Transporting the people arrested for vagrancy and as ­
sociated vices from Recife to the Fazenda Suassana could not 
have posed a major problem because a precedent had been set 
during the 1377-79 drought in the sertao for moving large 
numbers of backlands refugees in and around Recife to o u t ­
lying areas. Moreover, officials did not have to let a lack 
of space keep them from strictly enforcing vagrancy laws 
because the abandoned refugee camps could house thousands.
Roger Cuniff (1970 : 253)reports that at the peak of the great 
drought (June 1878) a refugee relocation camp similar to the 
Fazenda Suassana contained over eleven hundred families, or 
approximately 9,000 people.
Besides founding new cor rectional facilities to house 
idlers, politicians of the 1890's expanded the def inition 
of vagrancy. However, it was the extra-legal definition 
that changed; the legal description of a vagrant was the 
same in the 1830 and 1890 Penal Code. Changing definitions
I
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of the problem population can be seen in the target p o p u ­
lation of the agricultural colony proposed in 1890. It 
would house, in addition to vagrants, two new categories of 
deviants: "People not dedicating themselves to work" or
"Not looking for it" (M a n s a g e m , - 1890). Thus in 1890 the 
ablebodied who could work but elected not to had joined the 
traditional vagrants to become the problem population.
In the nineties, the most popular strategies of labor 
recruitment continued to be law-making and enforcement. 
Politicians wanted forced labor laws while police officials 
called for institutions to make existing statutes enforceable. 
However, it appears that 1890's planters did not find a d ­
ditional penal colonies the answer to their labor problems.
In 1893 Pernambucan politicians drew up a forced labor law 
entitled "Project 7" (Jornal do Recife April 7, 1893).
Project 7 would have required agricultural workers to sign 
work contracts with landowners; it forbade workers from 
travelling between municipalities to seek employment w i t h ­
out a travel voucher from the Justice of the Peace. Any 
agricultural worker without a contract and a travel voucher 
was subject to punishment for vagrancy. Landowners would 
literally have had the rural poor both coming and going with 
Project Seven: if agricultural workers did not sign a
work contract, they were to be subject to arrest as vagrants, 
and the only way someone caught without a contract would 
be able to defer punishment would be to sign a termo ob l i g ­
ing the law-breaker to secure honest employment within
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fifteen days. Workers traveling to seek employment needed 
permission from the landowners' Justices.
In spite of its obvious utility to landowners, Project 
Seven was never passed. Eisenb erg  (1974:197) argues that 
such proposals did not become law because men who had just 
abolished slavery were not disposed toward new forms of co­
erced labor. Perhaps it would be satisfying to believe 
Eisenberg's interpretation but everything in this chapter 
suggests the contrary. In fact, planters and politicians 
began searching for ways to force free people to work as 
soon as slaves became scarce. A more plausible argument 
than Eisenberg's is that only when labor-saving technology 
and the loss of the world market had reduced the industry's 
labor dependence in the early twentieth century would state- 
initiated coercion become unnecessary to secure a work force.
However, during the nineties, politicians clearly d e ­
clared their belief that state power must be used to reg u ­
late the undisciplined labor force. For example, Governor 
s
Correa de Araujo (M e n s a g e m , 1898) was even more expansive 
of state power than previous officials in arguing that 
nothing short of a reorganization of the state's punishment 
apparatus could solve the vagrancy problem. The Governor's 
program included "penitentiaries...; asylums for beggars, 
correctional schools for m i n o r s ... (and) penal colonies for 
recidivists..." He justified his proposal with the warning 
that "without those endowments, you can expect the black 
army of crime, and ex-convicts returning to society without
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work habits, to return to their criminal careers" (M a n s a a e m ■ 
1898) .
Change in the direction of the Governor's recommendations 
had begun earlier. The state converted the Orphans' Colony, 
Colonia Isabel, into a di scipl inary industrial school r e ­
named the Escola Industrial Frei C a n e c a . Everyt hing suggests 
that the Orphans' School had become a complement to the sugar 
industry, for in 1887 the pr ovi ncial  president reported that 
(Falla, 1887) the school had an engenho with the capacity 
to turn out 5,000 kilograms a year of "excellent quality" 
sugar, as well as the machi nery to make rum. In addition 
to providing skills for the sugar economy, the Orphans'
School was training children as shoesmiths, blacksmiths, 
tailors, and carpenters. The main objective of the Orphans' 
Co lon y-turne d-industrial-school was "to create professionals 
for large and small farming as well as agro-industry 
(Mensagem. 1895). While the regulations of the Escola Frei 
Caneca did not specify that vagrant minor's would make up much 
of the student body, it is likely that they did since the 
vagrancy law and termo stated that vagrants under twenty- 
one would be sent to such establishments.
Reorganization of the state's punishment apparatus was 
in full swing as the nineties drew to a close. Next on the 
agenda was Law 370 (Leis do E s t a d o , 1899) which budgeted 
an additional agricultural disciplinary colony for adults 
and an industrial school for minors. The law outlined the 
institutions' objectives and stipulated that the inmate
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populations of both institutions would be limited to beggars, 
drunkards, vagrants, and capoeiras . 1
Most past proposals for additional correctional f aci ­
lities had become bogged down because the police had to await the 
construction of appropriate facilities before enforcing the 
vagrancy laws. This time the law-makers had been far-sighted 
enough to include in Law 370 a clause that made it possible 
to take more immediate action agains t the pr oble m population. 
Article Five stipulated that individuals or associations could 
set up agr icultural penal colonies. That gave landowners 
or corporate usineiros the go-ahead to turn their plantations 
into agricultural colonies to rehabilitate idlers; it also 
gave them a steady supply of cheap labor. The state also 
benefitted from this arrangement because it was spared the 
expense of m ain ta ining a large inmate population. Whether 
landowners and the police actual ly worked together to realize 
the labor rec ruitment possibilities of Law 370 cannot be 
ascertained from the available data. It is clear, however, 
that Article Five gave them the go-ahead for such cooperation.
Law-making directed at pu lling  the free population into 
the export sector decelerated after the turn of the century.
It was not until 1923 that a Governor's annual report again 
spoke of the criminal problem posed by idlers and vagrants. 
However, by that time the sugar industry's labor dependence 
had been reduced by technological developments and the loss 
of foreign markets. The highest state official, therefore,
^Public dancers trained in one type of martial art.
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could afford a more benevolent posture toward the poor, 
though not toward idlers. Governor Sergio Loreto (Falla, 
1923) affirmed that vagrants, drunkards, beggars, and 
capoeiras were the state's "social parasites", but he reco m­
mended that police officials overlook the "legitimate paupers 
among this population. Governor Loreto explained that legi­
timate paupers were those who "don't have the ability to
work," as well as those with "the ability, but not the
means" (M e n s a g e m , 1923). However, no pressure was to be
spared against those who have "the ability and the means
(to work) but lack the desire"; they were, he said, "a 
stratum of dangerous indigents against whom preventive 
and repressive measures are necessary", a familiar litany 
from the late 19th century.
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CHAPTER IV
CRIMES OF THE MO RAL PASSAGE: 
PUNITIVE ARRESTS FOR LABOR RECRUITMENT
Introduction
There is little doubt that by the late 1870's planters 
and politicians were ready to use repressive means to secure 
workers for the sugar economy. No one could have made a 
stronger case for forced labor than the angry planter at th 
1878 Recife Agricultural Congress who demanded "a severe 
police regime..., to which all individuals without trade or 
craft be subjected" (Eisenberg, 1974:196). Four years later 
a newspaper editorialist insisted that, "there is not p e r ­
sistent work wi thout  force, and that is what the free worker 
presently needs" (Diario de P e r n a m b u c o , 1882).
These statements suggest the elite's readiness to use 
repression against unwilling free workers. However, r e a d i ­
ness does not always translate into public policy. This 
chapter examines arrest statistics to see if the police car­
ried out the elite's directives. The theoretical model 
(Chapter I) represents labor recruitment arrests as moral 
passage crime (V-4). The labor recruitment hypothesis p r o ­
poses that certain crime rates increased because enforcement 
patterns changed in response to resource depletion.
Linsky's paper on crime waves (1979) discusses the p r o b ­
lems of interpretation associated with rate fluctuations, 
and in his typology of crime waves lays bare the logic of
100
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such changes. Two of Linsky's crime waves ("moral passage" 
and "true prevalence") correspond to two types of rate 
fluctuations. In "true prevalence" crime waves, actors 
actually change their behavior and in doing so move with 
greater frequency across alr eady-established normative 
boundaries into non-normative behaviors; by contrast, in 
moral passages, crime rates increase, not because deviance 
has grown, but due to shifts in the placemen t and en fo rce­
ment of normative boundar ies (Linsky, 1979) .
In order to make the case for moral passage increases, 
the researcher must demonstrate what seems paradoxical: 
increases in official crime rates and stability over 
time in the real occurrence ("real rate") of these types 
of behavior. Crime statistics are relati vely simple to 
obtain; but demonstrating that there have been no real 
increases in such behavi or requires independent information 
about the actual behavior patterns of the relevant p o p u l a ­
tion; evidence for the latter is usually much more difficult 
to obtain. Victimization studies and various qualitative 
historical documents could provide such data since both 
offer independent evidence on the amount of criminality 
in the population. Official crime statistics alone are 
insufficient since they vary according to the changing 
definitions of crime, as well as the actual incidence of 
particular behaviors.
Therefore, official crime rates can only provide part 
of the data to test the labor recruitment hypothesis. Since
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victimization studies are unavailable, historical materials 
will be drawn together to provide information about the 
actual occurrence of certain kinds of deviance within the 
Pernambucan population.
Material Resources, Marginality, and Deviance
Chapter Two made the point that marginality (the deviant 
behavior in question) had been endemic to free status as 
long as slaves were the dominant labor force in the export 
sector. Contrary  to what planters and politicians thought, 
or at least proclaimed, marginal it y was not a late n i n e ­
teenth-century creation, it had been present in the p o p u l a ­
tion for a long time.
The prevalence ("true rate") of marginality had not 
changed markedly  since the beg in ning of sugar production.
Caio Prado (1967:19) estimates that over half of the 
Brazilian populatio n was ma rgi nal  to the export sector 
during the colonial period. Reis (1974:9) calculates that 
the bulk of the Pernambucan free population was still marginal 
as late as the 1870's.
Officials' original lack of attention to free marginals 
was the product of two related factors. In the first place, 
the labor requirements of the sugar industry were being met 
by slaves: in the 1870's slave labor produced over one-half
of the annual output of Pernambu can sugar (Reis, 1974:7).
By the 18 80's, however, slave labor had become supplementary 
to free: slaves produced less than one-fourth of the sugar
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shipped from Pernambuco annually (Reis, 1974:7).
As long as slaves were plentiful, planters could afford 
to overlook free marginals; once slaves became scarce, free 
people who were outside the export sector were recast as 
vagrants and idlers.
A narrow definition of vagrancy also accounted for the 
original lack of attention to free marginals. Prior to the 
moral passage, a vagrant was rec ognizable by what he/she 
did not h a v e ; an honest occupation and fixed residence.
By the labor problems phase of the moral passage, an individual 
could be arrested as a vagrant for the already est ablished 
reasons, and for what he/she did not do: vagrants were
people not looking for work, or not dedicating themselves 
to it. Officials had added a motiva tional  dimension to the 
def inition of vagrancy.
The Labor Recruitment Hypothesis
If the assumptions of the labor recruitment hypothesis 
are correct, arrests of free marginals should be lower during 
the "labor scracity" phase (18 60-1870)^ of the transition, 
since there were still sufficient slaves to power the sugar 
economy. Labor recruitment arrests should rise during the 
labor problems phase (1880-1900) when slaves were scarce and 
there was a demand for cheap labor to cut production costs.
1The labor scarcity phase began in 1850, but since 
there are no arrest data for that period, this analysis of 
the labor scracity phase begins at the first date for which 
data were available.
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Labor recruitment arrests should decline at the end of the 
moral passage (post-1900) when the labor requirements of 
the sugar industry had been reduced by mechaniz at ion and 
the loss of internatinonal sugar consumers.
The Data
The data on crime were obtained from the entry logs of 
the Recife House of Detention (Livros de Entradas is Sahidas 
da Casa de De n t e n g a o ) . In addition to the reason for de t a i n ­
ment, the logs listed the inmates' sex, age, occupation, 
legal status (slave/free), marital status, birthplace, and 
parents' names. It was easy to determine the inmates' color, 
because official recorders elaborated on this aspect of the 
person's racial characteristics. Missing is information about 
the disposition of the cases; thus it is impossible to say 
if the inmate went on to trial or served time without formal 
judgment. Logs do record the length of detention, but this 
information cannot be used as a variable becaus e fifty percent 
of the referrals to the house of detention (irrespective of 
crimes) left within three days of arrival; two-thirds were 
released within two weeks.
The short detention period, which applied to all 
types of crime, provides some insight into the criminal 
justice system of nineteenth and early twentieth-century 
Pernambuco. Justice was simple; anyone considered by an 
appropriate official or powerful citizen to be sufficiently 
deviant to accuse formally of criminal activity was taken
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to the house of detention; after being held the individual
was usually released without trial. Thus, the house of
detention served primarily as a pre-trial holding facility,^
2
rather than a post-convicti on jail.
Entry Logs as Arrest  Statistics
Students of contemporary crime obtain data from a 
number of sources, each focusing only on a part of the 
deviant population. Vi ct im ization  studies give the broadest 
view of crime, because they come closest to tapping the 
actual amount of deviance or crime in the given social unit, 
both reported and unreported. Arrest statistics narrow the 
problem pop ulation considerably, providing information only 
about those coming to the attent ion of the police and against 
whom law enforcement officials act. Court records shrink 
the criminal popula tion still further, by restricting in forma ­
tion to those lawbreakers going to trial. Convictions make
Statistics on referrals to the house of detention 
indicate that in the periods examin ed there was a mi nimum 
of 1114 and up to 2818 referrals in a year. The figure 
may have been still higher in other years: Provincial
President Castello Branco reported in 1865 that 4240 p e r ­
sons had been sent to the house of detention in the previous 
year (then only two of its wings had been completed) (Falla, 
1865) .
2
The prison on the Island of Fernando de Noronha, 
approximately 300 miles off Pernambuco's shore was used as 
a federal prison for convicted criminals.
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up only a portion of the prosecutions, while prison records 
tabulate only those ending up in jail.
Contemporary researchers might assume that the house 
of detention logs are comparable to prison statistics, since 
the logs provide information about an incarcerated population. 
Actually, however, the logs correspond more closely to arrest 
statistics than to prison records. The latter contain inform a­
tion on adjudicated criminals — people not filtered out at 
earlier points in the criminal justice system. The logs 
provide a broader picture because they represent the first 
point in the official filter, rather than the last.
Parameters of the Data'*'
This study, like all others, must contend with the 
problem of missing data. A good deal of deviance never came 
to the attention of official social control agents. The 
logs, for instance, do not cover deviance handled by the 
very efficient informal system of justice, which included 
l a n d o w n e r s ’ punishment of plantation inhabitants and the 
rural populations retaliatory crimes against one another 
and landowners. However, all students of crime must face 
the reality of undetected deviance. This study does not 
purport to examine the unknown; it focuses on crimes recorded
"''Technically, this case study is not generalizable 
beyond the context of mid-nineteenth and early twentieth 
century Pernambuco. However, the comparative socio-historian 
will note the similarities between the events described in 
this study and conditions in other socio-historical contexts.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
107
in the logs books.
Other criminals lost to this study were the people 
detained in jails scattered throughout the province. In 1884 
there were fifty jails in the province; Provincial President 
Freitas (Falla, 1884) reported that these jails had an 
official capacity for 937 inmates. However, Freitas reported 
also that forty percent of the fifty jails were a single room 
in a private residence, and that the majority of the Province's 
jails were in "ruins" or serious disrepair (Falla, 1884). The 
size and poor condition of the jails suggest that they may 
not have been officials' first choice as a detention facility.
Finally, the majority of slave deviance probably 
escaped arrest and detention because jail meant lost labor 
for the master as well as the expense of the detained slave's 
u p k e e p .
Sample
The most pr essing sampling probl em  was the trade-off 
between a large sample with a short period of historical 
observation, or a long time-span but only a small sample. 
Theoretical considerations dictated the latter, since s t r u c ­
tural changes presum ed to affect social control and crime 
took many years to unfold. In order to capture long-run 
fluctuations in crime rates, logs were examined at ten-year 
intervals over a span of sixty-two years.^
A seventy-two year period is being examined in the 
larger study. However, there were no logs for the 1850s (lost 
or destroyed). Thus the first year in the sample is 1860.
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The population for this study includes all people 
recorded in the logs of the Recife House of Detention over 
the course of eight years: 1860, 1870, 1880, 1885, 1890, 1900,
1910, and 1922.^ I developed a standard code sheet to record 
the data from the logs; the code sheet is in Appendix D. The
sample contained fifteen percent of all free people in the
2 3
logs of the house of deten tion and all of the slaves. The
small number of slaves detained made it po ssi ble  to secure
information on all of them.
There were 2,848 inmates in the sample. However, the 
data could not be analyzed before making the fifteen percent 
free sample comparable to the slave universe. Multiplying 
the sample of free referrals by 6.66 created a free inmate 
population estimate. When the slave pop ulation for the four 
sampled years before abilition and the free estimate for all 
eight periods are combined the weighted sample contains 14,976 
inmates. Table 1 gives the number of people (weighted sample) 
entering the house of de ten tion during the sampled periods; 
Table 2 breaks the weighted sample down by the year and by 
civil status.
The ten-year sampling scheme was broken in 1885 to 
secure four sampling points before Abolition, including 
one just before that event; 1922 was chosen because of missing 
logs for 1920 and 1921.
2
In order to obtain a 15 percent systematic sample in 
each log book every seventh case was coded, beginning at a 
randomly selected pages. Coders worked forward and back from 
this page until all pages had been sampled. If the seventh 
case was a slave, the coder recorded the first free-status 
detainee that followed.
3
All slaves were coded before the free sample was drawn.




Table 1: Number 

















The total number of cases varies slightly from 
able to table due to the weighting procedures 
used on the sample of free inmates.
: Livros de Entradas e Sahidas da Casa de
Detenpao de Recife.
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Table 2: Civil Status (Slave/ Free) of Inmates,
Recife House of Detention for Selected Years,
1860-1885
Year Civil Status Total
Free Slave
(Weighted Sample)
i860 912 202 1,114
1870 1, 392 151 1, 543
1880 1,792 155 1, 947
1885 2 , 617 194 2,811
S o u r c e : Livros de Entradas 
Deten^ao de Recife
e Sahidas da Casa de
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Organization of Coding Categories
All data were recorded in Portuguese and translated 
into English before being coded for computer analysis. Since 
the variables of crime and occupation were open-ended on the 
code sheet, responses had to be organized into analytically 
similar categories prior to the data anlaysis. The section 
to follow described the re coding of the crime and o c cu pa ­
tion variables.
Cr ime
People were sent to the House of De tention for forty -
five differ ent charges during the sampled p e r i o d s . 3, Before
the data were analyzed, the forty-five criminal labels were
2
grouped into five general categories of similar crimes:
(1) interpersonal violence, except for m u r d e r ; 3 (2) murder;
4
(3) theft; (4) public order violations, such as disorder, 
vagrancy, drunkenness, prostitution; (5) un specified 5
3See Appendix E for the percentage of referrals in 
each category of crime.
2
The Brazilian Penal Code (Codigo Penal do B r a s i l :1830,1890 
(C P B ) guided the categorizat ion of crimes.
3
This category included physical assault and other 
agression against persons, including armed robbery, theft 
with violence: roubo (CPB No. 356). Murder was analyzed
separately because an initial examination of the data in­
dicated that those accused of murder showed a different 
pattern of background characteristics than those arrested 
for other forms of interpersonal violence.
4
Stealing without violence: furto (CPB No. 330)
3A Person was frequently listed as a "suspect" or 
criminal", with no further information about the crime.
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(See Append ix B for the crimes in each category). Only 
the first four categories were analyzed, since the arrests 
falling within the unspecified category were uninterpretable.
Occupations
There were one hundred and twenty-five occupations^ in
the sample. The occupations were defined and categorized in
a two-step process. First the Pernambucan geographer Manuel
Correa de Andrade (A Terra e. 0_ Homem no N o r d e s t e , 1964) and
this author established the function of each occupation
2
within its regional historical context. Then the oc c u p a ­
tions were grouped into nine functionally-si milar categories:
artisan; m a n u a l - n o n - a r t i s a n ; business/clerical; civil ser-
3 4
vice; non-domestic service; domestic service; day laborer;
The occupations recorded in the entry logs were most 
likely a response to the question, "what is your job?". 
Apparently, the occupational self-defintion was sufficient 
for house of detention records for job descriptions did not 
accompany the occupational titles. Since the logs provided 
no more than a job title, occupations could not be ranked 
according to skill level. Insufficient information also 
made it impossible to distinguis h between many urban and rural 
o c c u p a t i o n s .
2
The author, however, is wholly responsible for errors 
in occupational classification.
^Actually, there was no state civil service per se 
during the period under investigation, but most of the 
government positions so categorized eventually came under 
the civil service.
4
There was no specification as to the nature of day 
laborers 1 w o r k .
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agricultural worker; and unemployed (See Appendix C for the 
categorized occupations ).
Arrests for Labor Recruitment
Since there is no r.eason to expect all crime rates to 
reflect labor recruitment arrests, this analysis begins by 
identifying the rate fluctuations for those crimes that c o r ­
respond to the rhythms of the moral passage. Four crime 
categories are compared: interpersonal violence; murder;
theft; public order violations. Chart A diagrams the 
rate variations of the four crime categories.
Rate fluctuations for public order crimes fluctuate 
more closely with the moral passage than do those for the 
other three crime categories. Public order violations peaked 
in 1880, 1885, and 1900; the most consistent increases were 
between 1870 and Abolition. The pattern was quite differ ent  
for violent crimes (interpersonal violence and murder) and 
theft: thefts did not begin to increase steadily until the
last decade of the moral passage; violence was low at all 
sampled points during the moral passage, except during 1890.
(See Chart A ) .
Do house of detention statistics on public order 
referrals support the labor recruitment hypothesis? The 
answer comes from four types of information about arrests:
(1) the timing of referrals; (2) the civil status of people 
arrested; (3) arrest labels; (4) referrals' occupations.
I
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The timing of increases in public order arrests gives 
the first suggestion that these arrests were labor r e c r u i t ­
ment mechanisms. In the sampled years during the labor 
scarcity phase (1860, 1870), public order arrests were 6 and 
7.5 per 10,000 population, respectively (See Chart A). By 
the beginning of the first decade of the labor problems phase 
(1880), public order arrests had increased to 11.5 per 10,000 
population; five years later they rose to 18.5. In the 
middle of the labor problems phase (1890), public order 
referrals to the house of detention fell sharply, to less than 
one per 10,000 population.^" However, in the last sampled 
period of the labor problems phase (1900), arrests for public 
order crimes climbed to slightly over 14 per 10,000 population. 
In the two sampled periods after the moral passage (1910,
1922), public order violations declined to 4 and 3.5 per 
10,000 population, respectively.
Additional evidence that arrests were labor recruitment 
mechanisms comes from the increase in free people arrested 
for public order violations during the labor problems phase 
of the moral passage. We must remember that planters' re ­
marks about labor problems demonstrated their concerns 
about the quantity and quality of free l a b o r . The sugar 
barons held the free population totally responsible for their
The 1890 decline appears to run counter to the p r e ­
dictions of the labor recruitment hypothesis; however, the 
next section will argue that the decrease may be a function 
of referral practices rather than arrests.
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labor problems; that definition of the situation grew out of 
a scracity of critical resources.
Falling sugar prices meant that costs had to be reduced 
and sugar production increased just to reap the custo mary  
profits. Since slave importation had ceased, expansion was 
accomplished by committing more free workers to the pro duction 
process. But free workers were unmotivated by the long hours 
and low wages, so public officials and the police responded  
by criminalizing the free workers' marginality.
Table 3 shows that free people were increasingly the 
focus of social control as the labor trasition progressed. 
However, the most critical point of comparison for the labor 
recruitment hypothesis is between slaves and free arrests in 
the labor scarcity phase (1860, 1870) and the labor problems 
phase before Abolition (1880-1885). Between 1860 and 1870, 
there was a 59 percent increase in the number of free people 
sent to the House of Detention for public order violations; 
and by 1880, free persons arrested for such crimes had 
increased another 87 percent. Slaves on the other hand, 
actually remained constant in public order detentions between 
1860 and 1870, and then increased by only 20 percent in the 
critical period between 1870 and 1880. As the moral passage 
progressed, referrals of free people for public order v i o l a ­
tions continued to climb steeply. In 1665, the last year for 
which a slave/free comparison can be made, 1,745 free men and 
women were sent to the casa for vi ola tin g public order: a
74 percent increase over 1880. That increase is even more
i









1900, rates increased most among the crimes punishable by 
the vagrancy statute and the termo. Those statutes f a c i l i ­
tated labor recruitment via arrests, for violators of the 
vagrancy statutes were ordered to secure honest employment 
withi n fifteen days or suffer imprisonment in an agr icultural 
correctional facility.
Table 4 gives the combined percen tage of arrests punish-
2
able under the vagrancy statute and termo. The offenses 
covered by those statutes were drunkenness, vagrancy itself,
3
disturbing the peace, and capoeiragem. Arrests legitimated 
by the vagrancy statute and termo will be labelled "labor 
recruitment arrests", in recognition of their association  
wi th  a legal ma chanism  that had such labor recruitment
^The decrease is not solely because there were fewer 
slaves in the population, since slave referrals for public 
order violations were still dis proportionate to their number 
in the population: 61 percent of all slave arrests were for
violations of public order; slaves made up only 11 percent 
of the Pernambucan popu la tion in 1872 and four percent in 
1887 .
2
See Appendix B for the full list of public order 
crimes, including those not punishable under the termo 
during this period.
3
Chapter III showed that these offenses emerged as 
pun ishable by the termo in the 1880's.
iking when we realize that at the same time, referrals 
slaves for public order violations decreased by two per- 
t .^ (See Table 3) .
Further support for the labor recru itm ent hypothesis 
indexed by the nature of the offenses found most repre- 
sible at the peak of the moral passage. Between 1880 and
I
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Table 3: Numbers, Proportions,
and Proportional Changes in Numbers 
Arrested for Public Order Crimes of 
All Slave and of all Free Detainees, 
Recife House of Detention,
For Selected Years, 1860-1885 
(Weighted Sample)
Year Detainee Civil Status
Slave Free
N % Change * % * * N % Change* % * *
1860 100 NA 50 340 NA 37
1870 99 -1. 0 66 539 + 58 . 5 39
1880 120 + 20 . 2 77 1006 + 86.6 56
1885 118 - 1.7 61 1745 + 73.5 67
‘Percentage change 
previous selected
from number detained for that crime 
year .
in
** Percentage of public order arrests among detainees of a
given status.
NA: Data not available
Source: Livros de Entradas e Sahides de Casa de
Detenjao de Recife
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Table 4: Arrests Punishable Under the Vagrancy Statute and
Termo^ as a Proportion of all Referrals to 
The Recife House of Detention, and as 
A Proportion of All Public Order Arrests 
For Selected Years, 1860-1922
(Weighted Sample)
Percent Termo Percent Termo
Year Punishable to All Punishable to
Arrests Public Order
1860 . 05 .77
1870 . 35 . 79
1880 . 51 . 84
1885 . 51 .93
1890 . 2 . 2
1900 . 54 . 97
1910 .25 .95
1922 . 35 . 99
Source: Livros de Entradas e Sahidas da Casa de Detengao
de Recife.
The arrests punishable under the vagrancy statute 
and termo were: Vagrancy, Drunkenness, Disturbing the
Peace, Capoeiragem.
j
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p o t e n t i a l .
Labor r ec ruitment arrests constituted less than one
percent of all referrals in 1860, increasing to thirty-five
percent of the referral total in the second year of the
labor scare H* ft *< phase of the transition. By contrast, in
the first year of the labor problems phase, labor r e c r u i t ­
ment arrests increased to one-half of all referrals; in 1885 
these arrests also const itute d one half of all violations.
In the middle of the moral passage (1890), labor recruitment  
arrests equaled only two percent of all referrals, but in 
the last period of the labor problems phase, such arrests 
again rose to fifty percen t of all referrals. In the two 
years sampled after the moral passage (1910-1922), labor 
rec ruitment arrests fell to twenty-five and thirty-five 
percent of all referrals, respectively.
The final evidence for the labor recru itment hypothesis 
comes from the occupations of the law violators. The a s s u m p ­
tion is that public order arrest increases should be greatest 
for workers subject to frequent periods of unemployment, not 
nec essarily because un employed workers committed more public 
order crimes, but because people who were out of work were 
more likely to be on the street and easy prey for labor re­
cruitment round-ups.
"''Further creditibility is added to the labor recr u i t ­
ment arguement by the evidence that 60 per cent of the public 
order violators were out of the casa (and therefore c o n c e i v ­
ably at work) within three days, as compared with only 23 p e r ­
cent of those arrested for theft, 35 per cent of those detained 
for interpersonal violence, and 7 percent of the people 
charged with murder.
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The reason for expecting higher public order arrests 
among the unemployed is simple. Chapter III left little doubt 
that between 1880 and the turn of the century public officials 
had initiated a drive against idlers and vagrants. The 
campaign was, of course, economically motivated: cheap labor
was the objective. It seems reasonable that people out of 
work and on the street would have a higher probability of a r ­
rest if the police were following officials' directives to 
pursue idlers.
There may be two questions at this juncture. In the 
first place, would not frequent unemp loyment  among some 
occupational groups (especially, agricultural and day laborers) 
suggest that labor demand was low and therefore that there 
was no need to recruit labor through the subterfuge of arrest? 
In the second place, why examine public order arrests among 
unemployed persons: should not economic crimes rather than
public order crimes be most sensitive to employment status.
In the Pernambucan case, high unempl oymen t among some 
groups did not suggest low labor demand. If planters c o m ­
plaints about the labor supply are to be believed, labor 
demand in the export sector was high in the eighties and 
ninties. Labor recruitment arrests and repressive s o cial iz a­
tion were necessary because free people elected unemployment^
2
over work m  the sugar sector.
^See Levine (1979) for a discussion of employment p o s ­
sibilities in nineteenth century Recife.
2
The free population avoided the export sector for 
many reasons, see Chapter II for a discussion.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
122
Why examine public order arrests among une mployed p e r ­
sons when it is economic crimes that might be expected to be 
most sensitive to employment status? In fact, there is every 
reason to expect an association be tween employment status and 
economic crime; that issue will be taken up in the next chapter 
However, the argument at this point is that during the moral 
passage all crimes assumed a secondary position to public 
order violations. With a drive against idlers, the meagre 
resources of the Pernambucan police were pressed to their 
limit just mai ntaining the public order; other forms of c r i m i ­
nality had second priority.
This analysis therefore compares the public order ar ­
rests for occupations presumed to have high un employment and 
between job mobility against the arrests of workers in jobs 
where there should have been greater employment stability.
Five of the eight occupational groups in the sample 
fall into the "likely a r r e s t " cagetory. Day laborers and 
domestics are two segments of the modern Brazilian working 
po pulation characterized by frequent job change. It is not 
unusual for day laborers to switch employers repeatedly 
and/or have lengthy periods of unemplo yment between jobs. 
Domestics may have somewhat more job stability than day 
laborers, but they still do a good deal of job switching.*- 
The assumption is that nineteenth-c entury patterns were 
similar to current ones.
The criado law, enacted in 1887, suggests that d o m e s ­
tics and other service workers were not dependable enough for 
employers. The law bound such workers to an employer with 
an agreement also signed by the Chief of Police.
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Non-domestic service workers also fell into the likely 
arrest category. Most of the service workers in the sample 
transported goods by animal, boat, or on foot between the 
plantations and Recife. However, unempl oy ment increased for 
transportation workers after the 1860's (Reis, n .d . a . :16-17) 
as the railroads broke into their mono p o l y  over the carrying 
trade. Semi-skilled manual laborers are another segment of 
the worki ng popula tion that should have been easy prey for 
street sweeps. Many of these workers had specialized skills 
that should have guaranteed job stability. But a good number 
of the semi-skilled laborers in the sample were mill workers, 
many of them displaced from jobs when engenho expansion ground 
to a halt in the 1880s'; unemployment problems for these 
workers increased still more with the expansion of the labor- 
saving usina after the 1890s.
"Agriculturalists" are the final group of workers in
the likely-arrest category. ^ After the cessation of the
2
African slave trade, landless caboclos who wanted to use 
engenho land had to give more of their labor to the export 
sector than they ever had before; those refusing the landowner's 
demands faced eviction. Many of the displa ced agricultural
Although it is difficult to p r e cisel y characterize 
"agriculturists" who appear in the casa logs, such a g r i ­
cultural workers clearly include lavradores, squatters, and 
agricultural day laborers, all of wh om  can be placed in the 
likely-arrest category.
2
A rural Brazilian of low social status.
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workers ended up in Recife without employment.^
The workers most unlikely to be arrested on public order 
charges for labor rec ruitment were the more skilled urban 
workers such as artisans, business and clerical workers, and 
civil servants. The assumption is that the special skills 
of these workers made them valuable to employers, gu a r a n t e e ­
ing greater job stability. Public order arrests should be 
lower for these workers, if 'availability for arrest' in­
fluenced the probability of being picked up during street 
s w e e p s .
In general, arrest increases were greater for the likely
arrest occupations than for the unlikely ones (Table 5).
Among the likely arrest occupations, day laborers had the
greatest increase in public order arrests between the labor
2
scarcity and labor problems phases. The figures for day 
laborers were really striking: between 1870 and 1880, the
critical period for the labor recruitment hypothesis, public 
order arrests of day laborers increased by over 800 percent; 
between 1880 and 1885 their public order arrests went up by 
another 125 percent, a five-year increase that was almost 
as high as increases in the previous ten year period.
Between 1870 and 1880 the 'likely arrest' day laborers, 
semi-skilled manual workers, and agricultural laborers ranked
■^Migrants who left the plantations went directly to 
Recife. See footnote 1, page 144.
2
Since occupation ally-spec ific rates are unavailable 
percentage comparisons between the various occupations have 
been used.
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Table 5: Number and Ranked Proportional Changes of
Referrals for Public Order Crimes 
by Occupational Category (Likely and Unlikely to Commit Such Crimea), 

















N % Change* N « Change H t Change H t Change H t Change N t Change N t Change N % Change
(Rank) (Rank) (Rank) (Rank) (Rank) (Rank) (Rank) (Rank)
I860 61 HA 25 NA 51 HA 49 HA 54 NA 117 NA 23 HA 41 NA
1870 25 - 59.0 38 + 52.0 40 - 21.6 125 +155.1 94 + 74.1 205 + 75.2 21 - 87.0 7 - 82.9
(6th) (4th) (5th) (1st) (3rd) (2nd) (8th) (7th)
1880 242 +868 . 0 88 +131.6 191 +377.5 244 + 95.2 76 + 19.1 204 - 0.5 44 +109.5 27 +285.7
(1st) (4th) (2nd) (6th) (8th) (7th) (5th) (3rd)
1885 545 +125.2 186 +111.4 333 + 74.3 383 + 59.6 65 -14.8 264 + 29.4 76 72.1 7 - 74.1
(1st) (2nd) (3rd) (5th) (8th) (6th) (3rd) (7th)
1890 14 0 0 0 7 0 0
1900 506 53 173 460 107 246 93 7
1910 153 67 67 213 27 33 33 7
1922 253 13 73 100 20 87 93 27
•Percentage Change from number in previous selected year.
NA: Data not available.
Source: Livros de Entrados e Sahidas da Casa de Deten^ao de Recife.
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first, second, and fourth, respectively in percentage increases 
in number of public order arrests; one of the unlikely arrest 
occupations (civil servants) ranked third, the remaining 
two unlikely arrest occupations ranked fifth or lower. The 
likely arrest occupations had still greater proportional 
increases in public order arrests between 1880 and 1885 c o m ­
pared to the unlikely arrest category: three of the five
likely arrest occupations ranked as the top three in p r o p o r ­
tional increases; one of the unlikely shared the third place. 
The other two ranked sixth and seventh. Table 5 suggests 
that there were notable exceptions to the occupational crime 
statistics. While the hypothesis on balance is supported 
by the occupational crime patterns, the evidence would have 
to be considered as mixed at this point.
Before concluding the analysis of the labor recruitment 
hypothesis, one apparent anomaly must be considered. In 
each of the previous analyses, public order arrests fell 
sharply in 1890, right at the mid-point of the labor problems 
phase. The decrease occurred when public order arrests 
should have been especially high if plante rs were using 
punitive arrests to secure low-cost labor for the export 
sector. However, it is plausible that there was a sharp 
decline in public order referrals because authorities sent 
law violators some place other than the house of detention 
in 1890.
The shift in referral practices is suggested by several 
statistics. In the first place, it seems dubious that an
i
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arrest category that made up a high plurality of arrests in 
all other periods would suddenly drop to its lowest level 
in the eight sampled years. It is even more curious that 
the sharp decline in public order referrals occurred in the 
midst of two decades when the proportion of public order 
arrests were at the highest levels of the sampled periods 
( see Table 6) .
Even more anomalous is the precipitou sne ss of its 
decrease in actual numbers between 1885 and 1890: in 1885,
more than 1,860 detainees were sent to the casa for public 
order violations, five years later less than t w e n t y - f i v e ; 
this was far below the absolute number of arrests in any 
other crime category in 1890. Even is the public order 
arrests generated by the moral passage had declined in 
1890, the true prevalence of public order violations alone 
should have been higher than twenty-five. This is especially 
so since 1890 was a period of fierce political turmoil:
Brazil had become a Republic in the previous year, and 
various factions were fighting for a piece of the political 
pie .
One possible explanation for the sharp decline in 
public order referrals to the House of Detention in 1890 
is that violators were taken somewhere else. In 1890 the 
governor recommended using the refugee compounds created 
during the great drought as agricultural correctional camps 
for vagabonds, drunks, beggars and others disturbing the
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Table 6: Number and Proport
For Public Order Crimes, Rec 
Detention for Selected Year 
(Weighted Sample)
ion Detained
if e House of
s , 1860-1922
Proportion of Public Order 
Year Number Crimes to all Arrests
1860 440 39.5
1870 638 41.4
1880 1,126 57 . 8
1835 1,870 66.3
1890 20 2 .1
1900 1,692 69.4
1910 619 31. 5
1922 739 35.9
Total 7 ,144 47 . 7
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public order (Mensagem, 1890). ^  Carrying out that recomm enda 
tion should not have been difficult since a precedent had 
been set during the drought for moving masses of people from 
the city to outlying compounds (see Cuniff, 1970). Whether 
public officials actually implemented the Governor's r e c o m ­
me nd ation and used refugee camps for public order violators 
cannot be established because records for the relocation 
camps are not available.
Yet several strands of evidence suggest that state 
agents used the drought camps for public order violators
in 1890. First of all, police and politician s 1 reports
indicate that vagrancy and public disorder we re ma j or
concerns in the late eighties and nineties • It is clear
that, despite vociferous complaints about pub lie order
violators, few were sent in 1890 to the House of D e t e n t i o n .
By contrast, the number of detained in the ca sa for other
crimes increased by fourteen percent over the previous five
year period, which suggests an additional reason to suspect
that officials sent public order violators to one of the
drought refugee camps in 1890.
The persistent increases in public order violations 
could well have caused officials concerns about dangerously 
overc row ding the facility, particularly since arrests for 
other crimes were not decreasing. In fact, if the p r o p o r ­
tion of public order referrals in 1890 had been an average
'*'One such camp had held over 9,000 people at the peak 
of the drought (Cuniff, 1970).
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of their percentages in 1885 and 1900 (68 percent), the
absolute number of public order violators in the Recife 
House of Detention facility would have been 3,348. This 
would have enlarged the population of the house of d e t e n ­
tion to 1890 to 4,425, far more than the total number 
sent there during any of the other years for which data 
were collected. Only at the peak of the forced army r e ­
cruitment campaigns of the Paraguayan War had any number 
to that passed through the gates of the House of D e t e n t i o n .  ^
Therefore, officials would have had every reason to divert 
people from the already overcrowded casa.
It does not affect this argument that the proportion
of public order violators sent to the detention facility
was higher in 1900 than before 1890. One the one hand, the
administrators of the house of detention did not need to
be concerned about a rising tide of public order arrests,
for the absolute numbers were lower in 1900 (1,645) than
in 1885 (1,859), as well as the total number of people
2
detained , thus putting considerably less pressure on the 
facility (see Table 6). On the other hand, officials may 
still have sent some public order offenders to a drought
1For example, President Castello Branco (Falla, 1865) 
reported that 4,240 people entered the casa during the first 
year of military recruitment.
2
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refugee camp in 1900 (which would mean that public order 
arrests may have befen even higher in 1900 than indicated by 
the arrest logs). However, it is quite likely that officials 
found that they could get along without the refugee camps 
after the turn of the century, as labor-saving technology 
had begun to reduce the labor requirements of the sugar 
i n d u s t r y .
The Place of Crime in the Moral Passage
During the Per nambucan transition from a slave- based 
to a quasi-capitalist mode of production social control 
shifted from traditional to legalistic. Traditional social 
control was informal and plantation based. Squatters in 
the planter's private militia helped keep the slaves in 
line, fight election battles, and resolve family feuds. 
Landowners extracted supplementary labor from squatters 
through feudal rent requirements: service to the l and­
owner secured the squatter's use of plantation land. Much 
of the latent force of these land-lease demands was d i s ­
guised by the pervasive structure of dependence in the 
rural zone.
In contrast to traditional social control, legalistic 
was formal and had its locus in organizational structures 
outside the plantation. Relief (Beggars' asylum) and 
taxation were legalistic strategies of social control.
Law enactment was another form of legalistic social r e g u l a ­
tion. The national guard, police, jails and correctional
1
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facilities added force to legal proscriptions.
During the labor scarcity phase of the transformation 
planters relinquished some of their power to the state in 
order to guarantee a slave force. However, for the most 
part, traditional mechanisms of labor recru itm ent pred o m i ­
nated. When state intervention appeared it was generally 
not concerned with repression, being directed instead at 
limiting the slave drain and concentrating the remaining 
slaves in the export sector.
Taxation on slave sales and law guaranteeing gradual 
abolition were the dominant legalistic social control strate 
gies during the transition's labor scarcity phase. So long 
as slaves were plentiful there was no need to correct the 
undesirable qualities of the rural poor, as the slave force 
declined being free and wit hout work, having irregular work 
habits, or simply moving around too much became problems 
for the planters, and ultimat ely for the police and law 
m a k e r s .
During the labor problems phase of the transition, 
state-initiated repression replaced many traditional social 
control mechanisms. Politicians proposed forced labor 
laws, and the police called for additional correctional 
facilities to house idlers, drunks, and vagrants. The 
vagrancy statute and termo provided a potential solution 
to labor problems; arrest statistics indicate that officials 
made liberal use of these laws to secure a work force.
The shift from planter self-reliance to state
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assistance, and from non-repression to repression illustrates 
Stanley Diamond's (1971) argument that law arises in the 
breach of prior customary order and increases in force with 
the conflicts that divide political societies. The 
Pernambucan transformation seems to support Diamond's co n ­
tention that "law and order is the historical illusion, 
law versus order the historical reality".
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CHAPTER V
SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND CRIME 
Introduction
So far in this analysis, the mode of production has been 
a dependent variable. However, this study does not consider 
structural change as an outcome only, for such theoretically 
diverse scholars as Marx (1903) and Durkheim (1951) have pointed 
out the value of viewing socio-structural changes also as 
causal variables. Whether the theorist claims that a new mode 
of production simultaneously creates new superstructural ele­
ments (Marx, 1906) or that rapid social, economic, or political 
changes cause social disorganization and anomie (Durkheim,
1951), the message is that structural change produces new 
structures and new problems.
One such emergent problem in Pernambuco was crime.
There is a tradition in sociology from Durkheim (1951) to 
Park (1024) suggesting a relationship between social dis o r g a n i ­
zation and particular forms of deviance. Political scientists 
such as Olson (1971) and Fierabend (1971) have demonstrated 
a relationship between certain types of change and collective 
violence. More specifically, rapid economic change has been 
ascribed socially destabilizing effects (e.g., Wilbur, 1979); 
a relationship between unemployment and crime has been d e m o n ­
strated by the Dutch criminologist, Bonger (1969).
In a different vein, radical criminologists such as
134
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Quinney (1977) and Spitzer (1975) argue that it is particular
forms of social o r g a n i z a t i o n , rather than disorganization,
which produce crime. Most radical theories of crime begin
with the mode of production, or the system of production
that links human labor to the environment (Balkan, 1980:13).
Class-based modes of production^ exist where one group reaps
a disproportionately large amount of wealth and control,
while another group gains only a disproportionately small
amount. Radical theory holds that this unequal structure
of resource distribution generates prob l e m  populations.
These become elegibile for management as deviants when their
behavior or personal qualities threaten the structure of
2
production and distribution.
Both approaches to crime causation provide guidelines 
for the research here. Radical theory hypothesizes a r e l a t i o n ­
ship between socially-structured inequality and crime. That 
relationship might appear difficult to test since both 
Pernambuco's dominant and secondary modes of production were 
class-based in the periods under examination. However, there 
are critical differences in workers' access to material r e ­
sources even within these class-based modes of p r o d u c t i o n .
In fact, the compulsion continuum (Chapter I, Figure B)
^Marxist theory holds that the primitive and socialist 
modes of production are not class-based (see Hindess and Hirst, 
1975 ) -
2
Chapter III shows how Pernambuco's export-dependent 
sugar economy produced a problem population and describes 
the conditions that made the problem population a social 
expense, and thus deviant.
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Iillustrated that access to the means of subsistence decreases 
with the transition from a feudal to a quasi-capitalist mode 
of production.
Pernambuco's transition is a case in point. There 
is no doubt that, in a legal sense, abolition meant greater 
freedom and equality for ex-slaves. However, the labor 
recruitment drives of the labor transition reduced the 
freedom of all rural workers. Furthermore, many rural 
dwellers lost even an informal claim to plantation land 
during the transition to wage labor. Finally, modernization 
of the forces of production (usinas) increased the consolida-
. • 
f.v
tion of land holdings and, therefore, the inequality of 
resource distribution. Thus, if the predictions of radical 
criminology are correct, there should be more crime in the 
quasi-capitalist mode of production than in the slave/feudal 
one.
Social disorganization theory provides a complementary 
hypothesis because it proposes a relationship between social 
change and crime. The assumption is that change decreases 
normative predictability which increases the probability 
that at least some group's norms will be violated. If 
social disorganization theory is correct, criminality should 
increase during periods of rapid change both within a 
particular mode of production, and during the transition 
from one mode of production to another.
Once the theoretical links between social structure 
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examining that association. • Crime rates provide information 
about reported crime, and the rates, in conjunction with 
historical data, give clues to the socio-structural sources 
of criminality. If an association between social structure 
and crime is hypothesized, the researcher must show that 
the fluctuations in crime statistics are the product of real 
changes in criminality and not solely the result of social 
control activity.
The last chapter introduced the distinction between 
moral passage and true prevalence changes in crime rates. 
Rate fluctuations which are the product of real increases 
in criminality are called true prevalence changes, while 
rate fluctuations which result from shifts in social control 
activity are labeled moral passage increases. Since the 
analysis at this point attempts only to identify the socio- 
structural factors which promoted actual changes in criminal 
behavior, the true prevalence fluctuations will be examined 
here .
The methodological strategy for identifying true 
prevalence changes in crime rates is, first, to rule out 
a moral passage, then to identify the conditions that could 
have accounted for real increases in criminality. This 
analysis begins by examining the rate fluctuations for the 
four inclusive crime categories:^- public order offenses;
The "other" category has been omitted from this analysis 
because the behaviors included under "other" were too vague 
to be analyzable, or the crimes were omitted altogether by 
house of detention recorders.
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theft; interpersonal violence; and murder (Chart A ) .
The public order offenses can be eliminated from this 
analysis of true prevalence crime, since Chapter III d e m o n ­
strated that those rate increases were mostly if not entirely 
due to changes in the definition and treatment of marginality 
It is more difficult to isolate the causes of rate fluctua­
tions in theft and in the various types of interpersonal 
v i o l e n c e .
The information gleaned from the provincial/state 
newspapers and official reports argues against a moral p a s ­
sage. That is to say, there do not seem to have been any 
significant changes in the official defintion and treatment 
of violence and theft during the period of analysis. If 
the rate increases in theft and violence were not moral 
passage fluctuations, then they may have been the product 
of real increases in criminality. To examine that assumption 
we must identify the conditions that could have caused real 
increases in theft and violence.
Data Analysis
We begin by dividing the sixty-two year period into 
the four points before abolition, and the four points 
after. During the pre-abolition period, a slave mode of 
production powered the export sector, with supplementary 
services provided by feudal work arrangements. After 
abolition, a quasi-capitalist mode of production structured 
rural work organization. The sixty-two year period is, of
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course, split by the transformation of the mode of p r o d u c ­
tion.
The data on crime'*' form three general patterns (Chart A) . 
Rates of interpersonal violence and murder vary together 
and increase during one period before abolition and at two 
points after. Two-thirds of the rate increases from 1860 
to 1922 for all three crime categories occur during the p o s t ­
abolition decades. Finally, the most steady increases in 
theft occur after the transformation of the mode of p r o d u c ­
tion .
Pre-Abolition Increases in Crime
„• i 2Violence
The pre-abolition increases in interpersonal violence 
came at the end of the Paraguayan War, Brazil's only n i n e ­
teenth century participation in international conflict.
Because military service was unpopular, Provincial Governments 
resorted to forced impressment to fill the ranks; in practice
this meant that large numbers were treated as criminals even
3
though they had broken no law. When the last day to volunteer 
for military service passed with the quota still unmet, the 
police would sweep through the streets picking up the unemploye
^"The methods and sampling procedures are the same as 
described in Chapter IV.
2
Violence refers only to interpersonal violence during 
this period, since murder rates did not increase markedly. 
However, all references to violence after 1870 are to both 
interpersonal violence and murder.
3
Forced recruitment was used throughout the Colonial 
and Imperial periods to secure soldiers.
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free N e g r o e s /  vagabonds, and beggers, even taking incor­
rigible slaves contributed to the war effort by their masters 
(McBeth, 1977: McCann, 1977). After the roundup, the new 
recruits were secured in the House of Detention, or any 
other temporary holding facility, until the next ship arrived 
for the war zone.
Presidential reports indicate that the rural poor 
violently resisted the onerous burden of military service, 
going so far as to attack recruiters, troop convoys, and 
jails to free those forcibly recruited. Two separate 
Presidential reports (Fallas, 1867, 1868) listed fourteen 
different assaults on either jails or troop caravans by the 
families and friends of men taken forcibly as recruits.
In 1867, 200 men in the city of Pau D'Alho attacked a jail
and killed the guards, freeing thirty-four recruits (Falla,
1867). In that same year, outraged Pernambucans violently 
liberated eighteen recruits traveling under military guard 
between the cities of Bonito and Recife (Falla, 1867).
In 1868, on the land of the Engehno PepicCf near the town of 
Nazareth, Jose lins, his wife and daughter, and other 
armed men and women attacked a troop convoy; they freed l i n s 1 
son, who had been captured by military recruiters (Falla,
1868). The Presidential reports between 1866 and 1870 leave 
little doubt that the rural poor put up a good deal of re- 
sistence to recruiters, and it is possible that many of
those apprehended ended up in the House of Detention for
^Correspondence between Provincial Presidents, Chiefs 
of Police, and slave owners suggests that recruiters fre­
quently captured slaves assuming or pretending they were 
free Negroes (A.S.S.P., 1865-70).





One of the worst droughts in Northeastern Brazilian
history struck between 1877 and 1880. It drove thousands
of starving backlands refugees into the provincial capital
of Recife. Along the way, migrants sacked sugar plantations
and robbed regional markets of f o o d . 1 Government officials
attempted to defuse the threat to property and relieve the
population pressure by transferring migrants from the city
2
to relocation camps in the plantation zone. But in spite 
of such population shifts, Provincial President Luna Freire 
(Falla, 1878) complained in 1878 that as many as 60,000 
destitute refugees remained in the provincial capital.
Provincial presidents into the eighties continued to 
bemoan the problems of hunger and crowding in the city.
They warned that strict measures had to be taken to solve 
the refugee problem, because impoverished migrants posed 
a serious threat to property (Falla, 1880). The elevated 
theft rates suggest that the officials' fears were well 
f o u n d e d .
As the eighties commenced, Pernambucan sugar producers
See Roger Cuniff (1970) for a discussion of drought 
conditions. Provincial Reports (Fallas )from 1878 through 
1880 give a picture of the widespread suffering produced 
by the great drought.
2
Chapters III and IV pointed out that such population 
redistribution helped combat the labor shortages of the 
sugar industry.
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were facing decreased revenues and were searching for new 
sugar markets. Since the Pernambucan economy survived by 
supplying international buyers with sugar, decreases in 
world sugar prices and changes in world purchasing habits 
had a negative impact on the entire province. However, 
planters could still hope to recapture a portion of the 
world market if sugar could be produced more cheaply. S u b ­
sidized mill modernization offered a way of cutting costs 
and increasing output.
The modern sugar refineries represented more than a 
change in technology; they had a profound impact on rural 
social organization. Usinas eroded traditional settlement 
patterns and social relations in the zona da mata by r e p l a c ­
ing slow-paced, labor-intensive agriculture with c a p i t a l i s ­
tically-oriented agrobusinesses (Pang, 1979). Almost every 
segment of the rural work force was downwardly mobile with 
modernization; some workers were totally stripped of their 
means of subsistence by labor-saving technology.
Post-Abolition Increases in Crime
Theft
A comparison of the pre and post abolition fluctuations 
in theft rates shows the increase in thefts in the decades 
after the transformation. Between 1860 and 1885 theft rates 
ranged between 1.2 and 2.3 per ten thousand population.
In the first period after abolition, theft rates were only 
1.2 per ten thousand population. However, they roSe in 1900
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to 3.2, falling slightly in 1910 to 2.9 per ten thousand 
population. In the last sampled period (1922), theft rates 
rose to 3.9 per ten thousand population (Chart A).
It is significant that theft rates increased most 
steadily after the 1890's when the economic health of the 
region made its sharpest decline. There were several reasons 
for this regional economic decline. By the turn of the 
century, Brazilian sugar had neither the European nor North 
American market, and modernization had done little more 
than eliminate jobs for rural workers. The workers who 
remained in the sugar industry after 1890 toiled at a wage 
below the 1860's level (Eisenberg, 1974:186). Worse yet, 
a large segment of the free plantation population was totally 
marginalized* during usina expansion, since many of these 
squatters lost both farming rights and occasional plantation 
work, due to the introduction of labor-saving technology.
Social and economic conditions in the city of Recife 
were no better than in the plantation zone. Beside the 
economic problems that beset a city whose well-being was 
linked to a sugar industry that was failing, urban density 
was growing and migrants were pouring into Recife to escape
^Marginalization is the "destruction of a class or 
class fragments' relation to the means of sustaining and 
reproducing social life" (Humphries, 1979:229).
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the extreme poverty of the rural zone . ^  Migrants quickly 
learned that Recife did not hold the answer to their 
problems. Urban employers did not need their particular 
3 0 b skills. The twentieth-century Nordestino author, Joao 
Cabral de Melo Neto, describes the fate that awaited migrants, 
in his play, Morte e Vida Severina (1976:84-87).
Migrant: Very good day, S e n h o r a ,
in the window, over there.
Can you say if it's possible 
to find work here?
Senhora: There is no lack of work
for those who know how to work.
What did you do C o m p a d r e , 
on your land out there?
Migrant: I was always an agricultural worker,
a worker on bad soil.
There isn't any kind of earth that 1 
can't cultivate.
Senhora: That is of no worth, very little exists
to till; but tell me, migrant, what else 
did you do there?
Migrant: I can cultivate all of the crops that this
soil can produce: cotton, papaya, century
p l a n t , corn . . .
Senhora: No bank will finance these crops. But
tell me, migrant, what else did you do 
there?
According to Levine ( 
impulse to cityward migratio 
of the usinas. Migrants' us 
compounded by the fact that 
began going directly to Reci 
porarily in the towns along
9:23-24), the single greatest 
fter 1885 was the arrival 
adjustment problems were 
the late 19th century they 
rather than settling tem- 





f e , 
the
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Migrant: I can run any of the five sugar mill
boilers, or operate the sugar grinder 
in the purging house of the engenho.
Senhora: With the spread of the usinas there are
few engenhos left. Didn't the migrant 
learn to do anything else there?
Migrant: There, no one learned any other trade,
nor will t h e y ...
Although most rural and some urban workers found life 
more difficult from the 1880s on, it was the cane t rans­
porters, sugar mill workers, and seasonal agricultural 
laborers who experienced the most serious assault on their 
economic well-being, particularly after 1890. In all three 
cases, a combination of modernization and export stagnation 
dealt the death blow to their means of subsistence.
After engenho expansion came to a half in the late 
eighties, there was a sharp reduction in demand for sugar 
mill workers of all sorts. But it was usina expansion in 
the. nineties that thoroughly undermined job prospects, 
because labor-saving technology halved the size of the mill 
workforce (Reis, n.d.a.: 10,23). A portion of the more 
highly skilled displaced laborers may have secured work 
as usina operatives, but with the international market 
for Brazilian sugar contracting, a good number of the 
unskilled faced permanent unemployment.
The cane transporters were victims of an earlier 
period of modernization; it was the railroads rather than 
improvements in milling that wiped out their jobs. The 
pack horse drivers (almocreves) were especially hard hit, 
because they had conducted most of the carrying trade
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between the plantations and Recife prior to the railroads; 
by the 1880s, only nine percent of the sugar brought to 
the capital came by almocreve (Reis, n.d.a ;15). A 
British Consul reported that while some of the displaced 
packhorse drivers had entered agriculture, the majority 
had been stripped of their work by the railroads (Reis, 
n.d.a : 17) .
Finally, agricultural and day laborers did not escape 
dislocation. The new sugar refineries made it possible 
to cut field labor by a third, since they could extract 
the same amount of sugar from a third less cane (Reis, 
n.d.a. : 10). It is difficult to assess the breadth of 
disruption experienced by agricultural workers; some 
probably retained their squatting rights even though they 
were no longer required in sugar production. However, 
the severest dislocation hit that portion of the agri c u l ­
tural workforce that had lost both squatting rights and 
occasional wages from day labor.
It would be • interesting to see how the workers most 
directly affected by techno-economic changes reacted to 
their displacement. One way of finding out is to compare 
thefts among the various occupations. If it is true that 
property crimes are committed out of a need to survive 
(Quinney, 1977:129), then marginalized workers should be 
proportionately more active in theft than those retaining 
some claim to their means of subsistence.
That prediction can be examined by comparing a group
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of economically marginalized workers with the economically
less marginalized.^- Included under the marginalized
2 3
label are: transportation workers; mill workers; day
4
laborers; and agricultural workers. The non-marginalized
occupations are: artisan; business/clerical and domestic
5service. The prediction is that the proportion of theft
arrests to total arrests will be higher and rise faster
for displaced workers then for those still functioning
within the new occupational structure.
Between 1860 and 1885 there was a decrease in the 
0
proportion of theft arrests for non-marginalized workers,
A good number of workers in both categories were 
unemployed, but unemployment is not the crucial variable 
that explains structural unemployment; it is marginalization. 
This cuts much deeper than cyclical unemployment because 
it completely destroys the worker's means of subsistence. 
People can be unemployed and yet still be employable if 
the means by which they support themselves have not been 
eliminated from the occupational structure.
2
Only transportation workers are considered here.
These are included in "non-domestic service" elsewhere 
in this study.
3
The mill workers were a part of the "semi-skilled 
manual worker" category in previous analysis.
4
Day laborers are included because many of the ma r ­
ginalized rural workers may have labeled themselves day 
l a b o r e r s .
^"Civil service" and "without occupation" have been 
omitted because the number of inmates in each category is 
very small.
0
It would be ideal to use rates in this analysis but 
data on the number of workers in each occupation are un­
obtainable .












while between 1860 and 1880 the marginalized workers' 
participation in theft increased (Table 7). With the 
exception of a decline in 1885, and a leveling off from 
1900 through 1910, both the proportion and absolute numbers 
marginalized workers detained for theft increased across 
the sixty-two years. Whereas it declined from the non- 
marginalized at least until 1890. After 1890, the p r o p o r ­
tion of theft arrests to the total increased for both c a t e ­
gories, but advances generally were most marked for 
marginalized workers. The gap between the two groups shows 
up most clearly by 1922 when nearly half of all marginalized 
workers' arrests were for theft, while these were only a 
fourth of the unmarginalized workers' total.
Furthermore, shifting crime patterns are as important 
as increases within a particular category of crime. In 
all years considered, except 1922, both marginalized and 
non-marginalized workers had more inmates at the casa 
for public order violaions than theft (excluding 1890 from 
consideration on the assumption that the public order 
offenders were sent elsewhere). However, the proportion 
of theft arrests to public order detentions among marginalized 
workers increased steadily after 1885, finally surpassing 
their disorder arrests in 1922, while the proportion of 
non-marginalized workers' theft arrests rose slowly after 
1885 toward the public order propotion, but never surpassed 
i t . (see Table 7.)
A closer look at the non-marginal occupations lends
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 4 9
Table 7: Proportion of Theft and Public Order Crimes
Among Economically Marginalized and Non-Marginalized Inmates 













1860 4 11 37 41
1870 13 9 13 48
1880 16 9 52 65
1885 5 4 66 67
1890 13 12 — —
1900 22 14 66 72
1910 21 21 27 38
1922 45 27 32 41
Average 18 13 44 52
Source: Livros de Entradas e Sahidas da Casa de
/V
Deten^ao de Rec
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additional support to the supposition that theft was a s ­
sociated with marginalization. Non-marginalized workers 
were clerks, business people, artisans, and household 
workers: all had a good deal of opportunity to steal.
A solid tradition in North American criminology (Cressey, 
1953; Cloward and Ohlin, 1950) suggests the hypothesis 
that workers coming into daily contact with money and 
valuables will have comparatively more arrests for theft 
than those relatively divorced from commercial exchange 
and from portable and valuable private property. While 
extremely plausible, however, that supposition is not 
uph e l d  by these data. In all periods except 1860, the 
marginalized segments of the population had proportionately 
more arrests for theft than workers with greater opportunity 
to steal. This suggests that something more than opportunity 
was behind their increases in arrests for theft.
Marginalization offers a more plausible explanation, 
because theft became more and more prevalent among workers 
who were increasingly stripped of their means of support, 
in contrast to those retaining their modes of subsistence.
It seems an appropriate conclusion that thievery was the 
most immediate means of survival in an environment totally 
lacking economic and social supports for the unemployed.
Violence
Rates of interpersonal violence and murder rose in 
the period (1890) immediately after the 1889 coup that




established Brazil's Republican Government,
1910, (See Chart A). These increases in vi 
during the years of turmoil that followed B 
independence from Portugal.
Recife was strife-torn in the nineties 
factions vied for the political positions v 
by the 1889 coup. Some of the political in 
in fact an outgrowth of certain aspects of 
neo-colonial rule. For example, one divisive strategy used in
the nineteenth century by Emperor Dom Pedro II was to
appoint a Province's President and its Chief of Police from 
rival political parties (See Hoffnagel, 1975). This created 
fierce factionalism at the provincial level, which facili­
tated rule from afar. By the time Brazil gained its 
Republican form of government, there was a well-established 
tradition of violent political factionalism, rekindled each 
time political offices opened up.
Political violence stretched into the first decades of 
the twentieth century. Levine (1979:82), reports that there 
was extensive political terror during the heated 1910-1911 
gubernatorial campaign. The struggle became so pervasive 
that Recife was placed under martial law for several days, 
businesses closed, the port was shut down and federal r e i n ­
forcements entered the city. Social and political disorgani-
; zation seems to have spawned violence during this, as in
?
{ the first period of political turmoil.
j  Only the millers, transportation workers, cyclically-
i
i
I employed day laborers, and artisans had increased arrests
and again in 
olence occurred 
razil's political
, as various 
acated or created 
fighting was 
colonial and
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for interpersonal violence during these periods of social 
and political unrest. T w o , or perhaps even three, of these 
segments of the Pernambucan population were the rural workers 
displaced by changes in the technology of sugar production.
It is possible that such uprooted workers were the most v u l ­
nerable to the political unrest of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.^
However, the turbulence of the late nineties and early
twentieth century was not restricted to the urban area;
2
it also escalated in the rural zone. Much of this rural
Many of these rural workers migrated to Recife in search 
of work. Instead of employment they found a city embroiled in 
political turmoil. One way to guarantee survival in a city 
torn apart by strife over political office was to join the 
private army of one of the political parties. However, one of 
the political factions had to face the fact that the police 
force was under the control of its political rival. It is 
likely that the losers in these battles over political office 
ended up on the house of detention for their attacks on p o l i t i ­
cal foes .
2
Two bursts of millenarianism occurred at this time.
The one ("Canudos") in Bahia, Pernambuco's neighbor to 
the south, formed around Antonio Conselheiro. The Canudos 
settlement posed such a threat (followers refused to acknowledge 
the authority of the new Republican Government) that federal 
troops were finally sent to destroy it. At about the same time, 
another social movement, led by Padre Cicero, began in Ceara, 
Pernambuco's neighbor to the north. By the first decade of 
the twentieth century, Padre Cicero had become an important 
political force and the entire state of Ceara had come under his 
c o n t r o l .
While these were broad-based, grass-roots social movements 
that m o bilized thousands, it would be difficult to argue that 
the conflict generated by them is reflected in the House of 
Detention data. An examination of the arrest locations listed 
in the house of detention referrals for 1890, the only sample 
period that would have captured these movements, showed only 
two arrests from the high sertao of Pernambuco near Crato- 
Joaseiro of Ceara, or near the Canudos encampment of Bahia.
Such arrests were clearly possible in the case of Canudos since 
Pernambuco sent a provisional police force to protect the cities 
along the Pernambucan border near Canudos (Mansagem, 1889). 
Perhaps, those arrested near Canudos never went as far as the 
Recife House of Detention (approximately 830 Km.).
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violence could have been linked to the broad changes in 
rural social organization.
In 1890, two elements of the mode of production were 
undergoing change: slavery had been abolished and the new
social relations of production between free laborers and 
employers were being worked out; during the same period, 
the second stage of mill modernization began.
Some Pernambucans gained from mill modernization, 
while others lost. Many of the free rural poor paid for 
modernization, through their impressment into the export 
sector. Eviction from plantation land was the price paid 
by others for the change in rural work organization. H o w ­
ever, the price exacted from free people was not without 
personal cost to landowners. According to Levine (1979:
30), many plantation dwellers did not passively accept 
eviction: landowners seldom left their houses without a
bodyguard for protection from angry squatters seeking to 
avenge personal dishonor for their indiscriminate eviction 
from plantation land.
It is possible that the 1890 increase in murder rates 
reflects this resistence to eviction and to forced labor 
arrests. It is notable that agricultural workers had a 
greater proportion of their arrests for murder than any 
other occupational group. Perhaps, some of the agricultural 
laborers detained for murder were angry plantaion dwellers 
stripped of land in the modernization process and/or forcibly 
impressed into the export sector workforce.
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Social Structure and Crime
Social Organization and Crime
Radical criminologists assume that crime is linked 
to class-based forms of social organization. It is a 
central premise of the radical perspective that the greater 
the inequality, the more prevalent is crime ("inequality 
hypothesis"). The assumption is that those deprived of 
the means of subsistence will use deviant means to secure 
t h e m .
The Pernambucan transformation to a quasi-capitalist 
mode of production provides an opportunity to test the 
inequality hypothesis. With the transition to wage labor, 
many rural dwellers lost the right to farm on plantation 
land. Modernization of the instruments of production 
eliminated work altogether for another segment of the 
rural work force.' Technological changes also brought a 
consolidation of land holdings.
Looking back at the house of detention referrals, we 
see that the people most likely to be referred for economic 
crime after the transformation came from the segments of 
the rural work force that had been marginalized in the 
modernization process.
However, we can also examine the inequality hypothesis 
by comparing crime rates and their peaks in the slave/feudal 
mode of production, with crime rates and their peaks
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under the quasi-capitalist system.^ If the predictions
of radical criminology are correct, rate increases should
be steeper and there should be more rate peaks in the
quasi-capitalist period than in the slave feudal.
Chart A shows that theft rates were higher and climbed
steadily after the transformation to a quasi-capitalist
mode of production; thefts peaked at only one point during
2
the slave-feudal period. Rates of violence increased 
sharply two times after the transformation, raising at 
only one point during the slave/feudal period and then more 
g r a d u a l l y .
Social Disorganization and Crime
A review of the true prevalence crime waves illustrates 
that all of the rate increases occurred during periods of 
social, economic, and/or political turmoil.
Violence rose during the forced military recruitment 
campaigns that disrupted the social organization of the 
countryside. Violence again increased immediately after
Such a comparison is, of course, predicted on the 
assumption that rate increases are true prevalence fluc t u a ­
tions .
2
The inequality hypothesis gains further substantive 
support from the one pre-transformation increase in theft.
The only time that thefts were high before the transformation 
was during the great drought, a period when thousands of 
backlands dwellers' were suddenly thrown into a fierce struggle 
for survival by a climatic disaster.
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the coup that ushered in Brazil's Republic, and during the 
factional fighting of the 1910-1911 election campaign.
Thefts rose during (Cuniff, 1970) and after the great 
drought which uprooted thousands of rural P e r n a m b u c a n s .
Theft rates climbed again during the transformation which 
modified the centuries-old structure of plantation o r g a n i z a ­
tion .
Conelus ions
This study used elements of both social organization 
and disorganization theory to understand the relationship 
between social structure and crime in Pernambuco. The 
data lent support to both approaches. Deep-cutting, d i s ­
ruptive changes produced crime in both the slave/feudal 
and quasi-capitalist modes of production. At the same 
time, crime increased with the increases in socially- 
structured inequality.
This research suggests that economic crime is some­
what more sensitive to changes in the distribution and 
control of material resources than is violent crime. H o w ­
ever, further research should attempt to more clearly 
delineate the crimes most sensitive to variations in r e ­
source distribution and control. It would also be i n t e r e s t ­
ing to know if rapid change affects criminality more than 
socially-structured inequality. A study which could d i f ­
ferentiate between these two conditions would contribute 
a great deal to criminology theory.
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CHAPTER VI
LESSONS FROM PERNAMBUCO FOR THE 
POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF SOCIAL 
CONTROL AND CRIME
This study makes three contributions to the literature 
on social control and crime. The first is to demonstrate 
two approaches to the analysis of social control. One 
approach seeks the material roots of social control, while 
the other isolates the function of social control in s t r u c ­
tural change. Both approaches use change as a central 
variable; however, they place it in opposite causal p o s i ­
tions: the analysis of the material determinants of social
control illustrates how changes in material resources affect 
the form and content of social regulation, while the descrip 
tion of the consequences of social control shows how social 
control promoted structural change.
From the examination of social control we move to an 
analysis of crime. The study of Pernambucan crime can 
contribute to criminology by its demonstration of two causes 
of fluctuations in crime rates. In one set of statistics, 
the rate fluctuations are an artifact of changing political 
priorities; in the other, they are the product of real i n ­
creases in criminality.
Linsky (1979) labels the first of these two types of 
rate fluctuations "moral passage" changes and the second, 
"true prevalence" rate fluctuations. Linsky's distinction
157
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is useful because it helps sensitize researchers to the 
problems of interpretation in using official crime sta t i s ­
tics. Moreover, these different kinds of rate fluctuations 
suggest different theories about the socio-structural sources 
of c r i m e .
The final contribution of this research is to stress 
the role of power and group conflict in crime and social 
control. By over-emphasizing the power of the dominant group, 
many studies of crime mask the intergroup conflict implicit 
in crime and its control. The struggles during Pernambuco's 
transition highlight the class tension inherent in crime and 
control, and suggest that crime is more than a simple process 
of powerful actors imposing deviant labels on less powerful 
ones. In fact, social control and at least some forms of 
criminality may suggest elite vulnerability in the face of 
direct and indirect challenges by less powerful segments of 
the population.
But Pernambuco's transition does provide insight into 
the role of power in crime and social control. In the first 
place, state-initiated social control functioned to promote 
the interests of the planter class. More specifically, law 
and public policy were deliberately enacted to serve the 
interests of those who controlled the principal economic 
r e s o u r c e s .
Moreover, the Pernambucan data suggest an interesting
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 5 9
relationship between crime and the maximizing of elite / '
interests. The chapters on moral passage crime argue that 
powerful actors created crime in order to promote their 
interests, while the chapter on true prevalence crime 
indicates that in pursuing their interests, powerful groups 
frequently induced others' criminal behavior.
These contributions will be elaborated in the follow­
ing pages.
Two Sides of Social Control
Material Roots of Social Regulation
The best socio-historical studies of the material 
roots of social control are by Chambliss (1964 ) and Reusch 
and Kirkhheimer (1968). Chambliss showed how shifts in labor 
supply and demand influenced the*’focus and content of vagrancy 
laws in Europe and North America, while Reusch and Kirkhheimer 
related the changing types of penal punishment to such material 
factors as labor supply and the degree of impoverishment of 
the population.
Changing levels of material resources also influenced 
the amount and type of social control during Pernambuco's 
labor transition. Gusfield's concept of a moral passage 
captured the impact of this resource depletion on social 
control during the transition. There were two stages in 
Pernambuco's nineteenth century moral passage, each associated
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with a different state of resource depletion and different 
ways of coping with it.
The labor scarcity phase of the moral passage began with 
the cessation of the African slave trade. At that time, planters 
equated labor scarcity with a shortage of slaves not an i nsuf­
ficiency of free workers. During this phase, informal p l a n t a ­
tion-based strategies of labor recruitment predominated. V7hen 
state intervention appeared, it was directed at limiting the 
slave drain rather than pulling the free p opulation into cash 
crop production. In order to guarantee a sufficient number 
of slaves for the plantation sector, the provincial government 
imposed taxes on slaves sold to the Center-south of Brazil, 
and applied pressure on slave owners to use their bondsmen 
in plantation agriculture rather than in urban occupations.
So long as slaves were still relatively plentiful, there 
was no need to pull the free marginal population into p l a n t a ­
tion agriculture. However, with the simultaneous decline of 
the slave population and fall in world sugar prices in the 
1880's, planters could no longer afford to have free workers 
engage in activity that did not produce wealth. Consequently, 
being free and without work, having irregular work habits, or 
simply moving around too much became problems for the planters 
and therefore for the lawmakers and police.
Thus it was the combination of falling sugar prices and 
an insufficiency of cheap labor that created the labor problems
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phase of the moral passage. During this period, state- 
initiated repression replaced many of the traditional mechanisms 
of labor recruitment and regulation. Punitive arrests became 
a central mechanism of labor recruitment, while forced labor 
laws and agricultural correctional facilities enforced work 
d i s c i p l i n e .
Social Control and Structural Change
Pernambuco's transformation from a slave-based to a 
quasi-capitalist mode of production involved much more than 
the shift from slave to free labor. At the very least, such 
structural transformations include profound changes in the 
social organization of work, and in the instruments of p r o ­
duction. Social control promoted one aspect of this larger 
transformation by restructuring the social relations of 
production between free workers and landowners.
In other words, the transformation did not just mean 
replacing slaves with free laborers; it meant turning feudally- 
organized free workers into cash-crop producers. Such a change 
in work organization could not be accomplished without altering 
the free populations 1 relationship to landowners and to the 
land. The long-run success of that operation turned on c r e a t ­
ing new structural mechanisms to extract surplus labor from 
free workers.
Feudal rent requirements had provided an excellent 
mechanism for extracting part-time labor from freeholders,
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but such arrangements checked the landowners' power over this 
work force once free labor had become the dominant mode. As 
long as free people retained squatting rights through rent 
payments they had an alternative to wage labor on sugar p l a n t a ­
tions. By separating free plantation dwellers from the soil 
and making them dependent on wages for survival, planters could 
gain greater control over the plantation work force.
Such control strategies as eviction from plantation land, 
strict work contracts, and arrests for labor recruitment p r o ­
moted the structural transformation by guaranteeing landowners 
an abundant supply of cheap labor. Argicultural correctional 
facilities and beggars' asylums helped redefine the social 
relations of production between free workers and the landowners.
However, in the last analysis, direct repression against 
a workforce is less efficient than the broader structural 
mechanisms of social control.^ For example, the wage r e l a t i o n ­
ship coerces labor in a more subtle and lasting fashion (Chapter
^Historically, both the wage relationship and most 
technological innovations have been introduced as improvements 
in the workers' condition and, hence, have augumented the 
legitimacy of the elite and the state. Repression, on the 
other hand, has the potential of calling this legitimacy into 
question. Thus, the switch to wages and the implementation of 
labor-saving technology have served the directors of production 
by providing increased control over the workforce while adding 
legitimacy to the political structures that support and p e r ­
petuate their positions of power.
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than daily police action against an unwilling squatter 
population. An equally efficient indirect structural 
m e chanism of social control is labor-saving technology. When 
technology can perform human labor, workers who won't play 
by the employer's rules can be replaced by machines, or by more 
willing workers displaced from other jobs by technology.
Thus, direct forms of repression provided the initial 
force for the transformation, while the structural mechanisms 
of control cemented the new social relations of production 
between free workers and employers.
The Dual Nature of Crime
Social Control and Crime
Linsky argues that increases in crime rates can result 
from at least two factors. Variations can be due to changes 
in the definition and treatment of some behavior or condition, 
or crime rates can fluctuate in accordance with real changes 
in the behavior of the population. Moral passage crime is 
the label given to the fluctuations in the crime rates which 
result from shifts in social control priorities and strategies.
Pernambuco's moral passage crime grew out of a redefinition 
of marginality. Free marginals were not a creation of the 
nineteenth c e n t u r y ; marginality had been endemic to free status 
as long as slaves were the dominant labor force in the export 
sector. O f f i c i a l s ’ original lack of attention to the free 
marginal population was due to the labor requirements of the 
sugar industry being met by slaves. Once slaves become scarce,
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free people who were outside the export sector were recast 
as vagrants and idlers. The fluctuations in public order 
arrests ("moral passage" crime) reflect this change in the 
elite view of marginality.
Social Structure and Crime
Some of the data on true prevalence crime in Pernambuco 
suggest that in maximizing their interests, powerful groups 
created more crime. For example, the modern sugar refineries 
of the 1890's resolved some of the economic problems of the 
planters by reducing the costs of sugar production. At the 
same time, however, this labor-saving technology displaced 
a large segment of the pl an t a t i o n  work force. The data on 
crime suggest that thefts increased most among those segments 
of the Pernambucan po pul ation  that had been displaced by this 
labor-saving technology.
When variations in crime rates reflect real increases 
in criminality they are labeled true prevalnce changes 
(Linsky, 1979) . Such increases in crime are assumed to be the 
product of specifiable soc io-structural conditions. Both the 
argument for social di sorganizat ion as a determ inant of such 
crime, and the radical criminologists' perspective on social 
or gan ization suggest general hypotheses on the more proximate 
conditions for such true pr eva len ce changes in crime rates.
Radical criminology hypothesizes that the greater the 
inequality of resource distribution, the more prevalent is 
criminality. The data on Pernambucan crime suggest that, 
as the mode of production changed from slave/feudal to
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quasi-capitalist, certain kinds of criminality increased. It 
appears that elevated crime rates for theft were associated 
with this increase in sociall y-structured inequality.
Social disorganization theory on the other hand; h y p o ­
thesizes a relationship betwee n social change and crime. The 
data indicate that deepcutting crises in Pernambuco were 
associated with increases in theft and violence in both the slave/ 
feudal and quasi-capitalist modes of production, as well as 
during the transition from one mode of p ro du ction to another.
Power and Conflict in Crime and Social Control
This research has emphasized repression against the 
Pernambucan population; however, the increases in repression 
suggest that free men and women did not pass ively submit to 
planters' demands. Such things as proposals for forced labor 
laws, arrests for vagrancy, agricultural correctional facilities, 
and beggars' asylums are indicative of conflict. They are a 
reminder that the labor transition did not pit a totally p o w e r ­
less free popul ation against an all-powerful landed elite.
While it is true that the squatters' individual power was 
both much less and far more vulnerable than landowners', the 
troublemaking potential of the rural poor lay in many of them 
retaining squatting rights while landowners were trying to mold 
such free workers into a rural proletariat. Workers with land 
had an alternative to subsistence wages and were slow to become 
the kind of labor force planters demanded.
By refusing to participate in Pernambuco's export sector
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as slavery declined, free people contributed to the erosion 
of planters' resources; without a large work force, production 
could not expand to compensate for low sugar prices. Those 
conditions turned the free p o pu la tion into a social expense.
In Pernambuco, the threat to wealth  accumulation was met by 
repressive social control: repression  promoted the transition
to free labor and turned the social debts back into assets.
Conclusions
Laws and coercive structures in the Pernambucan case have 
been shown to be the result of conflict between groups with 
opposing economic and political interests. These laws, and 
the correctional facilities which put teeth into them, helped 
landowners find a way to overcome the inhibitions that the 
feudal mode of production had placed on their power over the 
free labor force.
Thus, both crime and control grew out of attempts to 
resolve basic contraditions which were built into the political 
economic or gan izati on of ninete enth-cent ury Pernambuco. 
Chambliss (1964 : 111 ) maintains that seeing crime as "a matter 
of dilemmas and resolutions makes the people who create the 
laws as well as those who violate them active parti cipants 
in the social world that is both their doing and their undoing.
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APPENDIX A
Essay on Sources
Although a number of classic works on Brazil were used 
in this research, only studies of the Brazilian Northeast, 
Pernambuco, and Recife are discussed in this essay. The author 
hopes this summary of the available data sources will stimu­
late other research on Northeastern Brazil and Pernambuco.
The research model has six variables. Both primary 
and secondary sources provide data on the variables. Se c o n d ­
ary data are the foundation for variables one (material r e ­
sources) and variable three (t echnology). Primary sources 
illustrate variables two (social control), four and six (moral 
passage and true prevalence c r i m e ) ; both primary and secondary 
sources are used to describe the transformation of the mode 
of production (V-5).
The most useful secondary sources on life in nineteenth- 
century Pernambuco are by Peter Eisenberg, The Sugar Industry 
in Pernambuco (1974) and Robert Levine (1979) , Pernambuco in 
the Brazilian F e d e r a t i o n , 1 8 3 9 - 1 9 3 7 . Eisenberg focuses on
the sugar industry, rural social and political organization, 
and labor; Levine covers a broad range of subjects, placing 
special emphasis on Pernambucan politics. Periera da Costa's 
Anais Pernambucanos (1962) and Francisco Pacifico do Amaral's
V
Escavacoes (1974) provide a brief introduction to a large 
number of subjects relevant to Pernambucan history.
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Marc H o f f n a g e l 1s unpublished doctoral dissertation, 
"Prom Monarchy to Republic in Northeast Brazil: The case
of Pernambuco, 1868-1895" (1975) provides an in depth study
of nineteenth century Per nambucan politics. Also on the 
subject of politics, including interpersonal violence and 
sensational crimes in Pernambuco, is Oscar Melo's Recife 
Sangrento (1970). Roger Cuniff's study of the great drought, 
"The Great Drought in Northeast Brazil, 1877-1880" (1970)
shows how Northeastern state and municipal governments r e ­
sponded to a large-scale nineteenth century disaster.
Jaime Reis' two unpublished manuscripts, "The Realm 
of the Hoe: Plantation Agriculture in Pernambuco Before and
i» A
After the Abolition of Slavery" (n.d.a.) and "from Bangue 
to Usina" (n.d.a.), and his published article, "Abolition 
and the Economics of Sla ve-Holidng in North East Brazil" 
(1974), provide a wealth of information about Pernambucan 
slavery, and nineteenth and early twentieth century rural 
modernization. J. H. Galloway analyzes the Pernambucan 
sugar industry and its workers in his articles, "The Sugar 
Industry in Pernambuco During the Nineteenth Century" (1958) 
and "The Last Years of Slavery on The Sugar Plantations of 
Northeastern Brazil" (1971) . Finally, David Denslow's un ­
published doctoral dissertation, "Sugar Production in 
Northeastern Brazil and Cuba, 1858-1908" (1974) is an e x ­
tremely useful complement to Peter Eisenberg's in-depth 
study of the Pernambucan sugar industry.
For a picture of more recent northeastern social
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organization, especially with respect to labor, Manuel Correia 
de Andrade's A Terra e o Homem No Nordeste (1964) is excellent. 
Josue de Castro's Death in the Northeast (1966) and Joseph 
Page's, The Revolution That Never Was (1972) tell of the 
twentieth century n o r t h e a s t e r n e r 1s daily struggle to survive. 
Eisenberg (1974) is useful for nineteenth century rural society 
and work organization; Caio Prado's The Colonial Background 
of Modern Brazil (1967) describes colonial social organization.
Stuart Schwartz writes about rural workers in Pernambuco's 
neighbor to the south, Bahia, in "Free Labor in a Slave Economy: 
The Lavradores de Cana of Colonial Brazil" (1973a). Billy 
Janes Chandles describes nineteenth century rural social 
organization in Pernambuco's northern neighbor, Ceara, in his 
monograph T h e Feitosas and the Sertao dos I n h a m u n s ; The 
History of A Family and A Community in Northeast B r a z i l , 1700- 
1 9 3 0 . (1972)
Finally, no picutre of Brazilian life is complete w i t h ­
out the works of the Nordestino author, Gilberto Freyre.
However, the reader must be aware that F r e y r e 's devotion to 
the Brazilian northeast is frequently translated into an 
idealized picture of life there. Several of Freyre's books 
were useful for background on the Northeast. The Masters 
and the Slaves (194 6); The Mans ions and the Shanties (1963) ; 
N o r d e s t e : Aspectos de Inf luencia da Canna Sobre a Vida e_
a Paizagem do Nordeste do Brazil (19 37) ; and B r a z i 1 , An 
Interpretation (1945) .
This study joins the fields of law, penology, and law
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enforcement, besides dealing with Pernambucan labor history.
The most useful secondary sources on Brazilian Penal law are 
the Brazilian penal codes Codigo Penal do Brazil (1830) , (1890) ,
and Ruy Rebello Pinho's A Historia de Direito Penal Brasileiro 
(1973). Evaristo de Moraes (1923) describes the development 
of Brazilian penal philosophy, criminal law, and the growth 
of prisons in Instituicoes Penitenciarias No B r a z i l . Jose 
Paes de Andrade's 0 Nosso 14 de Julho (1975) tells the history 
of the Recife House of Detention from construction to d i s ­
establishment in 1974. Stuart Schwartz (1973) describes the 
colonial court system in Sovereignty and Society in Colonial 
B r a z i l . The most thorough historical study of the Brazilian 
Police from Colonial times to the present is Heloisa Fernandes' 
Politica e^  Seguranga forga Publiea do Estado de Sao Paulo (1974), 
Fernandes writes about Sao Paulo, but Martha Huggins' u n p u b ­
lished historical study "Historical Development of the Police 
in Pernambuco" (1979) suggests that F e r n a n d e s ’ study is a p ­
plicable to the Pernambucan context. The Huggins' study 
examines the political and economic factors pre cipitating 
the formation and disbanding of various Pernambucan Police 
Forces between 1850 and 1922.
Besides the secondary sources obtainable in the United 
States, this research utilized a number of manuscripts, 
governmental reports, criminal statistics, and law books found 
only in Brazil. Primary sources were the foundation for the 
social control and crime variables. The most original data 
sources in this research (from the standpoint of original
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
research on Pernambuco) is the entry logs of the Recife 
House of Detention (Casa de Dentengao do R e c i f e ) . The logs 
(Livros de Entradas e^ Shaidas da Casa de D e t e n c a o ) were used 
with the permission of the Secretary of Justice of the State 
of Pernambuco, Sergio Higenio Filho.
The logs were official entry registers for those co m ­
mitted to the casa. They contain information about each 
person detained in the house of detent ion.^  Along with the 
inmate's name, physical description, and crime,the log lists 
the length of detention, inmate's occupation, birthplace, 
and other information about the prisoner's marital and family 
s t a t u s .
Since the logs privide information about an incarcerated 
population, researchers might consider them comparable to 
prison statistics. Actually, however, the logs correspond 
more closely to arrest statistics than to prison records.
The researcher's use of house of detention referrals as a 
type of arrest statistic is justified by certain facts 
concerning the operation of the criminal justice system of 
nineteenth century Pernambuco. In the first place, many 
cases of deviance did not even become public record, since 
problems were handled directly by the injured party. Aside 
from that, anyone considered by an appropriate official or 
powerful citizen sufficiently deviant to accuse of criminal 
activity was taken to the House of Detention; after being 
held, the inmate was usually released without trial.
^Logs covering a sixty-two year period were sampled.
The years sampled and the sampling framework are discussed 
in Chapter Four.
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The logs of the House of Detention are stored in the 
archive of the Penitentiaria Ag ric ola  de I t a m a r a c a , an 
agricultural prison located on the shore island of Itamaraca 
about one hour from Pernambuco's capital, Recife.'*'
Casa logs provided one view of the formal social con­
trol apparatus and its criminals; the author obtained another 
while collecting data at the agricultural prison. The period 
spent at the prison gave opp ortunity for informal contact 
with prisoners, guards, and officials, and some observation 
of prison life. The data anlaysis will benefit from weaving 
impressions of the present with the archival record of the 
p a s t .
Another phase of data collection took the researcher 
to the archive of the Recife branch of the Secretaria de 
Seguranga P u b 1ica (Security Police) . Those visits turned 
up very little archival material of use in the study but 
provided invaluable insights into the operation of a twentieth 
century police force. Visits to jails in the interior of 
the state, and informal interviews with judges, prison of­
ficials, and police added to the researcher's sense of the 
formal and informal aspects of the state's twentieth century 
correctional philosophy. Finally, some idea of the original 
character of the former Casa de Detencao could still be 
obtained from a visit there, although it is now an historical
^Two days a week were devoted to data collection; with 
the help of two paid prisoners, the data were collected in 
one year.
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site, transformed into a series of gift shops and restaurants
Casa logs provided a great deal of information about 
crime and criminals but they said very little about the plans 
formal policies, and programs of Per nambucan politicans and 
social control agencies. Since the second variable looks 
at the role of social control in the labor transition, k n o w ­
ledge of social control strategies was essential. Some of 
the most useful information about social control came from 
the yearly reports of the President of the Province of 
Pernambuco^ (F a l l a s ). These reports (F a l l a , M e n s a g e m ,
R e l a t o r i o ) contain information about the provincial/state 
budget, new correctional and charity facilities, educational 
reports, police problems and programs, yearly crime s t a t i s ­
tics, conditions of jails and prisons, and any other e x c e p ­
tional occurrences during the year. In order to capture 
yearly changes, I examined all the Fallas and Mensagems 
between 1850 and 1922.
The collection of the Presidential/Governors' reports 
in the Arquivo Publico do Recife (Recife Public Archives) 
is fairly complete from the 1860's on; earlier volumes are 
at the Facaldade de direito do Recife (Recife Law School) .
The news and editorials in the Jornal do Recife and 
Diario de Pernambuco (state newspapers) provided a wealth
^After 1390 these were the reports of the Governor 
of the state (M e n s a g e m s ).
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of information about the transition from slave to free labor, 
and the plans and programs of planters and politicians. B o u n d  
volumes of both newspapers are housed in the Arquivo Publico. 
The Archive's collection of both newspaper's is failrly com ­
plete for the nineteenth century.
Finally, a study of crime and social control is incom­
plete without penal codes and State Law books. The Recife 
Law School has a complete set of penal codes;'1' between the 
law school and the public archive all the annually published 
law books from the mid-n inete enth century can be obtained.
Most students of Nineteenth Century Criminal law need only 
look at the 1830 and 1890 Penal Codes. In 1830, Brazil's
first Penal Code went into effect; for 330 years (1500-1830)
2
the laws of Portugal were the criminal law. The Brazilian 
Penal Code wenth through its second major revision in 1890 
with the birth of the Republic.
The Penal Codes are an invaluable source for criminal 
law, but they do not record changes at the regional level 
between revisions. The best place to look for yearly changes 
in criminal laws are the Pro vincial/State level is Leis do
^The Harvard University Law Library also has the 1830 
and 1890 Penal Codes.
^The Ordenacoes Alfonsinas were the law in Brazil after 
her discovery. The O r d enacges Manolinas directed Brazilian 
Law for about ninety years. The Ordenacoes Filipinas for more 
than two centuries.
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Estado de Pernambuco (Laws of the State.of Pernambuco). Bound 
volumes of the Leis are in the Recife Law School and Public 
Archive. All volumes for the sampled period were consulted.
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APPENDIX B
LISTED CAUSES FOR DETENTION IN 
RECIFE HOUSE OF DETENTION DURING 
SELECTED YEARS, 1860-1922 
(CATEGORIZED BY OFFENSE TYPE)
Interpersonal Violence
1. amaejas, insultos (verbal threats, slander, verbal abuse)
2. d e f l o r a m e n t o , rapto, estupro (rape)
3. ferimentos, e s p a n c a m e n t o , offensas physicas, violencia, 
agressao (wounding with or without bloodshed, physical 
offenses, violence, aggression)
4. roubo (robbery, theft with violence)
Murder
1. homicidio, assassinato, crime de morte (homicide, murder) 
Property Crimes
1. estellionato (swindles, fraud, embezzlement)
A
2. falencia (bankruptcy)
3. furto, ladrao, larapio (theft/without violence)
4. gatuno (theft without violence)
5. modea falsa (counterfeiting)
Public Order Crimes 
\ /
1. a moral publica (crimes against public order)
2. ajuntamento illicito (disturbing public order)
3. aramas defezas, usa de... (use of defensive or other 
prohib ite d weapons)
4. arrombamento (jail-breaking)
5. arrauceiro (rowdiness, street rioting)
176
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6. briga (fighting)
7. capoeiragem (a type of marital art)
8. catimbozeiro (sorcery)
9. dano (destruction of public property)
10. desobediencia (disobedience)
11. desordem (disorder)
12. devassidao (debauchery, loose morals, prostitution)
13. disturbios (creating disturbances)
14. ebrio, embriaguez (drunkenness)
15. embriaguez e desordem (drunk and disorderly behavior)
16. fora d'horas, a n d a r . . . (breaking curfew)
17. fugido (running away)
18. indiciplina (indiscipline)
19. jogos prohibidos (prohibited forms of gambling)
20. prostituta, meretris (prostitution)
21. resistencia (resisting authority)




1. a disposiyao do juiz (judicial order)
*
2. a requisiyao da policia, consul, etc. (request of police, 
consul, or other public official)
3. a requisiyao do senhor (request of the owner)
4. ate pode v e n f i c a r  verdade condijao (verifying true 
slave/free status)
5. atestado ao poder (attempted assassination)
6. atestado falso (falsifying election credentials)
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7. averiguaj&es (police questioning)
A w
8. a xnfracyao da casa (breaking the casa regulations)
9. condenado (condemned)
10. correcjao (corrective treatment)
11. criminoso (criminal behavior)
12. custodia (custody)
13. desertor (desertion from the army)
An#
14. infracjao de posturas (breaking city ordinances)
15. louco, alienado (insanity)
16. perjuria (perjury)
17. prisoner of war
18. recruta (army recruitment)
19. resistencia (resist authority)
20. sedi^ao (sedition)
21. sem delcarapao do motivo (without declaration of cause)
22. sem parte (without formal complaint)
23. suspeita (suspicion













A P P E N D I X  C* 1
Occupations of Inflates in the Recife House of Detention 
For Selected Years, 1860-1922
I* ARTISAN II. MANUAL III. BUSINESS XV. "CIVIL
(NON ARTISAN) CLERICAL SERVICE"
001 encadernador 030 mestre de assucar 050 baracheiro 070 pharmaceutico 090 trafego do porto
002 assentador 031 typografo 051 guarda freio 071 guarda livros 091 militar
003 ourIves 032 purgador 053 fogueteiro 072 f.eltor 092 marinheiro
004 caplnteiro 033 ref inador 054 tintueiro 073 negoc iante 093 pra^a
005 celleiro 034 caldereiro 055 operario 074 commerciante/commercio 094 mar ti jo
006 cartes 035 eletricista 056 maritime 075 negocio 095 bombeiro
007 ferreiro 036 marquinista 057 estivador 076 caxe iro/cacheiro 096 granadeiro
008 aflaite 037 padeiro 058 embarcadisso 077 datil<£grapho 097 correio
009 marcineiro 038 cunhador 059 foguista 078 bilheteiro 098 funcion^iro publico
010 pedreiro 039 oleiro 060 servente de.. 079 comneccilrio 099 cassaco de bondes
Oil litografia/litografo 040 funileiro 061 empregado 080 gazeteiro 087 official de justi^a
012 raarmorlsta 041 aerrador 065 pescador/pescaria 081 barraqueiro
013 chapeloiro 042 tanoeiro 066 estudacor 082 qultande ira
014 entalhador 043 serralheiro 068 vaqueiro 083 maeca te/neg.ambulante
015 charuteiro 044 ferrador 084 verdueiro
016 empalhador 045 cigarreiro 085 peixe iro/pombeiro
017 carpina 046 carvoeiro 086 vigia, garda
018 costureira 047 tnArgaref e 088 horteleiro
019 cabelleiro 048 suineiro





V. NON-DOMESTIC VI. AGRICULTURAL VII- DOMESTIC VIII . DAY LABORERS
SERVICE WORKER SERVICE
100 barcacelra 113 caplnheiro 052 lavrador 120 criado 062 gahhador
101 carreiro 114 cocheiro 064 agricultor 121 criado de servir 063 jornale iro
102 canoeiro 115 prostituta/meretris 067 canaveiro 122 copeiro
103 boleiro 123 engomadeira
104 catraiero 124 lavadeira IX. WITHOUT OCCUPATION
105 remador 125 ana
106 carciro 126 easiera 140 mendlgo
107 carraceiro 127 servente 141 vaqabundo
108 almocreve 128 servente domestico 142 sem oficio
109 estr ibeiro/estr iveiro 129 empregada 143 sem occupajao
110 engrachate/engtaxador 130 arrumador















A P P E N D I X  C.2
Occupations of Inmates in the Recife House of Detention 
For Selected Years, 1860-1922 
(Translated)
I. ARTISAN II. MANUAL 
(NON ARTISAN) III .BUSINESSCLERICAL
IV. <CIVIL
SERVICE
001 Book binder 030 Master sugar maker. 050 Boat rower 070 Pharmacist 090 Harbor master/
002 Places ciosiac on brick processer 051 Lineman 071 Bookkepper assistant
003 Goldsmith 031 Type setter 053 Fireworks maker 072 Administra tor/factor 091 Soldier (military)
004 Carpenter 032 Sugar purger/refiner 054 Clothes dyer 073 Business person 092 Mariner (military)
005 Harness maker 033 Sugar refiner 055 Opera tive 074 Merchant 093 Soldier (provincial,
006 Label maker 034 Sugar boiler room 056 Sailor/Mariner 075 Small business person federal)
007 Blacksmith worker (non-military 076 Counter Clerk 094 Mariner
008 Tailor 035 Electrician 057 Steveador 077 Typist 095 Fireman
009 Cabinet maker 036 Locomotive Conductor/ 058 Sea farer 078 Ticket seller/taker 096 Soldier
010 Mason Assistant 059 Stoker of loco­ 079 Merchant 097 Mail carrier
011 Li thographer 037 Baker motive or usina 080 Newspaper seller 098 Public Functionary
012 Marbel cutter 038 Mintei/makes metal 060 Servant of .... 081 Vender in a stall 099 Cleaner/Guard of
013 Hat maker for saddles (some skilled worker)082 Green grocer the Tramways
014 Wood carver/Engraver 039 Brick maker 061 Employee 083 Peddler
015 Cigar maker 040 Tin smith 065 Fi sherman 084 Vegetable seller
016 Chair seat stuffer 041 Prepares wood for 066 Plasterer 085 Fisherman
017 Assistant to carpenter carpenter 068 Cowboy 086 Guard, sentry
018 Seamstress 042 Cooper 087 Justice official
019 Hairdresser 043 Locksmith
020 Barber 044 Blacksmith
021 Shoesmith 045 Cigarette maker/
022 Maker of wooden shoes worker
023 Chaulker (usually boats) 046 Charcoal maker
024 Musician 047 Butcher
048 Pig raiser
049 Painter
V. NON-DOMESTIC VI . AGRICULTURAL VII. DOMESTIC
SERVICE WORKER SERVICE
100 Boat rower 111 Bag carrier 052 Planter/ renter on 120 Maid/man servant
101 Pack horse driver 112 Water carrier leased land 121 Maid man servant
102 Canoeman 113 Can Field clearer 064 Agricultural worker 122 Butler/waiter
103 Coachman 114 Coachman 067 Overseer of Cane Fields 123 Ironer
104 Boa tman 115 Prost i tute 124 Laundress
105 Boa trower 125 Nursemaid/wet nurse
106 Boatrower 1 26 Housekeepe r/ca re ta ker
107 Cart driver 127 Servant
108 Muleteer 128 Maid
109 Stablemaster 129 Mail








APPENDIX D: CODE SHEET
Livros de Entradas e Sahidas Dos Prezos Da 
Casa De Detenc^o
1. 0 seu nome (
2. Data de hoje (
3. VarOOl: Titulo do livro (
4. V a r 0 0 2 ; Cidade onde o livro esta localizado ( 
numero 2)
5. Os anos encontrados no livro (
6. V a r 0 0 7 : Condijao (_______________
) (dia , m e s , and)
<•
 ) (use o numero 2 )
 ) (use




8. 0 nome do criminoso (
9. Filiajiao (______________
10. V a r 013:
11. Var0015













14. Var015: Occupa^ao ou profis sao  (
INDIQUE SE HOUVER OUTRA 
RESPOSTA
15. Estatura (escreve no outro lado do papell
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16. Por quem foi conduzido (
17. A ordem de quem foi preso e se acha a d i s p o s i c a o (
18. Var009: Nota da culpa ou motivo (
19. VarOlO: Data de sahidas (dia, mes, ano) (_______________ )
20. VarOll: Data de entrada (dia, mes,ano) ( _________________)
/////. ///// ///// ///// /////
21. Var012: length of time in prison (VarOlO-VarOll]
_///// ///// ///// ///// /////
22. Var016: 0 criminoso nasceu (________________) l=Legitimo
2=Illegitimo 
(natural)
23. V a r 0 1 1 4 : Sexo (______________ ) 1=M
2 = F
 ///// ///// ///// ///// /////
m=saSBlIek-
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AP P E N D I X  E
LIST OF CRIMES FOR W H I C H  PEOPLE WERE R E F E R R E D  TO 
THE RECIFE HO USE OF D E T E N T I O N 1
Crime Number Percent
Against Pu b l i c  Morality 607 4 . 0
(Includes pro stit ution )  
Breaking a City Ordina nce 47 . 3
(U n s p e c i f i e d )
Breaking and Entering 7 0 . 0
Breaking C u r f e w  (slave) 31 . 2
Breaking the regul ations of 
the House of Det ention 7 o : 0
Capo ei ra gem 81 . 6
Correction 13 . 1
Criminal 154 1. 0
Deserter 21 . 1
D es tr uction  of Public Pr opert y 13 . 1
Diso be dien ce 47 . 3
Disorder 1600 11 . 0
Di s turbance s 2519 18 . 0
Di sturbing the Public Order 21 . 1
Drunk and Dis o r d e r l y 42 . 3
Drunkenness 806 6 . 0
Embezzleme nt 94 . 7
Falsifying an Election 13 . 1
Fighting 323 2 . 0
Held as Army Recruit 180 1 . 0
Held for Cu stody 8 . 1
Held for Qu e s t i o n i n g 31 . 2
Held to V e r i f y  Slave/Free Status 14 . 1
Homicide 789 6 .0
Illegal G a m b l i n g 180 . 2
Imprisoned at the request of 
the Consul, Police 112 . 8
Imprisoned at the request of 
the Master 149 1.0
Imprisoned wi thout formal 
complaint 991 7.0
F o r t y - s i x  d i f f e r e n t  c a t e q o r i . e s  a r e  l i s t e d  i n  A p p e n d i x  E .  
H o w e v e r ,  o n l y  f o r t y - f i v e  o f  t h e s e  w e r e  u s e d  w h e n  t h e  c r i m e s  
w e r e  r e - c o d e d .  T h e  c a s e s  w h e r e  n o  m o t i v e s  f o r  a r r e s t  w e r e  
g i v e n  w e r e  p u t  i n  t h e  " o t h e r "  c a t e g o r y .
183
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Crime Number Percent
Insanity 1094 8 . 0
Jail Breaking 33 . 2
M aki ng Cou nt er feit Money 13 . 1
Motiv e Omitted 120 .8
Physical Aggress io n 725 5: o
Pr isoner of war 33 . 2
Rape 234 2 . 0
Re sistance 14 . 1
Robber y 147 1. 0
Runawa y (slave) 95 . 7
Sediti on 7 0.0
Sorcerer 33 . 2
Suspect 33 . 2
Su sp ec ted of Being a Slave 21 . 1
Theft 2249 16.0
Us ing  De fensi ve Arms 120 . 8
V a g ab ond 319 2.0
Verbal Abuse 196 1.0
14.3861 99.7
Total nu mber of inmates less than Table 1, Ch apt er III 
bec ause "other" category was omitted.
2
Less than one hu nd red pe rce nt due to ro un ding errors.
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